

Neil MacNeil Reporting on Everett McKinley Dirksen

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2016

Neil MacNeil (1923-2008)

The Bronx-born MacNeil arrived in Washington in 1949 to report on Congress for the United Press. He worked for *Time* from 1958 until his retirement in 1987. In 1964, MacNeil became one of the first congressional correspondents on television. He began delivering weekly news and commentary about Congress on WETA, a public television station in Washington. His program, "Neil MacNeil Reports," continued until 1967, when the station originated "Washington Week in Review," on which Mr. MacNeil frequently appeared as a commentator. The program was broadcast nationally by the Public Broadcasting Service. He wrote three books: *Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives*, 1963; *Dirksen: Portrait of a Public Man*, 1970; and *The President's Medal 1789-1977*, 1977, a study of presidential inaugural medals. At the time of his death, MacNeil was completing a fourth book, tentatively titled *Call The Roll: A Candid History of the United States Senate*. For many years he served on the executive committee of the Congressional Periodical Press Galleries. In 1980 he won the Everett McKinley Dirksen Award for Distinguished Reporting on Congress.

On August 24, 1961, in response to a request from his editors, Neil MacNeil filed the following report on himself [MacNeil to Clurman for pub letter]:

As you requested, here's a self-serving report on me.

Schools: Phillips Exeter, Harvard, Columbia School of Graduate Faculties. Major: American political history.

Father: Neil MacNeil, former assistant managing editor, New York Time. Mother, Elizabeth Quin, originally from County Galway, Ireland. Wife: Laureen, and daughters: Dierdre and Catherine Elizabeth, both under 16 months.

It's true I kept a falcon for almost a year—actually had it flying around the house, and I claim I taught it to fly—but I'm not a qualified falconer, just a long-time observer of the great falcon migration down the Long Island shore each fall. Southampton is home away from home, but I'm pretty well rooted in Washington now, having been here [the] last 12 years.

I have a small reputation as a chef—filet of sole, bonne femme, coq au vin, and the best hollandaise in town—and a somewhat exaggerated reputation as a wine connoisseur. The only secret is to know how to read the bottle's label, to own taste buds adequate to tell a chateau bottling from rotgut, and to have on tap the patios of the wine-lover. I keep a modest cellar in the Victorian house

we restored on Capitol Hill, a half dozen blocks from the big dome, and, like any man who likes the good things in life—i.e., old books, Rembrandt etching—I prefer claret.

I broke in as a reporter for the New York Times, covering Brooklyn police headquarters, got the rudiments there and on New York's east side with the usual collection of fires, murders, suicides. I punched cattle briefly in Cotulla, Texas, a state which didn't appreciate me. I left after I had been charged by a loco white-faced con, been endangered by tarantulas, scorpions, rattlesnakes, and been shot at by the foreman. My first job was selling librettos at the Metropolitan Opera. I'm a trout fisherman who doesn't tie his own dry flies, but I keep and don't use enough a handsome collection of custom-made fly rods, including two very early (1870) split bamboo rods. I had an abortive music career with the bagpipe, being forced to give that up because of the neighbors.

I came to Washington in late 1949 with the UP [United Press International], and for them covered the U.S. Senate first for a few years, then the night rewrite for a few more, then a brief stint at the White House, before the House of Representatives. I joined Time in April 1958. I've been covering the Capitol ever since for Time. Covers include: Rayburn, House leaders, Halleck, and Lodge.

Professionally, my main interest on the Hill is not so much what happened as how it happened, for the true drama of a legislative fight normally takes place before the formal vote, in the private offices, the closed committee rooms, the cloakrooms, and the lobbies. These are the places where the decision is made, where the blood is shed.

I first met Larry O'Brien [President John Kennedy's congressional liaison chief about whom MacNeil was preparing a Time cover story in August 1961] in the early days of the West Virginia primary, saw his operation in Los Angeles, ran into him a few times during the fall campaign. I began to bump into him this year around the Senate and House, but didn't really get interested in his operations until a dramatic change took place around April. My count of the House told me that the Kennedy program couldn't get through, and this count was confirmed by friends on both sides in the House and lobbyist friends as well, but the Kennedy bills were moving through the House. The Senate had some rough spots for the Kennedy program, but not the challenge of the House. The obvious question came up: how was this being done? And an examination of the power centers quickly turned up O'Brien's footprints and those of his aides and allies. Thus the cover.

For the past several years, I have been making an intensive study of Congress, particularly the House, a chamber normally neglected by Washington correspondents largely because of its complexity. This study has included in depth examination of the power centers, the lobbies, and so on, and a near exhaustion of the published sources on Congress. I'm proudest of one private remark by Speaker Rayburn to a friend about me. He said: "He knows the House."

END

Neil MacNeil's Collection

The Dirksen Congressional Center, Pekin, Illinois, houses the MacNeil Collection. The reporter's daughter, Deirdre, donated the collection in August 2012 following its use by Richard A. Baker, Historian Emeritus of the U.S. Senate, who consulted the collection in order to complete a manuscript on the history of the Senate begun by MacNeil.

The collection is divided into the following series: Clippings, Notes, Reports, Subjects, and Miscellaneous. This publication draws on the Reports series.

MacNeil's reports, filed with his senior editors, comprise the heart of his collection. They are typed and detailed and cover a vast array of topics. These reports document the interplay between MacNeil, the reporter, and his editors. Further, they include off-the-record information as context for published stories. Together the reports portray the time period in a personal, colorful, and informed way.

Although the first report authored by MacNeil was dated April 3, 1958, his collection includes earlier reports from other *Time* reporters, likely retrieved from the magazine's archives as background research for MacNeil's own reports.

"Neil MacNeil Reporting on Everett McKinley Dirksen" transcribes every report in his collection that mentioned Everett Dirksen by name.

Explanatory Notes

MacNeil's reports took two forms. Many were prepared in draft form using a typewriter often with handwritten corrections and annotations. Others appeared in final form with the text in ALL CAPS. In relatively few cases, both versions exist for a single report.

To improve readability, and yet preserve MacNeil's style, the editor adopted the following conventions:

1. Although MacNeil's final reports were filed in ALL CAPS, this transcript employs standard rules of capitalization.
2. Minor errors of spelling and punctuation have been corrected. Major errors are noted by [sic].
3. The reporter varied his spelling of certain terms. For example, he spelled Vietnam as both a single and as two words, i.e., Viet Nam. The transcript adopted a consistent approach—in this case converting all references to "Vietnam."

As rich and thorough as the Reports series is, there are gaps, indicating that MacNeil did not save all his filings. There are relatively few documents between 1962 and 1964, and there are no reports on the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964.

"Neil MacNeil Reporting on Everett McKinley Dirksen" is organized chronologically. The header for each entry lists the date, the author's name (usually MacNeil), the person to whom the report was sent, and the title notation. In the vast majority of cases, several reports or drafts on a single topic apparently were prepared—a Roman numeral designated the version. There are many omissions in those cases where MacNeil prepared multiple drafts.

July 3, 1957

Berger to Laybourne

Kennedy on Algeria

Context

Neil MacNeil's papers at The Dirksen Congressional Center contain reports filed by other *Time* journalists, including reports written before MacNeil joined *Time*. It appears that MacNeil may have called for these as part of his research for current stories. In this case, the collection includes several reports related to Senator John Kennedy. The July 3, 1957, report is the first in MacNeil's collection to mention **Dirksen**.

Lead Paragraph

Only eight senators were in the chamber when Jack Kennedy rose up from his back row seat, early Tuesday afternoon, to deliver the Algerian speech. The galleries were three-quarters filled, mostly with tourists craning hard to glimpse the unsmiling tousle-haired junior senator from Massachusetts, a youthful figure in a single-breasted grey suit, white shirt, grey tie.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

During the hour and one-half that Kennedy held the floor (i.e., his speaking time, plus questions and comments from other senators—pick it up beginning on page 9718 of Tuesday's [*Congressional*] *Record*), the number of senators swelled to fifteen. Some (e.g., Morton, **Dirksen**) felt it necessary to defend the administration's position; some (e.g., Mansfield, Carroll) sided with Kennedy; John Sherman Cooper endorsed both the administration's record on colonialism and the Kennedy speech.

...

END

July 5, 1957

Berger to Laybourne

Kennedy's Immigration Bill

Context

Senator John Kennedy introduced an immigration bill in the Senate on June 27, 1957, prompting this report—another authored by someone other than Neil MacNeil.

Lead Paragraphs

The *New York Times* story is accurate.

Jack Kennedy drafted the bill some weeks ago, but instead of blindly hopping it, he negotiated backstage with those lawmakers who could make or break the measure—principally Lyndon Johnson in the Senate and Francis Walter in the House. ...

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

After it wins Senate approval (a step that seems assured, inasmuch as the Kennedy measure incorporates several administration proposals introduced by **Ev Dirksen**—e.g., quota redistribution, waiving of fingerprinting requirements—and has Lyndon Johnson's blessing as well), the bill could be referred back to the House where one of three steps could occur: 1) the House could, by unanimous consent, accept the Senate amendment; 2) the House could send the measure to a House-Senate conference, to reconcile differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill; 3) the House could send the bill back to its own Judiciary Committee for further study.

...

END

August 16, 1958

MacNeil to Williamson

ADD Congress Week

Context

This report dealt with a controversy played out on the Senate floor and prompted by an article inserted into the *Congressional Record* entitled “Question of When United States Should Surrender in All-Out Nuclear Attack Studied for Pentagon....”

Lead Paragraph

Surrender: Late Friday afternoon, the U.S. Senate, whose members pride themselves on describing their club as “the greatest deliberative body on earth,” voted 88 to two to prohibit the spending of any federal money “to confirm [word missing] study or to plan when and how or in what circumstances the government of the United States should surrender this country and its people to any foreign power.” The vote followed one of the most remarkable debates that ever pockmarked two days of the Senate’s business, a debate that, if parody, would have rivalled Dean Swift. Incredibly, this wasn’t parody but the pretense at dealing seriously with a serious matter. A psychologist might make of this a study of group aberration. An anthropologist might see it as tribal incantation against evil spirits. One reporter, a parent, covering the debate cracked: “This is the first time I’ve been paid to attend a PTA meeting.” This observer checked the Heavens to see if the moon was full, for he suspected the Senate had been infected with moon gall.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Lyndon Johnson then added his ponderous voice: “I think it would be very unfortunate if Congress failed to act unanimously on the suggestion of (Russell.)” This ended the early session but another round of even greater foolishness was scheduled for later that session. Jack Kennedy, in his own prestige bid, picked the early evening to make a defense speech, only to run into blundering Capehart, who questioned, among other things, who wrote the speech for Kennedy. “If what he says is true,” said Capehart of Kennedy, “Congress should appropriate another \$20 billion.” A little further on, Capehart accused Neuberger of having his speeches written, and unbelievably the Senate acted to close its doors and clear the galleries.

This was frivolity uncompounded, and immensely amusing if it weren't pure country. **Dirksen** blew the whistle on this, under Senate rule XXXV which Capehart seconded. The Senate was saved this indignity when **Dirksen** withdrew his motion.

...

END

January 29, 1959

MacNeil to Williamson

Housing (Biz)

Context

This report dealt with housing legislation.

Lead Paragraph

The Housing Act of 1959, now being written, has been given top priority by the Democratic leadership in the Senate and the House. Johnson and Rayburn have put so much heat behind Senator Sparkman and Representative Rains that the two subcommittee chairmen are scarcely going through the forms of holding hearings on their respective bills. Sparkman wound up his hearings on Wednesday. Rains is confident that he will be able to finish his hearings on Tuesday. Sparkman plans to have his bill approved by the full Senate Banking Committee on Monday and on the Senate floor Tuesday or Wednesday. Johnson, **Dirksen** and Sparkman conferred Thursday and agreed to that schedule. Sparkman expects the Senate to pass his bill (or a slight modification of it) on Wednesday or Thursday of next week. Rains, who was held up a bit by the delay in getting his committee officially appointed, expects to move with equal dispatch. His bill will go before the Rules Committee by next week's end, so he tells us, and we have no reason to doubt either Rains or Sparkman. Both guys have the votes.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

See the **Lead Paragraph**

...

END

March 12, 1959

MacNeil to Williamson

Hawaii (na)

Context

MacNeil described in great detail (consuming 19 double-spaced pages) House and Senate passage of legislation to grant Hawaii statehood.

Lead Paragraph

It was 3:01 Thursday afternoon in the House chamber when Sam Rayburn, standing, intoned: “On this vote the yeas are 323 and the nays are 89. The bill is passed.” The galleries, well filled for that time of day, burst into applause, and the idle and curious in the galleries were joined by the three hundred House members still left on the floor. The applause was enthusiastic, but restrained, nothing like the excitement of last year when Alaska was voted into the union. ...

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

In the Senate it was the same story. Johnson called up the bill at 2:25 p.m., just twenty minutes after the House had started debating the resolution to take up its bill. ... **Everett Dirksen**, wearing his usual craggy and deeply worried look, asked the impeccable Johnson whether the Senate would vote on the bill that day. Johnson said he couldn’t promise—but this was a startling idea that the Senate could complete debate in a single day on a bill that had been threatened in the past with a to-the-death filibuster.

...

END

April 23, 1959

MacNeil to Williamson

Nation's Lede (Labor Bill)-1 (NA)

Context

MacNeil described the vote-by-vote results as the Senate voted on Senator John Kennedy's labor reform bill.

Lead Paragraphs

It was 6:20 Wednesday evening and in the Senate chamber a high drama was unfolding.

The Senate clerk had just finished reading the roll of the Senate on an amendment to the Kennedy labor reform bill. The vote stood at 38 ayes, 41 nays, but senators were still scurrying into the chamber, asking for recognition, casting their votes. The vote was of extreme importance in the fate of the bill because it was the amendment where the Kennedy opposition could muster their maximum strength. A defeat for the Republican-southern Democratic coalition would shatter their ranks. There would be no point to fighting on.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

The vice president announced the vote: 47 to 46 and the amendment was adopted. **Dirksen**, already on his feet, moved to reconsider the vote, and vote, and Goldwater, in on the play, moved to lay that motion on the table. (This is a parliamentary device which nails down the vote, makes it irrevocable for practical purposes, since it takes a two-thirds majority to take the motion off the table.) Kennedy alertly popped up out of his chair, demanded the yeas and nays. The chamber was flooded now with excited chatter. There was no applause on the announcement of the vote. The clerk again called the roll of the Senate, and again the game was renewed.

...

The Nixon-McClellan conversation neatly displays the strategy of the Republican-southern Democratic coalition on this one. McClellan will lead. The coalition had no expectation of winning Tuesday's vote—an amendment by Sam Ervin to strike out Title 6 with its Taft-Hartley Act amendments and an administration amendment formally offered by **Dirksen** to put into the bill a new Title 6 containing the organizational picketing, secondary boycott and other Taft-Hartley amendments wanted by the Republicans. But they didn't expect to lose as

badly as they did. Kennedy was certain of winning those two, and his face wore a thin, amused smile as he listened to the vote rolling up on Ervin's amendment. ...

They couldn't make up their minds which way they wanted to go, to take out all the Taft-Hartley amendments or put in a lot more. The Kennedy side was particularly strong because many Republicans and southerners were concerned about these six "sweeteners" for labor, feared that without them the pro-labor House Labor Committee might balk. (In a real sense the six Taft-Hartley amendments in Title 6 can be called "sweeteners" for the House, as well as for the AFL-CIO.) George Meany's support of this title also helped swing senators, and the Republicans who came along with Kennedy knew that the building trade unions, always a friendly bunch to Republicans, really wanted and needed the amendment thrown in for them. Then some Republicans, like **Dirksen**, voted against Ervin because they wanted to be consistent when they offered their own Taft-Hartley amendments.

Dirksen's amendment, junked by the Senate on a vote of 67 to 24, never had a chance. It was a pro-forma administration amendment. Kennedy knocked it dead when he told the Senate: "Is the senator aware of the fact that if the amendment were agreed to, it would mean that all amendments dealing with secondary boycotts, rehiring agreements, picketing and so forth, would be in the third degree..." In other words, to adopt this amendment would close the door to any tampering with it; no other amendments in the Taft-Hartley field could be offered.

...

The Ervin and **Dirksen** amendments, as we suggested, were not real tests of the forces at work on this bill on the Senate floor, and no one in the contest took them as such. But the margin of their defeats was shattering the morale of the GOP-southern Democratic coalition leaders even so.

...

END

April 25, 1959

From MacNeil to Williamson

Nation's Lede—Labor Bill-IV

Context

This report was another in a long series of MacNeil filings on the Senate's consideration of Senator John Kennedy's labor reform bill.

Lead Paragraph

One of the few real flurries in floor debate Friday came just before the vote on McClellan's amendment to limit organizational picketing, so-called "blackmail" and "shakedown" picketing used to drive employers and sometimes unorganized employees to the wall.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

Everett Dirksen, his usual hulking self, his crop of greying hair flourishing atop his head, dramatically read to the Senate a letter from a union official threatening an Illinois company with economic extinction unless he forced his employees to join the union, Local 714 of the Teamsters. **Dirksen**, his voice a roar, played his speech with the stops out, standing behind his minority leader's desk, front row center, then stalking up the center aisle towards Kennedy in his back row, center aisle seat.

"Talk about the fine Italian hand of an insidious force," shouted **Dirksen** to the Senate. "There it is. 'We will destroy your business unless you tell your employees that we ought to represent them.'"

"Aside from partisanship, aside from the question of whether a person is conservative or liberal...This amendment appeals to fairness as nothing else can. I am speaking for the small companies...I think the Senate is on trial on the question of peaceful picketing. This amendment is for the protection of little people...That is the whole story...And I rest the case on it."

Kennedy walked down the aisle, asked the presiding officer how much time he had left under the time limit, and yielded two minutes to Wayne Morse to reply. Morse, his thinning grey hair slicked flat on his head, his black eyebrows beetling over his angered black eyes, did reply and acidly to **Dirksen**.

"I would have the Senate take at least enough time...to review some of the great doctrines enunciated by the courts of this country, which have been handed down in picketing cases, which in my judgment are the great landmarks for the preservation of some basic freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom to pace

the streets of America with signs notifying the public, for example, that here is a plant which is undermining high labor standards in the community because of the fact that it is not organized. The courts have clearly defined peaceful picketing and what peaceful picketing includes. I wish to say to my friend from Illinois that it will be a sad day in Congress if this afternoon we strike a blow against the cardinal principle of freedom of speech under the Constitution of the United States....”

...

END

April 25, 1959

MacNeil to Williamson

Nation's lede—Labor Bill—IV (NA)

Context

This report was another in a long series of MacNeil filings on the Senate's consideration of Senator John Kennedy's labor reform bill.

Lead Paragraph

They brought the heavies in Saturday morning to clear up that delicate matter of whether or not Kuchel's key amendment was in order. Vice President Nixon assumed the chair and read a brief statement on the parliamentary question that Bridges had raised. The vice president put himself solidly and totally behind Monroney's ruling of the night before. Then Dick Russell of Georgia, one of the finest parliamentarians around, put his blessing on Nixon's ruling, explained to a hushed Senate just how the Senate adopted the procedure by which a motion to table a motion to reconsider a vote was added to the Senate's rules. ...

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

The question was not put to the challenge. The GOP Senate Policy Committee met at Saltonstall's invitation at 10:30 to find a way out of Bridges' misplay in some way that wouldn't bloody Bridges. The New Hampshire senator was not there, was about to leave for New Hampshire, but he agreed by telephone to go along with their solution, and he authorized **Dirksen** to withdraw the challenge to the ruling. That settled that crisis, and the rest was easy.

...

END

September 4, 1959

MacNeil to Gruin

Labor Reform II (NA)

Context

Another in a long line of stories on Senate and House consideration of labor reform legislation. This report dealt with action by the conference committee on what was known as the Landrum-Griffin bill.

Lead Paragraph

Kennedy had used both circumstances and psychology to force the Republican-southern Democrats back into conference. And although he had driven the conservative coalition into the realization that they didn't have the votes to force their will on the Senate, Kennedy didn't have the votes either to force on the Senate what he wanted.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

To return to the Senate floor for instructions would seem now to be to his advantage, but it wasn't for his substitute to **Dirksen's** resolution was itself subject to amendment, and Kennedy didn't have the votes to hold the line against the "bombthrowers" as he refers to Morse and company, who would, of course, move to strip down the bill to mere fustian. This would have hazarded putting the Senate back to the first dilemma: a choice again between no bill and a harsh bill. Kennedy had struggled right along to keep control of the legislation, and now he had the Republicans helping him keep the bill in conference for they wanted to nail down what they had gained and not risk total loss.

...

Incredibly, at 8:20, into the gallery came Sid Zagri and Harold Gibbons to watch the last moments of the Senate's action on legislation their boss Jimmy Hoffa had proved so necessary. They had had dinner in the Senate restaurant a little earlier, then come to the gallery. Zagri appeared amused, a little thin smile on his face. Gibbons, a hulking fellow, sat beside him, whispered a joke to Zagri and the two chuckled in unison. They listened through Mundt, Humphrey and **Dirksen's** speeches. (As **Dirksen** finished at 9:01, senators here and there on the floor cried, "vote, vote, vote.") The roll call began at 9:10. Gibbons leaned forward, intently

watching the senators vote. Zagri, who had borrowed a pen from Gibbons, incredibly kept count. He ticked off the votes as they came right to the end, just as though the question was in doubt. The final score was 95 to Morse and Wild Bill Langer.

...

END

December 31, 1959

MacNeil to Johnston

Nation's Lead-I- (NA)

Context

In this report, MacNeil examined the likely impact of presidential campaign politics upon Congress and prospects for the legislative priorities of liberals and conservatives respectively.

Lead Paragraph

Next Wednesday, at high Noon, Vice President Nixon and Speaker Rayburn will gavel their chambers into session, call for a brief prayer from the chaplains—and then it's every man for himself over the six-month course leading to the national conventions and beyond to the November elections. Every man in the House and Senate has a stake in the outcome, just as does every citizen in the land, but for the members of Congress the stake is political power whether personal or merely party.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

The 1959 session, however, turned out radically differently from what the Democrats had expected, thanks to the president's remarkable performance and his able help from Charlie Halleck and **Everett Dirksen** (with the accent on Halleck). Instead of a record of accomplishment, the Democrats found that they had to settle for merely getting rid of the labor reform problem, and, in doing so, to suffer the slings and arrows of outraged labor led by the Teamsters. ... This has greatly increased Democrats' sense of the need to push through a minimum wage bill this year in the face of the administration's opposition. It had been saved for this year as a means to demonstrate Democratic friendliness with the working man; now it has become an emergency technique to woo back labor.

...

END

April 2, 1960

MacNeil to Johnston (copy to Hedley Donovan)

Connally Rider (NA)

Context

This story dealt with the so-called Connally Amendment dealing with U.S. acceptance of compulsory World Court jurisdiction which had died in Senate committee.

Lead Paragraph

The 9 to 8 vote this week in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee does not, repeat not, reflect the committee's view on the Connally rider. In the committee there is a clear majority in favor of repealing the rider, and a quick examination of the vote demonstrates the fact. ...

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

However, the Senate leaders Johnson and **Dirksen** took soundings in the Senate—as filed by Steele—to learn just what the chances of the repeal proposal had on the floor, which we need not say is a different place than the committee. They stopped counting when they had counted 44 senators opposed to repeal. That's ten better than the actual number that would prevent the Senate from casting a two-thirds vote for the repeal.

“I took some sounding on this to get the sense of our fellows,” says **Dirksen**, insisting that he didn't make a hard nose-count of all hands. “It was bad.”

...

END

August 26, 1960

From McNeil to Johnston

Congress -11 (NA)

Context

MacNeil described congressional action on senator and presidential candidate John Kennedy's legislative priorities. The Democrats ultimately lost the vote described in this report on Kennedy's amendment to the Social Security bill relating to health care benefits for the aged.

Lead Paragraph

This week the Congress cleared away the last of its major problems standing in the way of adjournment sine die and a return of the members to the folks back home. Action was taken on medical care, minimum wages, the foreign aid appropriation, and the scenes of significant action were the Senate floor, the House Rules Committee, and the conference rooms. At no point did Jack Kennedy find anything resembling victory. The conservative coalition, lines drawn taut by the coming presidential campaign, had commanding control of both chambers, forced substantive concessions from Kennedy for what little got through, forced surrender on the rest.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Dirksen wound up the Republican argument, stating that he believed that Ike would veto the bill with the Anderson-Kennedy amendment, and ended with another bald statement of the political issue before the two parties: "If we want some bread, this is the time to get it by voting down the Anderson proposal."

The vote started, by agreement, at 6:22 Tuesday afternoon. The Senate floor was crowded; so were the galleries. Kennedy had slipped out of the chamber after appealing for the Republican votes, slipped back into his back-row chair just one minute before the rollcall began. Johnson and Kennedy knew they weren't going to get those Republican votes, but **Dirksen** wasn't entirely sure how many might stray from the GOP flag at the last moment. He knew Case of New Jersey was gone, doubted that he could hold the others. Mrs. Smith was doubtful, so was Cooper. And, of course, **Dirksen** had doubts about the Democrats, wasn't sure but that some of the southerners, under pressure, might break. One actually had, given

Johnson's assurances that if his vote was really needed, he would switch.
Dirksen was worried, carefully notified Nixon that he had better be on hand just in case of a tie.

...

END

February 23, 1971

From McNeil to Jones

Welfare (NA)

Context

This report dealt with President John Kennedy's legislative program.

Lead Paragraph

After a little more than a month in office, President Kennedy has laid down the basics of his domestic welfare program, in the mass variations of those Democratic programs that the 86th Congress, for one reason or another, failed to enact. These basic programs involve: school construction and teachers' salaries, health care for the aged, minimum wages, unemployment insurance, and depressed areas.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Mansfield is so totally confident that he has nothing but praise for the organized opposition of **Everett Dirksen** and the Republicans in the Senate. "They are offering alternatives," said Mansfield, admiringly. "They are acting responsibly."

...

END

May 3, 1961

From McNeil to Parker (copy to Cate for Press)

Capital Notes, Ike and the Washington Post (NA)

Context

MacNeil reported on a story in the *Washington Post* about a meeting of Republican congressional leaders with former President Eisenhower.

Lead Paragraph

The incident took place in President Eisenhower's Gettysburg office where he was meeting with **Everett Dirksen**, Charles Halleck and the other GOP congressional leaders and with GOP national chairman Thruston Morton.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

"Mr. President," said **Dirksen**, "I understand that over at the *Washington Post*, every time they mention the 'Ev and Charlies show,' [balance missing]."

END

May 12, 1961

From MacNeil to Parker

Ev and Charlie (NA)

Context

After losing the White House in the 1960 presidential election, congressional Republicans developed the “Ev and Charlie Show,” a weekly press conference, to articulate the Republican Party’s program.

Lead Paragraph

Charles Abraham Halleck and **Everett McKinley Dirksen**, the Republican leaders of the House of Representatives and the Senate, suffered a disaster last November: they and their party lost the greatest sounding board on earth, the White House. And when they awoke they found themselves in possession of only 35 of the Senate’s 100 seats, 170 odd of the House’s 437 seats.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

During the 86th Congress, they had also owned another great weapon, a defensive weapon, the president’s power to veto. **Dirksen** and Halleck had merely to find one third plus one of the Senate or the House to kill any bill they opposed. That minority would sustain a presidential veto—and the use of that veto weapon forced the hulking Democratic majorities to trim and trim further their major programs, and even then Halleck and **Dirksen** could kill them if they chose.

...

In these bleak circumstances, **Dirksen** and Halleck have tried to maneuver themselves and their followers into their strongest possible position—which, for want of Republican votes, automatically had to be weak—and to build for the future. ...The GOP floor leaders in the past, in similar circumstances to **Dirksen** and Halleck, have been paper leaders only.

Dirksen and Halleck knew this well enough—both had lived through those dark New Deal days from the beginning—and they resolved to try to be something else. Out of this, with the blessing of Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon, they developed a plan to enliven their party in Congress, and to let the country know that the party was alive and viable.

They had to start from a most painful position of party leaders: they didn’t have the votes, and even some of their votes could be stolen from them by an adroit and political president. In the Senate **Dirksen** had 35 Republican seats, but a dozen of these—the likes of Javits, Cooper, Case of New Jersey—tended to vote with the

Democratic liberals. **Dirksen** got back those votes, however, and sometimes a few more, from the southern Democratic conservatives. At best, however, he could find no way to produce a majority of the Senate on the major items coming before Congress. Halleck had a far stronger position than **Dirksen**...

But if the Republican leaders lack votes, it would never be said that they lacked voices. Halleck's dress sergeant's boom has long been one of the House's curiosities, and **Dirksen's** mellifluous use of Shakespear's [sic] native tongue has long been one of the wonders of the age. (**Dirksen's** pomposity, so often in the past revealed in his speeches, has decisively given way now to wit and good humor, which tempers the accuracy of his old title as the Wizard of Ooze.) They decided to bring these two voices—Halleck's strident tenor and **Dirksen's** soothing baritone—together in a duet, backed by the chorus of their party leaders. Thus evolved the weekly leadership conferences that now have been dubbed the "Ev and Charlie show."

This is a high-toned operation, complete with a crack \$25,000-a-year producer, long-time Republican publicity man Bob Humphries. As it has worked out, the party leaders—all of them—meet every Thursday morning for discussion of various vital matters coming before Congress or the nation. The day was chosen to follow the president's Wednesday news conferences. In the days before the leadership meeting, Bob Humphries, who works with only a secretary out of the Senate Republicans Policy Committee room, drafts proposed statements on the issues agreed upon, keeps tab on what's politically viable in the week's news, and consults frequently with Halleck and **Dirksen** on the substance of the meeting to come. A principal problem: narrowing the subject matter with which to deal from the clutter of [a] thousand things that might be called up for discussion and policy decision.

Halleck meanwhile handles his floor duties, and keeps in constant touch with his own House GOP policy committee....**Dirksen** is doing the same, handling the floor leadership, as well as keeping constant contact with his Senate Republicans, particularly party leaders Bridges and Lev Saltonstall and Tom Kuchel.

Dirksen has a more difficult position, for his party ranks cover a range of political views as extreme as Javits' liberalism and Goldwater's conservatism. Besides, you can't dismiss a senator, creatures of substance as they are, with the ease that Halleck can brush aside the objections of his tiny minority of liberals.

But Thursday morning, having duly noted the performance of the Democratic leaders at the White House on Tuesday, the president at his press conference Wednesday, **Dirksen** and Halleck are quite prepared to assume a party stance. This stance they take up at the meeting, over which presides party Chairman Thruston Morton. ...

The “Ev and Charlie” show is really nothing more than a TV-covered news conference. It is also covered, of course, by Capitol Hill newspaper, magazine, and wire service reporters. Normally, **Dirksen** reads a prepared statement, and then Halleck reads one on another subject. They both answer questions from the reporters. No TV station carries the news conference in full; normally “Ev and Charlie” get only a few moments on the news casts—a minute clip or so. And what they get of TV time, they have to earn the hard way with a punchy statement. After the conference, they remake the parts the TV cameras want, and that is normally edited down to what the TV stations squeeze into their new reports.

The performance by **Dirksen** and Halleck has been dubbed the “Ev and Charlie show” by reporters, and the clownish interpretation was applied by Herblock, who in a series of cartoons has drawn Halleck as a buffoon, **Dirksen** as the sad-faced clown. **Dirksen** has been amused, even delighted by the popularity of the “Ev and Charlie show”—which is what he calls it. But it galls Halleck. Halleck always is somberly serious when he’s dealing publicly, although privately he likes to tease his staff, tell country humorous stories. But he’s not known as a wit. “I’m no clown,” he grumbled privately this week. “I’m a gut fighter.” **Dirksen**, who is a wit, takes the suggestions of clowning with delight.

...

This news conference, and the weekly joint leadership meeting, has been the major item on the **Dirksen**-Halleck schedule that is new. And it is unique, for it has brought them into the public awareness as nothing else could. Minority leaders of the past have largely been ignored, if their party didn’t control the White House. By the very nature of the present political situation, **Dirksen** and Halleck could not rough up the new president. He deserved something of a “honeymoon,” and they feared causing hard feelings around the country if they fired at him too soon. This has been the cause of their general approach of playing down their usual rough-and-tumble methods, keeping things light with needling and humor. The 100 days now are up—and the pace of the **Dirksen** and Halleck performance is changing. ...

The significant thing about this **Dirksen** and Halleck performance is that it has caught hold. They have made it a major item in Washington’s week. They have claimed newspaper and TV space for the Republicans to carry their side of the political dialogue to the American people. They have done what hasn’t been done in the past: shown that the Republicans have members in Congress and that they’re in there scrapping.

And that’s what they intended in the first place.

In terms of their normal operations, and their effectiveness, both **Dirksen** and Halleck are severely handicapped by their shortage of votes, **Dirksen** almost to the point of despair. ...It’s unfair to blame them for their inability to write laws the

way they want them: they don't have the votes. They remain political creatures, operating as they have been since they both became leaders in 1959. Both are dangerous opponents in a floor scrap, effective in rounding up votes and pressures, and they can perhaps win a fight here and there. The real question on whether Kennedy's legislation will be enacted they can't answer. That depends largely on Kennedy's ability to woo the southern Democrats and the Kennedy-oriented lobbyists to split off Republicans. ...

We refer you to our earlier files on the Republican plans to offer alternatives to the Kennedy bills. This they have done on depressed areas and minimum wages (Halleck won the minimum wage fight in its initial floor fight, lost it later). And they are doing so on housing, schools and so on. But to get it across to the people that they are offering alternatives—that, in fact, the Republican Party is itself an alternative to the Democratic—the party needs someone capable of getting the message abroad in the news columns and TV channels. This **Dirksen** and Halleck are doing—and we really won't know how successfully until we get the election returns in November, 1962.

END

June 1, 1961

MacNeil to Clurman for Hooper World Fronts Life
“Republican Speechmaking -I”

Context

In this period, political commentator Roscoe Drummond accused Republicans of being adrift and rudderless, with inept congressional leaders.

Lead Paragraph

You asked about Wicker’s piece on the GOP liberal bloc in Congress and Roscoe Drummond’s jeremiad that the GOP is adrift and rudderless. You also ask about the Republicans’ role and effectiveness in Congress now.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Drummond blames everything on the party’s congressional leadership, blames them for lack of party teamwork, failure to recognize present economic problems, failure to speak articulately, failure to provide adequate staff on congressional committees for the GOP minorities. Actually, the Republicans in Congress never have had more teamwork—what else is the new effectiveness they have found in the House GOP Policy Committee, the Senate Policy Committee, the Joint Leadership meetings where the party agrees on striking a stance? Failure to recognize economic problems? Nonsense. For the first time, the party (without presidential leadership and in a minority) now offers alternatives to the Democratic proposals. They’ve done so in minimum wages, depressed areas, medical care, and many others—demonstrating that the party does have something to offer. That the GOP minority does not win can’t be blamed on **Dirksen** and Halleck—they don’t have the votes. And it may come across as merely amusing to some folks, but Halleck and **Dirksen**—in their “Ev and Charlie” show—have successfully claimed TV and newspaper space, successfully brought to the public mind the idea at least that there are Republicans in Congress and not just New Frontiersmen, and that the Republicans have something to say. And it’s not committee staff men that the Republicans need—they’re knee deep in proposals and programs to support or oppose.

We find it significant that there is little or no real criticism of **Dirksen** or Halleck among congressional Republicans. Instead, one hears constant admiration of them for getting up and getting attention for the Republican position. What they are doing—offering alternatives (Eisenhower alternatives, incidentally) and speaking up—has the specific endorsement of Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon.

Indeed, it was Eisenhower's idea that the leadership meetings continue, and it was Nixon's that the party offer alternatives to the Democratic welfare proposals.

...

What the Republican Party needs...is to attract attractive candidates from within its ranks for public office. ...

Too often, from what we see, the attractive Republicans, largely a fairly conservative crowd, are professional men unwilling to give up their professions for politics. And so the party suffers. Take Chuck Percy of Illinois. Why didn't he run last year against Paul Douglas—instead of the clown the party put up? Now, we hear, Percy wants to run against **Dirksen**. That doesn't make sense.

In sum, we see the role of the GOP leadership in Congress the job of keeping the party viable, keep public attention on its ideas and men—and we think **Dirksen** and Halleck have been effectively doing this. The GOP leadership outside of Congress has the job of finding men to turn the Democrats out of office, and so far they have been less than successful.

END

September 4, 1962

MacNeil to Parker

Dirksen Cover-I (Nation)

Context

Everett Dirksen was featured on the cover of *Time* magazine on September 14, 1962.

Lead Paragraph

On August 22, 1962, Senator Prescott Bush of Connecticut took the Senate floor to speak of his affection and admiration for his colleague, **Everett McKinley Dirksen** of Illinois. Bush, a Republican progressive, is retiring from the Senate this year; and he did not wish to leave without paying tribute to **Dirksen**, a man he opposed for the floor leadership of the Republicans less than four years ago.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

“Senator **Dirksen** is finishing his fourth year as our leader,” Bush told the Senate, “each one of these four years has enhanced his prestige, increased his authority, and further increased the respect and affection that senators hold for him. I mean senators of both parties.”

Bush, tall, handsome, and distinguished described the virtues he saw in **Dirksen**—“always helpful, always considerate of the needs of others...warm...he is one of the very few men in the Senate who actually makes votes when he speaks on an important issue...when grave national issues are involved, **Everett Dirksen** is not a partisan...his memory is fantastic, and he knows how to use it...a servant of the people, a public servant...The elements of true greatness. Simply, homely virtues are combined with dynamic fighting qualities—qualities that inspire the loyalty, admiration and complete respect of these [sic] of us who are privileged to salute him as our leader.”

Bush’s speech was a generous and kindly salute to a party colleague in the Senate, one up for re-election this year for his third term in the Senate of the United States. Bush’s fellow Republicans quickly joined in this eulogy of **Dirksen**. George Aiken of Vermont, from 22 year’s perspective, could not recall higher qualities of leadership, and he praised **Dirksen** for his fairness and his courage. Thomas Kuchel of California, the GOP Senate whip, spoke of his courage and integrity, his unselfishness, his erudition. Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania spoke of **Dirksen**’s ability to bring unity to the Republican Party ranks in the Senate. John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, who had been **Dirksen**’s opponent for the floor leadership, spoke of his patriotism, his greatness as a Republican, his greatness as an American. Jacob Javits of New York spoke of his tolerance, his eloquence, his understanding, his integrity,

sense of mission, his sense of humor—“**Everett Dirksen** is a superbly successful Senate leader, ranking with the very best who ever graced this chamber, on either side of the aisle.” John Tower of Texas came next, from the other extreme wing of the party, to say that he had sat at the feet of **Everett Dirksen** to be taught, and taught he had been by **Dirksen**’s warmth, good humor, good counsel and advice. Clifford Case of New Jersey paid tribute too, as did senators Hickenlooper, Prouty, Young, Jordan, Butler, Boggs, Fong, Williams, and Bennett—Republicans all.

To the experienced Washington correspondent, such palaver by members of the Senate was by no means an unusual occurrence. Periodically, the floor erupts with a feshet of senatorial generosity to a colleague. This spate of praise for **Dirksen** might seem a little unusual by the intensity of warmth flowing on his greying head from these Republican members associated with liberalism or progressivism, for only a few years ago they desperately tried to prevent this man from receiving the job they now praised him for. Yet it was only 76 days before the people of Illinois were to decide whether to extend **Dirksen**’s 12-year stay in the Senate for another six. It was time for the party members to join ranks and help their colleague through this ordeal.

But was that so? Was so easy and pat an answer the real reason for the flood of praise? For who is this seeking recognition? The Democratic floor leader Mike Mansfield? This is part of what Mansfield had to say:

“Mr. President,” Mansfield said, addressing the chair, “on this occasion I wish that I possessed the eloquence of the distinguished Senator from Illinois. I wish for his wit and wisdom. I wish for his humor and poetry. I wish for his scholarly erudition and his homespun simplicity. I wish for that immense range of language and voice, from the softest serenity to the most turbulent thunder.

“Had I these gifts, I would unleash them in orchestrated expression of the great affection, respect, admiration, and esteem in which I hold the distinguished minority leader. I would weave, with words, a magic spell over the Senate as he has done so many times. With words, I would lift the eyes of Senators to the mountain peaks and the stars beyond or I would lead them gently down a rustic road in Illinois. With words, I would lay bare the heart of a flower or pry open the fiery core of the atom that the Senate might appreciate the depth and breadth of the Senator from Illinois.

“...There is only one Demesthenes [sic] in the Senate, one **Dirksen**...**Everett**, I am honored and grateful that you sit across the aisle from me. You are a tower of strength as a collaborator in the leadership of this body. For 30 years you have served your party faithfully and brilliantly. But for 30 years you have served your country more.”

Has Mansfield lost his senses? Has he forgotten that Sidney Yates, the Democrat, is trying to unseat the Wizard of Ooze and thus add one more voice and one more vote in the Senate to the president's chorus there? Does he not know that political partisans are listening, that they can read and use the pages of the *Congressional Record* for political advantage? But here comes John Pastore of Rhode Island, just as Democratic as Mansfield. Pastore wished **Dirksen** "many more years of service." Does that make sense? And here is Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, the Democratic whip and a political liberal too, to join the "serenade" as he called it. And after Humphrey came Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, newly powerful in the Senate, to describe **Dirksen** as "a great patriot, a great statesman, a great senator, and a man of courage...."

Even as the words of praise went reverberating through the hall of the Senate, rumors were moving through the city of Washington; being picked up by the sensitive and relayed out to the land beyond: the president of the United States, John Kennedy, the political partisan, felt so strongly the need to keep **Everett Dirksen** in the U.S. Senate that he would not really support **Dirksen's** Democratic opponent, Sid Yates. White House aides were publicly and privately denying that any such course would be followed by the president. It was perfectly true that **Dirksen** had given the president invaluable aid from his strategic post in the U.S. Senate; but it was not true that Kennedy would not campaign in good faith and to good purpose to help elect Yates to the Senate.

Even in so politically sophisticated a town as Washington, such praise passes the ordinary, humdrum sort of thing that politicians are accustomed to heap on each other. Where was the **Dirksen** of former years—the fierce and brutal partisan, who had rocked a convention with a bitter, biting speech, who had stood in his place on the Senate floor and defended the intransigence and arrogance of Joe McCarthy but a few years ago? The old pro with the acid tongue, who made opponents quail with the fury of his verbal onslaughts, who made editors, even of the *Chicago Tribune*, writhe and think up new terms of opprobrium for him?

Even Sidney Yates seemingly had doubts of his party leader. He conferred with Kennedy privately at the White House the following Monday to urge him to give more to the Illinois campaign. The president would come, as he had promised, on October 19 to indorse Yates for the Senate. There were rumors that **Dirksen** would be the first to shake his hand as he arrived in the Lincoln country. Yates wanted commitments from the president to canvass downstate Illinois as well as the primary Democratic base in Chicago. Could the president land in St. Louis, cross into Illinois by car, and tour downstate to Springfield? Then go on to Chicago? That might indeed be worked out replied the president; he would discuss it with Larry O'Brien.

A plumbing of the real Senate attitude toward **Dirksen**—the views privately expressed, and not just the on-stage niceties of the floor—might turn up a different

reading of this man. But what does one find there? More of the same, and some of it with even greater intensity.

Here is Mike Mansfield talking privately of **Dirksen**, the old war horse turned statesman and leader: “You need his cooperation and collaboration, and he has always been willing to give it—sometimes under difficult circumstances—but he’s always willing. He’s understanding of my problems, and I try to be understanding of his. In my opinion, I couldn’t have a better man as leader on that side of the aisle. We have an understanding that neither one of us is caught flatfooted by the other. There’s a fair exchange, scrupulously honored. If we can’t work together, the Senate can’t work.

“He’s turned out exceedingly well as the Republican leader. He has their confidence and trust. I have admired him as leader—at times he has literally stood by himself. His own feelings were secondary.” (He’s been castigated in the press for positions he’s taken as party leader). “He is privy to information, which he can’t reveal. His lips are sealed. He can’t defend himself [in these instances]—and yet he does it willingly and whole-heartedly. He’s not what some newspapers picture him. He is a man of responsibility, understanding and integrity. If he gives his word, that’s it. He’s not dogmatic. He tries to see the other side of questions. He tries to come half way, and he’s not adverse to coming even a little past half way on occasion.”

Here’s another private reading from a Democrat (Not for use: Bobby Baker, long-time intimate of the Senate, and Lyndon Johnson, now the secretary of the Senate Democrats):

I’ve seen a lot of Republican leaders in the Senate in the past 20 years—the most dynamic period in the history of the world. Most of the Republican leaders were inflexible—McNary, White, Ken Wherry, Taft, and Knowland. Taking all things into consideration, **Dirksen** is by far the ablest leader that they’ve had. He’s been a fantastic help to the Kennedy administration—and Kennedy knows it. If he was mean, he could be a spoiler, like Charlie Halleck. I’ve never dealt with a more honorable and fair man, a fellow who will go further than yourself. He’s changed, and he’s developed into a real Senate man, he’s close to being the head of the club. When he came here, he was a sort of demagogue. But now, he’s totally unselfish. The Republicans had a crisis a few years back, a real crisis, over a fellow who thought he was entitled to go on the Appropriations Committee. **Dirksen** got off the committee. He got off the committee, one of the most powerful in Congress, to help a colleague out and solve the crisis. I like Sid Yates, but my party would be in a hell of a mess—Kennedy would be in a hell of a mess—if **Dirksen** gets defeated. **Dirksen’s** not an obstructionist. Charlie Halleck is a gut fighter, and if **Dirksen** acted like Halleck, Kennedy would be in real deep trouble.

On the Republican side of the aisle, the variation of political orientation is vast—from Javits to Goldwater—but the whole party in the Senate, without exception, have been delighted with **Dirksen's** leadership. Goldwater tells us this: “**Dirksen's** been a good leader. I think he's done a good job. His ability to point out the deficiencies of the New Frontier, his attacks on the New Frontier, have added strength to the party all over the country. He deserves a great part of the credit for the resurgence of the Republican Party across the nation.” Here's Javits: “From the point of view of individual freedom of action, without even implied disapproval, I find Senator **Dirksen** a most satisfactory leader. Naturally, I have different ideas about constructive alternatives for our party to follow, but that is not the way the leadership of either side works. And therefore, [in] terms of the system under which we work, Senator **Dirksen** fills the bill.”

We don't mean to suggest in this file that **Dirksen** is a man who has risen to statesmanship of the highest order, that he has reached a plateau of excellence that forbids criticism. There's another man, too, indeed there are several. There's the Fourth-of-July orator uttering what someone has called “steamboat gothic prose” to a wondering and amused world. There's the charge of political fakery and charlatanism, the skillful catering to voters that raises doubts as to whether he has any political principles or beliefs. There's the gnawing ambition for a place in the sun that led this man to run abortively for president. There's the incredibly hard worker—fantastic, prodigious worker—with the ability to let the world go by as he tends his garden of vegetables. There's a zest for living and combat, a simplicity of morality, and religious faith, that touches the core of the America of the Middle Border. There's a summing up of this fellow, perhaps best expressed in the words of one of his colleagues, as “the complete politician”—old English style, please—out of the heartland of America. An American phenomenon, indeed.

There's a man inside, and in the files to come we hope to spell out the workings of that man and the making of him.

END

September 4, 1962

MacNeil to Parker

Dirksen Cover VII (Nation)

Context

Everett Dirksen was featured on the cover of *Time* magazine on September 14, 1962.

Lead Paragraph

As early as 1953, when Eisenhower became president, there were detectable changes in **Dirksen's** voting record from the archconservative-isolationist record he ran up in 1951-1952. Yet he continued to vote his opposition to many appropriations and to international projects. How to explain this record and its change we are not sure. The changes in any man are subtle. The explanation frequently given by the idle and the curious is that **Dirksen** had become the creature of the *Chicago Tribune* and was doing Colonel McCormick's bidding in the Senate. We doubt that. In all his years in Illinois politics, **Dirksen** tells us, only once did that publisher telephone him—and that call wasn't about legislation. Not only that, but **Dirksen** before this period and after it appears perfectly ready to offend the *Chicago Tribune* with his speeches and votes.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

Dirksen's own explanation is that he had supported the original Marshall Plan because it was a relief program needed by the stricken countries of the world. But then the program became a give-away, filled with incompetence and foolishness, like shipping tons of gum to the children of Belgium and beer coolers to Italy (a favorite pair of objections, for he's used them more than once). When the program changed to a sound basis of loans instead of grants, he found he again could support it. Also took on a cast of national defense, and could be defended.

This explanation lacks something in candor, we think. In the first place his position in 1951 and 1952 was not merely hostile to foreign aid, it was hostile across the board to internationalism, and it remained so through the voting on the Bricker Amendment in 1954. He had become an isolationist, not merely a critic of wasteful spending on foreign aid. More than that, we have found one vote where he opposed an amendment requiring three-quarters of the economic aid money to be in loans instead of grants.

Our explanation is merely suggestive, but it seems to us that **Dirksen** slipped easily into opposition across the board to the Truman administration when the politics of the time heated up to white anger as they did through Truman's second term. The rise of the communist menace as a political issue, the damning and counterdamning that went on, helped push **Dirksen** into the extremism of his

natural allies. Republicans were equating Democrats with communism and war, and some of them with treason. It was not a quiet time, and men on both sides tended to move into extreme positions.

Besides this, **Dirksen** had a profound commitment to Robert Taft, and he fought desperately to win the Republican nomination for him. That made him not only an extreme partisan as against the Democrats, it also made him an extreme partisan as against a wing of his own party for Taft was defeated for the nomination. The spirit of that contest can perhaps most eloquently be described by the Eisenhower slogan that ruined Taft—Stop, Thief!—and **Dirksen's** brilliantly acerbic speech at the 1952 convention denouncing Tom Dewey in perhaps the most personally offensive a manner as had been used since Blaine unnerved Conklyn way back in 1866.

The bitter assaults on McCarthy, whom **Dirksen** knew well and liked, helped drive **Dirksen** into the position of becoming his chief defender—and that kept him in the far-right wing of the party that had surrounded McCarthy: Jenner, Welker, Malone, and Dworshak.

Taft died in 1953. McCarthy lost all face in 1954. Knowland had taken over the party leadership on the Senate floor, and **Dirksen** had been made whip. Knowland was an independent party leader—who felt utterly free to bolt at any time from the administration's position. **Dirksen** was frequently going to the White House for leadership meetings. The world was changing. The era of good feelings that Eisenhower brought to American politics—the good fellowship and the friendliness in place of the recent acid—was at work. The radicals in the Republican right subsided, with McCarthy's humiliation, and Eisenhower moved into a national popularity that was simply overwhelming. No politician of **Dirksen's** skill and intuition had to be told what that meant. There was no point in holding to the dead grudges of the dead past. Very well he could have detested Eisenhower for stealing the rightful claim of Taft to the presidency, but that was gone. **Dirksen** faced reality.

By 1955, **Dirksen** had become an Eisenhower man. His record, which we are sending you, shows him voting time after time, in 1955, 1956, 1957, and 1958 in support of the president's position. In 1955 and 1956, **Dirksen** was up for re-election. If he had been following Ike merely on intuition, it was a curiously accurate gauge of that election. Eisenhower carried Illinois—Stevenson's home state—by 850,000 votes in 1956. **Dirksen** won re-election by 385,000. It's not too much to assume that Eisenhower's candidacy and his support of Eisenhower in the Senate had a large share in bringing **Dirksen** safely back for a second term.

The 1958 elections threw the Congress heavily Democratic and removed Knowland as the Republican floor leader. A fight developed over his succession, the conservatives versus the liberals and progressives. Styles Bridges and the senior conservatives decided on **Ev Dirksen** for the job, and the liberals, after some

pushing and pulling, put up John Sherman Cooper. On the vote in the Republican caucus, **Dirksen** won 20 to 14—a vote which indicated the division politically of the Republicans in the Senate; and the problem **Dirksen** would have in being leader of them all.

He came to office as minority floor leader in January, 1959—and he brought a startling change to the job. Taft had briefly been Ike's Senate floor leader, in a trying period, and Taft had cooperated with him as well as he could. Knowland had seen the post differently and could not be called a loyal man to the president. He opposed the president frequently, even leaving his leadership chair to take a position in the back of the hall to dramatize the fact that he did not speak for the Eisenhower administration. Whatever hostility Ike might have had for **Dirksen**, or **Dirksen** for Ike, had long since vanished. He and **Dirksen** became good friends; and, indeed the testimony of everyone we talked to these past days confirms that it's mighty difficult not to like **Everett Dirksen**. That may not have been so true 10 years ago, but it was by 1959.

Dirksen simply took over the job of representing Eisenhower on the floor. "I carried the flag for him," said **Dirksen**, in a phrase both he and Eisenhower love. On one occasion, **Dirksen** was the only Republican to vote for the position Ike wanted. He conceived his office as one of a lieutenant to this immensely popular president, and that's the way it was.

With his party rank and file, the problem was more difficult. How could any man pull together the discordant branches of the Republican Party in the Senate, with Goldwater on one extreme and Javits on the other? Of course, it couldn't be done. But that didn't mean that **Dirksen** could not work to serve them, to accommodate them. To help them whenever he could, and to lessen the divisive drives inside the party and work them towards a middle unity. This he did. Before 1959 was finished, **Dirksen** had won over the liberals who had opposed him. "He's been marvelous," said one of them at the time. What **Dirksen** did, fairly and generously, was to represent their views to the White House, to give them a full show and full consideration, and then to reply back to them with great consideration and tact the positions of the White House. He became a bridge between the White House and all the Republicans in the Senate. We will discuss in detail in another file some of his leadership philosophy and practice. It is enough to say here that he convinced the members of his party that he meant them the very best he could—and they appreciated it.

The old political hatchet man, the biting critic, and the demagogic orator had slowly vanished; and the shape of **Dirksen** was changing in the minds of those who knew him—although long afterwards he would still be remembered for his most violent utterance against Dewey in '52. Where he once talked in bombastic homilies, indeed, where he once carried pure Faustian to an art and earned the title "The Wizard of Ooze," he now became a man of flowery phrases, to be sure, but phrase

meant to charm and amuse. Distinctly, the acid and the pomposity had gone. We've seen this ourselves, a slow miracle working in the man, a gentling of his being. Where once **Dirksen** was to be avoided by reporters for his fulsomeness, his lack of candor, and his arrogance, he became a man whom it was a pleasure to visit; he always found time to see you—where before he hadn't; he gave you what information he could—where before he tried to confuse you.

There had been a violent change in **Dirksen** when he came first to the Senate, then a gradual change as he moved into the direction of Eisenhower. Now came still another change; and it was a change unmistakably connected with the fact that **Dirksen**, after so many years of frustration in his desire to hold responsible office, so many years of simply being another one of the “outs”—he was even an “out” when Eisenhower was elected for he had backed Taft—had reached a position of great power and prestige. He had reached it, what's more, at a time in his life (he was 62) when he had to consider it the ultimate political position he could hope to hold.

Dirksen, after a lifetime, bore great personal responsibility in a position of great power and of great influence over the course of the nation. The long hunger was sated, and he could show his colleagues the stuff of which he was made.

END

September 4, 1962

MacNeil to Parker

Dirksen Cover VIII (Nation)

Context

Everett Dirksen was featured on the cover of *Time* magazine on September 14, 1962.

Lead Paragraph

From his earliest days in politics, **Dirksen** has been beset with an enormous ambition. He had no interest in state politics, for the conniving and machinations of building a local hill for himself. He wanted to get into “the big show” in Washington from the start, as we have already filed, and he used his politicking on the Pekin City Council and in the American Legion to thrust himself into national politics by way of a seat in the House of Representatives. He had to knock off an incumbent and wealthy Republican representative to do so—and he did.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

What good did it do a young, intelligent and energetic man to win a seat in the House of Representatives? He became one of 434 others, almost all of whom were unknown to the nation at large. It was true he had some local fame as an orator; he had some training as a lawyer, although he had yet to qualify at the bar. He was from a poor family, who had to provide his own education. He was a baker boy. Well, what qualifications did Lincoln have for national fame? He too was poor, self-educated, a lawyer, out of Illinois’ rural America, with a touch of eloquence, and a big feeling about his fellows. Lincoln had gone to the House of Representatives in 1847, for only one term. He was a rail splitter.

Lincoln was on **Dirksen’s** mind even before he took the oath of office in the House for the first time in 1933. Here is what he wrote of himself, while still only a representative-elect:

What can a young, inexperienced, Republican congressman...do for his country and his district...? Under such circumstances, opportunities for service are certain to rise. In 1846 when Polk was president, Illinois was represented in the House of Representatives by seven Democrats and one Republican. That lone Republican served only one term in Congress and yet that term produced an opportunity which elevated him to high station. He was Abraham Lincoln.

His own people in Illinois, even then, toyed with the idea that **Dirksen** might have before him a similar career. In a land like this, what were the limits to a man’s opportunities? And **Dirksen** obviously had such dreams. He spoke often in

Lincolnian terms. He still does, and Lincoln's phrases, like "the last best hope" and "we must disenthral[] ourselves," fall easily from his lips. He still has a passion for quoting Lincoln, and his speeches and conversations are studded with Lincoln's words. To us, so many years after his political beginning, he described his early years in Lincoln's precise words—"the short and simple anal[]s of the poor."

Dirksen aimed at the presidency from the star[t], and he worked for this high station from the start. In a body like the House, there could be great rewards for a man of intelligence and who worked hard, for the rewards in the House are dispensed for merit. **Dirksen** was not the least shy in asking for the choicest assignments even as a green freshman. He did move up rapidly. As we have seen, won the reputation of being one of the ablest men in the House. He saw the writing on the wall in 1941, moved to take leadership in the House in foreign affairs, followed the course led by Wendell Willkie long before his fellows in upholding FDR's hand in the face of international cataclysm, then moved in the early war days to try to take the lead in proposals to settle the peace—on an international basis, abandoning the long-revered American tradition of isolationism. Tom Dewey, at the State House in Albany, at just this time was altering his own stand on foreign affairs, moving rapidly into the stance of an internationalist. Why? Dewey was aiming at the 1944 presidential nomination. So was **Dirksen**.

Dirksen announced his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination in December, 1944. Even earlier he had misfired on two higher offices than representative. There had been talk of running him for the U.S. Senate in 1938, talk of running him for governor of Illinois in 1940. Did it seem ridiculous in 1943 to shoot for the highest office of all [?] The times were out of joint; the nation was at war. **Dirksen** had a solid reputation behind him in Congress, and he had considerable support from his fellows in the House for the presidency. The Congress had a unique political role in this period: financing the war, bracing the nation with bipartisan foreign policy, looking to the international settlement to follow the war. The nation's attention was on national affairs—and there were no Republicans in national politics seemingly qualified or interested in the presidency. The principle [sic] candidates for the 1944 GOP nomination were all out of war-time Washington: Willkie, Dewey, Governor John Bricker of Ohio and Governor Earl Warren of California. If the party decided it needed a candidate with rich Washington experience, why not **Dirksen**? It was a long shot—but how long a shot was Abe Lincoln in 1860?

"I'm not against anybody," **Dirksen** said at the time of his entry into the race. "I'm a serious candidate."

Some of the GOP polls in Washington were guessing that **Dirksen** was using the presidential target as a means of building stature in the House for a race for the Speakership, should the House swing to the Republican Party. There were

others, however—38 representatives signed a petition asking him to get into the presidential race—who thought otherwise.

But not until June did **Dirksen** finally withdraw his candidacy for the presidency. At the time, there was speculation that his real target was 1948—that 1944 was not a propitious time for a Republican to win the presidency, what with the war in full swing. **Dirksen**, however, switched from a presidential race to try to win the vice presidency. Dewey already was certain to win the presidential nomination, and **Dirksen** found himself actually in line to get the vice presidential nod from Dewey—for he was in direct line for it, after Warren and Bricker. Warren declined to leave his governorship. But Bricker had no such commitment to Ohio. **Dirksen** missed out.

That did not deter his ambitions. In 1946, he moved again for higher office—this time campaigning for the Republican floor leadership in the House. The Republicans won the House in 1946, and immediately a scramble began for the party's floor leadership. There was no attempt to fight Joe Martin for the Speakership, but there were three main candidates for the floor leadership: **Dirksen**, Charles Halleck of Indiana and Clarence Brown of Ohio. Halleck's forces crippled Brown by persuading Thomas Jenkins of Ohio, who [out]-ranked Brown in seniority, to get into the race. That split the Ohio delegation and took away Brown's political base. With **Dirksen**, it was simply a matter of outpolling him with the Republican members. Halleck tells us now that he considered **Dirksen** a more serious rival than Brown, but **Dirksen** withdrew when he discovered he couldn't defeat Halleck in a party caucus. "I've looked around, Charlie," **Dirksen** then said to Halleck, "and you have the votes."

That frustrated **Dirksen's** second push for power. Just at the point in his career when he had to make a major move to get into position for a thrust for national office. He was 50 years old. Of course, his failure to beat Halleck, and his forced retirement from politics shortly thereafter, removed him from any possibility of anything in 1948—and thereafter. His recovery in the summer of 1948 made Dewey think of him for a Cabinet post, and his election to the Senate in 1950 again opened possibilities for at least the second spot on a national ticket. **Dirksen** himself made a total commitment to Taft for 1952—but he had it deep in mind that Taft just might choose him as his running mate, if Taft won the presidential nomination. Curiously, **Dirksen** did not seem to consider that his geographical proximity to Taft's Ohio eliminated him from serious consideration, that Taft would have to go to the West coast or the East to find a running mate. Even now, **Dirksen** keeps a fading memory of the lost chance then. He told us that in the height of the campaign in 1952 to win the nomination for Taft, he went to Taft about the vice presidency. He told Taft that he had but one interest in his work for Taft: Taft's nomination. "If after you are nominated, I look like a likely..." Well, that would be entirely up to Taft; **Dirksen** was available if wanted, but Taft should make his decision in his own best interests. **Dirksen** said he took the matter up with Taft only because **Dirksen's**

friends were doing a lot of talking about a Taft-**Dirksen** ticket and it had become somewhat embarrassing to **Dirksen** and he feared it would embarrass Taft.

Dirksen incidentally tells us a charming story about Taft's political naivety. They were walking together down a Senate corridor, when **Dirksen** spotted a West Virginia delegation coming along who had invited Taft to a meeting in West Virginia. Taft had declined to come to the meeting and had sent a telegram instead. **Dirksen** introduced Taft to the group now, and one of them thanked Taft for sending the telegram. "Oh, that's all right," Taft blurted out, "We send those telegrams to everybody."

"I could have killed him," laughed **Dirksen** at Taft's faux pas.

Dirksen, of course, believed Taft to be eminently suited to be president. He admired immensely Taft's intelligence, integrity, and "depth of conviction." When Taft's ambition was frustrated by Eisenhower, as supported by Tom Dewey, **Dirksen** vented on Dewey not only his bitterness against Dewey for destroying Taft's last hope of the presidency, but **Dirksen's** own hopes for great office. The bitterness welled up in him in that extraordinary speech at the convention—and it stayed with him into the new administration. The year 1952 seemed well in advance like a Republican year, much as 1948 had. The Democratic administration not only had been shown pockmarked with corruption and venality, but was also under a terrible crossfire of being soft to communism, at an hour when American boys were being killed by communists in Korea. The Republican presidential candidate would win—and inevitably be re-nominated in 1956. There would be no hope for any other Republican until 1960, and by that time, Taft would be 71 years old, **Dirksen** would be 64, both too old for the "big" office. Doubtless, that added acid to the **Dirksen** of this time.

Dirksen returned to the Senate in 1953, as a member of the opposition minority of his own party, and that opposition found a center in Joe McCarthy. Not until McCarthy's p[er]s[on]al passing from the scene, which was more than a year after Taft died, did **Dirksen** begin to move into a new orbit whose center was that remarkable man, Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower was not a man admired by Republican conservatives. Even besides the destruction of Taft's ambition, Ike entered the White House with programs and policies that smacked too much for the conservatives of the Roosevelt New Deal and the Truman Fair Deal. It took a little time for **Dirksen**—for many of the GOP conservatives it took until 1959 and Ike's dramatic shift to strict conservatism—to move towards Ike. His record shows **Dirksen** becoming an Eisenhower man as early as 1955—and then in 1959 he became the GOP floor leader, the president's lieutenant in the Senate, a great office indeed, if not presidency or the vice presidency.

From the beginning, **Dirksen** had his eye on the main chance. His ambition was enormous. All through his career he had calculated for his own advancement:

the presidency, the vice-presidency, the Speakership. His voting record had shown violent fluctuations. He is still capable of spinning around completely on subjects—and we will cite a few in a later file—and he had won for himself, among his harshest critics, a plausible record of a man with no political principles. He did what helped **Dirksen** most, no matter the awkwardness of the shifts and turnings involved. This is the reading of those who have watched particularly his record in foreign affairs, but there have been similar gyrations on other subjects as well.

His ability, his reputation as a political spinner, his acidity, and his obvious admiration of himself in his early years in the Senate, brought on him a large body of contempt from his political opponents. They had that erratic voting record to point to and the cirulence [?] and venom of the man in action and spoken word.

That reputation now has largely vanished among his own colleagues, the men who know him best. At the time of his elevation to the party's floor leader, the Republican liberals and progressive[s] despaired of the "image" **Dirksen** would give the party nationally, of themselves as Senate Republicans. That has vanished. Even the liberal Democrats, the ones who despised **Dirksen** for his defense of McCarthy as well as his fluctuating voting record, began to change in their views of **Dirksen**. One of them said to us the other day: "He's a man of no principles." This was the old, raw contempt for **Dirksen**. Another, equally liberal, said precisely the same thing: "He's a man of no principles." Then this one added: "No, that's not fair. He does believe in some things." We thought the qualification fascinating. (The senator, no use: Joe Clark.)

From **Dirksen's** own Republicans, however, the view today has been as we've filed in *Take One*: Unanimous endorsement of the man as leader. From **Dirksen's** opposites in the Democratic leadership: Precisely the same endorsement of **Dirksen** as leader.

Repeatedly, when we told senators, in preliminary to interviewing them about **Dirksen**, that this was for a *Time* cover on **Dirksen**, their response was: "God."¹ From both sides of the aisle. They thought he deserved this form of recognition.

Repeatedly, too. From the ranks of his own party and from the Democrats (except the northern liberals) came variations on one basic theme: "He's grown." "He's settled down."

Dirksen's ambitions have been satisfied. He has stopped thinking of himself as an end in himself. This has been more than merely becoming Ike's lieutenant on the Hill—for Ike is now two years gone and **Dirksen** acts with the same profound sense of the responsible public officer now as he did then, albeit with the old skill to maneuver of his earlier years, now that Kennedy is president. What has happened to

¹ It may be that MacNeil intended "Good" instead of "God."

Dirksen, we suggest, is that he has become a Senate man, a man committed to the mystique of the Senate, an everescent [sic], ennobling something that makes its practitioners believe that beyond party, beyond self, their task is something richly rewarding, immensely significant in making the Senate, the noblest work of man, operate in its own high traditions, the very touchstone of the American idea of responsibility and freedom itself.

END

September 4, 1962

MacNeil to Parker

Dirksen Cover IX (Nation)

Context

Everett Dirksen was featured on the cover of *Time* magazine on September 14, 1962.

Lead Paragraph

A couple of years ago, when Lyndon Johnson of Texas was running the U.S. Senate as his own private bailiwick, in a style never seen before on Capitol Hill of self-gratulation [sic] and command, an apocryphal story went the rounds of Washington about the rivalry between him and **Everett Dirksen** for personal marks of prestige. The story had it that **Dirksen** was exceedingly jealous of Lyndon's telephone in Lyndon's Cadillac limousine. After much finagling, **Dirksen** got one too, and promptly used it to telephone Lyndon as they were both being driven from the Capitol Hill to their homes. The conversation went like this:

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

"Hello Lyndon, This is **Everett Dirksen**. I'm calling you from my limousine with my new phone."

"Wait a minute, **Everett**. The other phone is ringing."

The story, although totally fabricated (**Dirksen** actually had the phone automatically provided in his official car removed, so he wouldn't be bothered on his rides back and forth), has a profound meaning for us, for the fact of the matter is that **Dirksen** did learn much from Lyndon's style of leadership and did, with very important exceptions, model his own leadership on that of Lyndon's. There was a considerable mimicry by **Dirksen** of Johnson.

Dirksen and Johnson did not disagree one iota in their concept of the Senate, once **Dirksen** moved into the philosophy that the Senate, as an institution, is an end unto itself. "Lyndon proceeded on the sound theory," **Dirksen** said to us, "that the Senate is a two-way street and that if the Senate did not get along, the Senate would be quickly reduced to a shambles.

"The Senate's primary function is to serve the whole country. For that reason it is the duty on the part of the Senate leaders never to forget the national interest in seeking action in any legislative field. As a result, when seemingly insurmountable difference[s] arose, it was necessary to sit down and explain all possibilities in order to resolve the problem.

“The course to pursue is the course of gentle persuasion.”

The Senate cannot proceed in its business without, essentially, a consensus of the Senate ready and willing to proceed. By its very rules, any senator can block immediate action on anything. And any determined group of members almost surely can block any action indefinitely. **Dirksen**, like Johnson, has predicated his leadership of the Senate on “forbearance and flexibility.” He has been, like Johnson, a seeker of compromise in the middle ground—and like Johnson, **Dirksen** has been committed to the central idea that the leadership of both parties must coordinate their own activities, to accommodate each other, that the Senate can act.

Dirksen gave to Johnson that total cooperation, and he has continued to give it to Mike Mansfield, Johnson’s successor as majority leader. That essentially explains the admiration of **Dirksen** by Mansfield and the whole Democratic leadership. He has given his very best to them—not agreeing on how to vote, of course—in keeping the Senate functioning. Had he been a political spoiler like Charles Halleck, had he been as inflexible as Halleck, the Senate could not have acted as a forum of national judgment, for a political gut-fighter and obstructionist in the role of a party leader in the Senate could prevent action at will.

Dirksen learned self-abnegation in two ways, and this fact of his self-abnegation, we suggest, has been the secret of his current popularity in the Senate. The first and obvious way was in recognizing himself as Eisenhower’s man in the Senate. He gave to Eisenhower his total devotion to the extent of altering his own positions (as in foreign aid) to back Eisenhower fully. The second—and this is the important way now—was to sublimate himself for the sake of his party in the Senate and the Senate itself.

He concedes that in recent years, he has felt his own mellowing. This is not age alone, but a growing contentment inside the man, the loss of unsatisfied ambition.

“The longer one is identified with public life, especially at the national level,” he said to us, “the more one is persuaded, as an ancient philosopher said, that politics is the art of the possible.”

(Lyndon Johnson read that same ancient philosopher.)

“In any parliamentary body,” **Dirksen** went on, “you deal with many individuals who embrace different philosophies and represent different local interests. It would be strange indeed if members did not give attention to those items which meant the wellbeing and prosperity of their states and districts.

“So in compounding legislation on the national field, there must be give and take. Nothing is ever black or white. If it were not for the adjustments made, it’s doubtful that the legislative machinery could ever operate smoothly and effectively.”

That’s **Dirksen’s** philosophical approach to the needs of operating with a flexible approach [in] the U.S. Senate. It’s identical to Lyndon Johnson’s. All right, then, but how does **Dirksen** approach the problem of finding the “possible”?

“What you do,” he said, “is see how much common ground there is on which every member of the party (in the Senate) can stand. You note what the differences might be. When that’s been done, then you try to close the gap, and this is different with every situation that arises.”

How about an example? Well, take the recent satellite bill. That bill, supported basically by most of the Congress, was assaulted in the Senate by a band of Democratic liberals who regarded it as a “giveaway” and attempted to prevent its passage by filibustering. The filibuster had to be broken, if the bill were to be passed, and cloture—a formal vote by two-thirds of the Senate to end debate—was the only feasible possibility. Cloture had not been invoked in 35 years. Cloture is normally impossible to invoke in the Senate.

“The members,” said **Dirksen**, “as a general thing, simply refuse to invoke cloture against themselves. Normally, in some states the question at issue is only of academic interest.” (Therefore there could be no pressure on the senators from those states to vote for cloture.) “When it came to the satellite bill, however, there were questions of national security as well as the progress being made by the Soviet Union. Quite aside from the basic problem of space communication, other appeals could be made. I used them as effectively as I knew how.”

That is, **Dirksen** could argue with his Republicans that the filibuster had to be halted in the interests of national security. He was so successful that he lost only two Republican votes on the cloture vote, Goldwater and Tower, and of these, one, Goldwater, waited in the cloakroom ready to sidestep the vote until **Dirksen** sent him word that cloture would be invoked whether he voted or not. Goldwater felt he could not vote for cloture, but he was willing to go along with **Dirksen** to the extent of not voting at all.

How about **Dirksen’s** relationship with the Democrats?

“Even in a predominantly Democratic Senate,” he said, “the minority has its interests and its policies, which it tries to effectuate. Very obviously to do so requires votes from the other side of the aisle. As a general thing, minority policy comes about in the form of amendments or substitutes for administration bills.”

What **Dirksen** does is consult with those Democrats known to oppose a given administration bill and try to work out a coalition position between those Democrats and the Republicans. His best instance of success this year was the vote by which the Senate killed the president's medical care program. He worked closely with Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, and between them they mustered 52 votes against the bill. Only five Republicans voted for the bill. **Dirksen** must attract southern and conservative Democrats if he is to win in a test vote against the administration Democrats. To do so, he, of course, consults in detail with the leaders of those opposition Democrats.

In general, **Dirksen** approaches his job of leadership in a most elementary way. He goes to members of his party, normally every one of them, when a controversial question is about to come before the Senate. "How do you feel about this?" he asks his colleagues, one by one. Many of his rank and file members feel strongly for or against a given bill. These **Dirksen** does not normally attempt to influence. Those with mixed ideas, he will try to persuade to a position found and set by himself. He has been eminently successful at this.

Take, for example, the vote a week ago on the president's tax credit for business. That proposal received the opposition of every single Republican member of the House of Representatives. They established a firm party position against it. **Dirksen** saw the question differently. He knew that major industries, like the railroads in his home state, wanted that tax credit. He began to work for it. He started by telling Republicans that he thought the section would remain in the tax bill as reported from Harry Byrd's Finance Committee, despite Byrd's opposition to it. The conservative Republicans took alarm at this hint by **Dirksen** that he favored it. They began to bring pressure on **Dirksen** to switch his position. By the time they did, it was already too late. **Dirksen** had himself already worked over the ranks of the Republicans in the Senate, and he had 13 Republicans besides himself committed to vote for it. "I need your vote," he told his Senate Republicans. "Can you help me?" He talked to Goldwater, too, and Goldwater was against the tax credit—but to Goldwater it wasn't a matter of life and death. "If you need my vote," Goldwater said to **Dirksen**, "I'll go with you." We find that a dramatic proof of **Dirksen's** wooing of his own people. **Dirksen** didn't need Goldwater's vote, and Goldwater voted against the tax credit. But he would have [voted for the tax credit], if it meant the difference to **Dirksen**.

This item, of course, was high on the administration's list—and its approval by the Senate rested solely on **Dirksen's** ability to bring Republicans to support it. The Democratic leadership in the Senate confirms to us that without **Dirksen's** active support on this one, it would have been rejected by the Senate.

Normally, **Dirksen** has not provided such cooperation for the Kennedy legislative proposals affecting the economy. He has, in fact, led the opposition to most of these economic measures offered by the president, among them: medical

care, the farm bills, urban affairs, public works. His cooperation with the administration normally encompasses national defense and foreign affairs—and that’s a large area. We can expect him to back the trade bill, still to come before the Senate, and the foreign aid bill appropriation, as he has in the recent past. “His leadership responsibility,” said one Democratic observer of **Dirksen**, “has made him responsible on foreign aid.” His support of the president’s proposal to buy U.N. bonds, as a means of financing that international body, was the critical support needed to get that past the Senate—as was his support of the satellite bill and tax credit.

Dirksen did more than hustle a few votes from the Republicans on that one. He worked hand in hand with Mike Mansfield to put together amendments that would assuage the Senate’s objections to the proposal, then got them cleared by Kennedy himself. Then, as a final capstone to his work, he made a remarkable speech on the bill, just before the vote, a speech that Senator Carroll acknowledged changed his vote on the bill.

“We had some faith in Dwight Eisenhower,” **Dirksen** told the Senate, in his ringing voice, “and I have not forfeited my faith in John Fitzgerald Kennedy. I am willing always to trust the president, because I think he has a sense of responsibility.” (We suggest this speech—pp 5616-5617, *Congressional Record*, April 5, 1962—to your full attention). As he concluded, Rhode Island’s John Pastore, a tough, eloquent man in his own right, jumped to his feet. “I have been a member of the Senate for 11 years,” he told the Senate, “This evening I have heard one of the finest speeches ever delivered in the Senate. I congratulate the senator from Illinois.” After the vote, Mansfield took the floor and he too commended **Dirksen** for being “a voice of strength in the consideration of this measure.”

This is a fine example of the new **Dirksen** and the new respect he commands in the Senate from his colleagues. It’s a far different attitude than a few years ago when he was regarded as something of a demagogue and political hatchetman.

“I think he’s developed into a very responsible leader of his party,” said Cliff Case of New Jersey. “I think he’s grown tremendously in the past four years.”

His mastery of detail on legislation, his ready memory, his ready wit, his flamboyance, and boisterous good will, his friendliness, his charm, his sympathetic understanding of the problems of his colleagues and associates—all attested to many times over to us—have won him the affections of his colleagues and their respect. And this has been reflected in the White House of John Kennedy as it was in the White House of Eisenhower. “Who the hell could dislike **Dirksen**?” a Kennedy lieutenant asked. “He gets his arm around your shoulder, and, well...he’s a total pro, able, cute, and clever.”

The White House of Kennedy has learned to respect **Dirksen**, as does the president, as well as like him. At the time of the White House conferences with the congressional leadership on the gathering Laos crisis, the president's aides were astonished to find that the most penetrating questions asked by the men from the Hill came from Senator **Dirksen**. All the foreign policy experts were there—Fulbright, Sparkman, Judd, Mansfield, but **Dirksen** outshone them all in his knowledge and range of the Southeast Asian imbroglio.

His support of the president in foreign and defense matters has not been a me-too approach, even though his defense of the U.N. bonds caused deep resentment among the Republican ranks, both in the House and the Senate. He has, in recent weeks, been firing at the president on the Berlin situation, and the general foreign picture, and we are packeting to you some of these statements. In the nuclear field, he has also been rough on the president and the president's offered concessions to the Russians on testing.

That, however, has been part of the great game of politics and policy, freely accepted by the Democrats on the Hill and the White House without resentment, [f]or they know from **Dirksen's** actions that they can count on him in the tight areas of foreign and defense bills, even when his own ranks swing into opposition. And it is this area primarily—despite contributions to Kennedy on the satellite bill and tax credit—that the Democrats are most grateful to **Dirksen**, why Mansfield in particular rates **Dirksen** so high among all his colleagues in the Senate.

END

September 4, 1962

MacNeil to Parker

Dirksen Cover XI (Nation)

Context

Everett Dirksen was featured on the cover of *Time* magazine on September 14, 1962.

Lead Paragraph

And what about **Dirksen's** opponent this year, Sydney R. Yates of Chicago, 52-year-old lawyer and representative of Illinois in the House for seven terms? Yates is a handsome, very intelligent, machine-oriented politician of the liberal persuasion, who long has wanted to become a federal judge. (He claims this desire for a judgeship has waned now, but the Republicans in Illinois are referring to an unfilled district judgeship as the "Yates appointment" to be filled after the votes are counted.) Yates ranks second to Eddie Boland as the representative who has most closely supported President Kennedy in Congress.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

Yates got the nod from Dick Daley and the Democratic organization early this year, after Adlai E. Stevenson turned down the chance to run against **Dirksen**. Adlai consulted with Kennedy at the White House, then announced from the steps that the president wanted him to stay at the United Nations. It made Yates publicly a second choice by the party, but that hasn't stopped Yates from campaigning furiously all over the state.

Yates, basically, has been trying to do what **Dirksen** did to Scott Lucas in 1950. In that race, Lucas couldn't leave Washington, while **Dirksen** was free to canvass the state at will. Yates has had no reason to stick to Washington, and he has been flying in only long enough to cast a critical vote, and then fly back to Illinois to get back to shaking hands.

Yates freely concedes that he started as a decided underdog in the race against **Dirksen**; that **Dirksen** was widely known throughout the state; and that he, Yates, was known scarcely further than the borders of Chicago. Yates, however, believes he is closing the gap between him and **Dirksen**. He has had the help of Kennedy-pollster Lou Harris, and Harris's figures indicate that Yates is "within striking distance" of **Dirksen**. What that means, we are not sure. Yates tells us that he doesn't exactly remember the precise relationship, percentagewise, between him and **Dirksen**, but he thinks it was about 52 to 48 in July. We don't believe that figure from Yates—he himself was acting evasively when he said it; and we're almost certain that Yates is far worse off than that, and just doesn't want to discourage his own people by giving the exact figures.

Yates has been concentrating his efforts so far on downstate Illinois, all those counties beyond Cook where he is not known. He appears, from a distance, to be working very hard at the business of getting his name known to the voters. So far he has canvassed 63 of the state's 102 counties, and he claims that he now has pulled even with **Dirksen** in the counties along and just south of U.S. Route 40. This is an area that is now sending some Democrats to the House of Representatives.

Yates is using all the modern techniques of campaigning: labor meetings, women's groups, shopping centers, coffee klatches, luncheons, dinners, caravans, factory gates, railroad stations, news interviews, local radio, and TV, college campuses, craft unions, court houses—and continuing this right through the week from 6 a.m. to after 10. This he is doing while **Dirksen** is held in Washington and gets out to Illinois only on weekends.

Yates tell us he's found little enthusiasm for **Dirksen** and considerable hostility for him in the state, and Yates is hitting **Dirksen** hard on several issues. Here's one sample of a speech:

“The people of Illinois won't send a man to Washington again who votes one way in Washington, and talks another way in Illinois. Senator **Dirksen** may use his flowing phrases, his soothing oozy, syrupy words; but his record is coming out, and I'm going to help it come out...”

Yates charged that **Dirksen** “sabotaged” the drug bill, and then “the outcry over Thalidomide changed his mind after he told me: ‘The present law is adequate.’”

Yates also has been hitting **Dirksen** on these points:

Parmark: Medical care. “I hear tell that **Dirksen** is being considered for an honorary degree as Master of Surgery from the American Medical Association for cutting up the medical care bill.”

Parmark: Minimum wages: “Can a family be supported on less than \$50 a week? **Dirksen** voted against it.”

Parmark: Area development. “This is the bill that meant so much to southern Illinois. **Dirksen** was against it.”

Parmark: Housing bill for low-rent units for the poor and the elderly, which **Dirksen** opposed.

Parmark: Rural electrification. “**Dirksen** has voted against every rural electrification bill.”

Yates has also accused **Dirksen** of doing nothing for Illinois as a senator. He claims that **Dirksen** can only point to one state project—a navigation project on the Kaskaskia River; and that bill hasn't been passed yet by the House—[as] **Dirksen's** sole claim for 12 years in the Senate.

Yates has had some film clips made with JFK that he'll use in the campaign, and a picture of himself with Kennedy. "He's helping all he can," said Yates of Kennedy. "He's been completely cooperative."

Yates takes hope from some statistics on Illinois. In recent elections, there has been a statewide preponderance for the Democrats. **Dirksen** ran far behind Ike in 1956. Chicago gave Democrats a 400,000 margin in 1958. In 1960, Kennedy won with only the majority vote of 9 counties, while Douglas won that year with a 500,000 majority. Democratic registration is doing well, and the Daley machine is working hard.

The Democrats here in Washington have not given up on Yates. Kennedy will campaign vigorously for him, hitting both downstate and Chicago in October, the best time to stir up the Democrats to vote. Yates does have a chance, in the view of the Democrats; but he is only on their "hope" list, not the "possible" list, or the "probable" list, certainly not on the "sure" list.

Barry Goldwater, the GOP senatorial campaign chairman, writes Illinois as certain for **Dirksen**. "Yates doesn't have a chance," says Goldwater.

END

September 5, 1962

MacNeil to Parker

Dirksen Cover XII (Nation)

Context

Everett Dirksen was featured on the cover of *Time* magazine on September 14, 1962.

Lead Paragraph

Everett Dirksen moves with great physical energy. A restless, nervous man he exalts in the furious pace that he now is keeping, a more energetic pace than he has ever kept before—and he has been known through his adult life as a “prodigious” worker. He’s a man who loves action, activity of any kind, so long as it’s politics or the business of running the U.S. Senate.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

His secretary, Mrs. Glee Gomien, keeps a pot of coffee warm the whole time he is in the vicinity. Just about every time he slips away from the Senate floor to his nearby office (once the Supreme Court’s dressing room, later Bill Knowland’s office), he calls for a cup of coffee, which he drinks black. Perhaps ten a day. His doctors told him to cut down on cigarettes when he confessed to them that he was smoking three packs (Kents usually) a day. **Dirksen’s** solution: He no longer carries cigarettes on him, freely bums cigarettes any place he can get them, usually his staff aides, and thus has no longer any means of telling how many he smokes a day. There’s no record, but he guesses about two packs.

Normally he flies out to Illinois every weekend, even without a campaign underway. And every time he gets into a plane, he sits in the same seat, the second seat back from the front of the plane on the left side. It’s just a habit, but of course it’s over the plane’s wing, and therefore subject to the least disturbance on the flight. He has no amusement about him in a plane, doesn’t want to talk to anyone. He works on his papers the moment he sits down until the plane lands. He normally carries a brief case so packed with papers that he has to pay extra charges for it. Usually it weighs about 35 pounds, more than the clothes he takes. Plane rides are one of his principal times for catching up on his work.

Dirksen normally rises at 5:30 in the morning, and still in his pajamas, heats up a little coffee to get him started on the day. His two bedroom apartment at the Berkshire, out Massachusetts Avenue in the northwest, is modest, and one of the bedrooms has been fixed up as an office for him. He gets right to work on his reading, and his mail. He developed this habit of early rising as part of his adult life when he was working in the bakery; then he got up at 4:30 every morning to get the ovens going. **Dirksen** likes these early hours to work because he can’t be interrupted

in his work. “There are no phone calls,” he says, “and there’s no one walking in on you. It’s the most fruitful time of the day for me.” By 8:30 or so he’s ready to go to the Capitol, and he continues working on his papers on his chauffeur ride. He’s going all day long. First comes his office routine, perhaps a call or two from colleagues, then usually off to a committee. Although the minority leader, he serves on the Judiciary Committee, and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, as well as two minor joint committees.

He’s on the floor at the opening of the Senate, usually at Noon, but frequently earlier. Then he keeps to the floor, or nearby, for the rest of the session. There’s always a heavy stream of people wanting to talk to him, lobbyists, home state people, constituents of one kind or another; and he pops into his office to see them as he can. He eats a sandwich for lunch, frequently at his desk; and keeps in operation and in mind all the bills, reports, resolutions, and strategies of all the legislation on its way to the floor. He frequently consults with Bob Humphries, staff man for the joint GOP leadership, often typing out notes or scrawling in longhand ideas he has for formal leadership positions on various questions and issues. He has the GOP conference every Tuesday or Wednesday at Noon, the leadership meeting every week, too.

Then he’s frequently invited to dinners; and because of his official rank, he often hesitates to refuse the official ones: i.e., Cabinet, White House, embassies, and, of course, the big conventions. A year ago, we invited him to the White House Correspondents’ Dinner for the president. He refused because he had a big dinner the same night out in Illinois that was important to him politically. He called back a few minutes later; he was worried that if he didn’t go to the White House Correspondents’ Dinner, he might be missed, and his absence might suggest that he was snubbing the president. Could he accept after all? It fascinated us that he was so concerned that he might inadvertently cause embarrassment to the Democratic president.

On those nights he doesn’t have to go out to dinner, he heads for his apartment for dinner with his wife—and more homework on his bills, reports, and all the rest. “I’d be lost in a fog if I didn’t do it,” he says of this enormous effort to keep up with every detail of his operations. He’s in bed by 11, but sometimes he runs a little later. He’s up at 5:30 the next morning anyway. He doesn’t need much sleep.

Frequently in the late afternoon or early evening at the Senate, he will meet with other senators in his own “hideaway.” This is actually an office adjoining the one he uses as minority leader. There, a bar is set up off to the right of the handsome marble fireplace, and the room is comfortably furnished with cushioned chairs and sofas. **Dirksen** usually takes a couple of ounces of Jack Daniels with soda before dinner; but he’s a light drinker, and uninterested in wines. He likes to eat fish, and he likes steak.

Dirksen almost has no interest in things on radio, [or] television except an occasional western (“Have Gun Will Travel” is a favorite). He won’t go to movies, has little interest in athletics of any kind, rarely goes to more than the opening baseball game in Washington, no interest in the theater.

Curiously, **Dirksen’s** pants pockets are as filled with odds and ends as any country boy’s. We heard of this and simply demanded that he empty his pockets on his desk. This is what we unearthed: a pocket knife, a Christopher medal, an empty leather pill box (he usually carries aspirin in case of an oncoming cold, eye strain, etc.), a cold sniffer, a magnifying reading glass in [a] case (for small type), an odd shape piece of rough jade (given to him years ago), a 1955 medal of the Kewanee Lodge, a silver dollar cash clip, two heavily burdened key rings, and one quarter.

On weekends, when he doesn’t fly to Chicago and Illinois, **Dirksen** slips out to Leesburg, Virginia, where a few miles out of town he has a four-acre farm. There he still likes to garden; and what he’s gardening usually are the same truck vegetables he used to garden as a boy in Pekin. He loafs and rests out there—a process he calls “system repair.” “It freshens you up for the combat of the next week.”

He used to play golf, and he used to swim, but this [he] does no longer. Occasionally he goes fishing; and he’s a fisherman who likes to sit on a wharf and let the fish come to him: no athletics in chasing them. “Fishing should be relaxation. When you fish, you can think, puzzle and philosophize.”

What about the thesis that **Dirksen** is a changed man since he took over the leadership, since the thirst for power and office was satisfied, since he found a larger self in self-abnegation for the benefit of his party and the Senate [?] **Dirksen** scarcely could be expected to agree that before this he was a demagogue or a charlatan, a bitter, biting partisan, a political hatchetman. But here is how he sums himself up, what the responsibility of leadership did to him.

“When you assume leadership,” he said to us, “you have to become decisive, whether you like it or not. Decisions have to be made every day. You can’t dawdle. The pace is fast.

“Life is a matter of development or decay. You either grow or you retrogress. There’s no standing still. You go backward or forward. The challenge will make you grow, if you are willing to assert a leadership and look on the challenge as something to be met and disposed of.

“I did not always see eye to eye with President Eisenhower; but if you’re going to be a leader and carry the flag, you ought to do it with loyalty and devotion, or you should surrender the leadership flag.

“Every year that you are in public service at the national level broadens your horizons, your background, and the reservoir of information that you accumulate, and thereby gives you a better predicate from which to make decisions.”

And what about your change?

“Time sharpens your charitable instincts. I made a practice for a time of reading a portion of the first dozen verses of Paul’s Letter to the Corinthians. ‘Though I speak with the voice of men and of angels...’ He ends by saying that there are three things, faith, hope, and charity, but the greatest of these is charity...that spirit sort of goes with you as the years unfold, and you look with more charitable eyes. You finally discover that you do not want to build up anger with anybody. Never let the acid of anger in your soul.”

And what are your thoughts against the day when the Great Presiding Officer of them all recognizes the senator from Illinois and calls him to a final account?

“I think that at any given time, every individual thinks of the day of his physical dissolution—and a very pointed philosophy has built up in me which is based on the admonition carried in the Book of Matthew. There the Gospel points out: It’s not your sins of commission, but your sins of omission that will be the basis of the final judgment. He says: ‘Ye did it not.’ You take that to heart a little. You hoped you haven’t overlooked too many things and being charitable when that day comes.”

END

August 10, 1963

From Miller to Gruin

Kefauver (Nation)

Context

Although MacNeil did not file this report, his papers include this report following the death of Kentucky senator and erstwhile Democratic presidential candidate Estes Kefauver.

Lead Paragraph

Estes Kefauver, the knight in the coonskin cap, warred on a lot of dragons in his political life. Thursday of this week he entered the lists in the Senate once again, lowered his lance and charged at that old *bête noir* of the anti-monopoly liberals, the Communications Satellite Corporation. In a sense, at least, the old boy went down fighting. While leading the battle on the floor against a NASA appropriation which would have benefitted the Communications Satellite Corporation, Estes began to feel ill—in the middle of a speech. He attributed it to an attack of indigestion, and remained on the floor an hour or so. But when he felt no better, he had two of his aides from the Anti-Trust and Monopoly Subcommittee drive him out to the Bethesda Naval Hospital when the Senate quit at the end of the day. Less than 36 hours later he was dead.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

There is not a great deal to say about what he'd been doing for the last six months. Perhaps the most interesting affair was the renewal of his joust with the drug companies. Kefauver learned that the big drug firm of McKesson-Robbins had tentatively planned to help out with the Alliance for Progress by making drugs available for distribution in Colombia at very low prices, but had come under bitter pressure from the other big drug companies not to do so. Kefauver had issued subpoenas to these firms, in preparation for an investigation to document their actions against McKesson-Robbins. But there was considerable opposition to such an investigation by others on his Anti-Trust and Monopoly Subcommittee—which had been purposely stacked with defendants of industry by Judiciary Committee

chairman Jim Eastland and **Ev Dirksen**—and it was expected when this opposition finally forced a showdown sometime late this month Estes would be outvoted and the subpoenas quashed.

...

END

August 22, 1963

From Miller to Parker

Kefauver (Nation)

Context

This report from Miller followed the August 10 filing relating to the death of Estes Kefauver.

Lead Paragraph

Estes Kefauver's primary committee post—from which he launched his recent investigations into everything from price-fixing in the drug and electrical industries to boxing—was chairmanship of the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

Next in line on the Democratic side of the committee is Michigan's Phil Hart, a solid senator whose liberal credentials are as good as Kefauver's but who has none of the demagogue in him. He is so liberal, in fact, that there was a good deal of speculation that the vested interests which have been successful in recent years in getting Judiciary Committee chairman Jim Eastland and senior Republican **Ev Dirksen** to stack the subcommittee (with conservatives) against Kefauver would be able to get Eastland to bypass Hart and appoint a new chairman more amenable to the rape of the consumer. Eastland, however, moved up Hart to the chairmanship—a move which my sources around the Senate interpret as clear proof that Hart stands high enough in the esteem of his colleagues that Eastland would have found it impolitic to pass him over.

...

END

November 21, 1963

From McNeil to Parker
Congress Week (Nation)

Context

On the day before President John Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, MacNeil filed a report on the last days of the Senate session, focusing on the unusual action of Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's to hold senators accountable for conducting the chamber's business. Mansfield was responding, in part, to criticisms of the Senate's slow pace.

Lead Paragraph

This week the Senate and House got around to handling a few more appropriation bills—incredibly tardy for this routine but mandatory business of running the federal government.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

He and **Dirksen** were at their posts, said Mansfield.

“But where was the business?” he asked. “Where were the Senators to do it? A quorum bell does not necessarily bring the same responses in the Senate as the alarm bell brings in a firehouse.”

Mansfield was joined by **Dirksen**, who described the affair as a “distressing situation, to say the least.” “We could not find the senators in charge of the respective bills that were announced as the order of business,” said **Dirksen**.

...

END

November 23, 1963

From MacNeil to Parker

Johnson Cover-VI (Nation)

Context

In the wake of the Kennedy administration, MacNeil contrasted the late president's relationships and approach to Congress with those of his successor, Lyndon Baines Johnson. *Time* featured Johnson on the cover of its November 29 issue.

Lead Paragraph

The death of President Kennedy has simply frozen the U.S. Congress. None of the legislative leaders had the faintest concept of its meaning in terms of the legislative program that the president had advocated. They did not even know when again the Congress could get back into operation. The utter shock of this harrowing, unthinkable fact of the president's assassination has simply paralyzed—for the moment—the legislative process.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

But more than this is Johnson's own personal style of operation. If he bases his presidency on his own past, we must expect Johnson to have a much more cordial relationship with the congressional Republicans. Those Republicans, in the past two years, have always been suspecting Kennedy of harpooning them when they weren't looking. Johnson will not let that situation arise with him. His closest working ally in running the U.S. Senate—at the height of his powers there—was **Everett Dirksen**, and that fact is significant for the future.

...

In specific terms, we hesitate to forecast the legislation that will be emerging. It seems pretty obvious that nothing of substance will be enacted this year. There's widespread agreement with **Dirksen's** idea that Congress may in fact adjourn a little earlier than planned this year—come back a little later than the January 3 date planned. This would give Johnson a chance to adjust to the presidency, without the

burden of Congress on his neck. All members of Congress want to help Lyndon now. They all know the safety of the nation is in his hands. That comes first. And they will be, as they are now, more than willing to abide by his immediate wishes.

...

END

November 26, 1963

From McNeil to Johnston

“Congress -11” (NA)

Context

MacNeil described the congressional response to the new president, calling attention to liberals’ preferring to push ahead with John Kennedy’s bills against conservatives’ preference for delay. He analyzed votes on specific legislative measures.

Lead Paragraph

The Congress welcomed Lyndon Johnson this week as president of the United States with great personal warmth and with sure confidence in his known abilities and familiarity with the vast and complex business of the whole federal establishment.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

“Let’s just do what we have to do and go home,” said Halleck. **Dirksen** backed him in this, saying that Congress ought to let Johnson “get his ducks in a row.”

...

Kennedy’s death has not improved the chances of foreign aid appropriations. Nor any of the other important Kennedy bills.

Everett Dirksen put the reason succinctly this week: “Congress hasn’t changed.”

...

END

December 19, 1963

From McNeil to Parker

The 88th, First Session-II (Nation)

Context

As was his custom at the end of congressional sessions, MacNeil produced a wide-ranging analysis of the accomplishments and shortcomings of the preceding session.

Lead Paragraph

We hesitate to call this Congress the worst in so many years for two reasons. The first is that the framework of the reference is awkward and unconvincing to the initiated and indemonstrable without more information than we have on hand. The second is that there is a case to be made for a “do-nothing” Congress, a dilatory, listless Congress, a standstill Congress, or even a frustrated, somewhat schizophrenic Congress as we expect this one to be. For the case can be made that the Congress’ job is to represent the people, and we suspect that the Congress has been doing just that, on the now familiar theory that President Kennedy was more popular personally than his legislative program.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Senator **Dirksen** followed Mansfield on the floor and then inserted in the *Congressional Record* a long and detailed appraisal of the Congress in Republican terms. He struggled to find a way to describe this session of Congress.

“When all is said and done,” said **Dirksen** in that appraisal, “the first session of the 88th Congress was not a ‘do-nothing Congress,’ as some would have it, or a ‘do-little Congress’ or a ‘standstill Congress.’ The more appropriate terms would be a ‘stop, look and listen Congress.’”

Dirksen was being too kind, for the blunt reality cannot be escaped that this session of Congress—outside of education—did almost nothing but reluctantly keep the creaking machinery of the national government going for another 12 months.

END

January 3, 1964

From McNeil to Parker

Add Foreign Aid (Nation)

Context

MacNeil filed reports in January detailing the congressional politics involved in appropriating funds for foreign aid.

Lead Paragraph

A critical phase of the present crisis for foreign aid has been the utter breakdown in communication between the agency and State with the US. Congress. There has been right along a violent dichotomy between the politicians and the administrators—one that none could hope to resolve. They think and act differently inherently, have no way to comprehend each other. The administrators regard the congressmen with contempt on the grounds that they are venal, corruptible men given to principlelessness as the means to reelection. The congressmen are guilty because they are elected. For the congressmen, the administrators are guilty because they are not elected; what claim can the administrators have, sitting isolated in the bureaucratic towers, to understanding the American people and their needs?

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

And in the contemptuous squabbling between the Congress and the agency's administration sponsors, a compelling point must be noted: the facts do not (repeat: NOT) exonerate the agency. On the contrary, the congressional committees—not Otto Passman alone—have a wealth of damaging proof of the agency's blunders and stupidities. (Like **Ev Dirksen's** case of the Peruvian dam that was built in an area of no water.)

...

END

February 24, 1964

MacNeil to Parker

Mansfield Cover III (Nation)

Context

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield appeared on the cover of *Time* on March 20, 1964. This report was entitled, “Mansfield’s Record as Floor Leader.”

Lead Paragraph

“I have no successes,” Mansfield insists, in summing up his three years as majority floor leader, “because what we’ve done, the Senate has done.”

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

How does Mansfield work with **Dirksen**? Here’s an example out of the recent past, on the test ban treaty. **Dirksen** was troubled by the proposal, and, in that frame of mind, he approached Mansfield. “Let’s go over to your office,” said **Dirksen**, and they did. “I’ve attended all the hearings,” said **Dirksen**, once there, “and listened to all the debate. There’s a pattern to it, the pattern of fear, that if we do sign this treaty, we won’t keep on our toes. If anything happened, if the treaty were abrogated suddenly, we could be in trouble. You and I ought to get on our horses and go down to the White House.”

Mansfield promptly put through a call to the White House—where Kennedy was somewhat reluctant to see **Dirksen**. Kennedy was upset at giving **Dirksen** the play. After all, he was the Republican leader, and he had not been helping on domestic bills. Larry O’Brien argued with the president, and the appointment was made for a few days later. It was peculiarly fortuitous, for the next day Dick Russell announced he was against the treaty. So did John Stennis—and there was a sudden panic that the treaty might be defeated after all. Then the president was more than happy to see **Dirksen**. Out of the meeting came Kennedy’s letter to Mansfield and **Dirksen**, the substance of which was suggested by **Dirksen**, that calmed the fearful and led eventually to the overwhelming adoption of the treaty.

At the White House, incidentally, Kennedy was amused and pleased to see **Dirksen**.

“You got your notes?” the president asked **Dirksen**.

“Yes,” said **Dirksen**.

“Can I have them?” Kennedy asked.

“Yes, Mr. President.”

Kennedy read over **Dirksen’s** draft of a proposed letter to be sent by Kennedy to **Dirksen** and Mansfield, and quickly approved it.

“It will be done,” said Kennedy to **Dirksen**.

On a question like the test ban, obviously Mansfield had to have substantial support from the Republican side, for a two-thirds vote was required to approve the treaty.

And here’s another instance of their cooperation: Mansfield has been anxious to get Senate passage of a farm bill affecting cotton and wheat before the March 1 deadline—after that it’s too late this season for the farmers. But at the same time, Mansfield could not afford to allow an indefinite delay on the civil rights bill. The civil rights bill arrived at the Senate on Monday last, and the Senate Agriculture Committee had not yet reported out the farm bill. Mansfield opened negotiations with **Dirksen**. He wanted to know the Republican response to the farm bill—how hard would they fight it? Mansfield told **Dirksen** that he’d like to bring the bill up, but only if he could have assurances that debate would run only a few days, and that they could set a date for the vote.

Later, after **Dirksen** took soundings, they met again. And **Dirksen** gave Mansfield the Republicans’ judgment: “It’s a monstrosity, a junior edition of the Brannan Plan, and would be on the floor for several days. There’s real hostility on our side. The Midwest farmers are up in arms. You have to be prepared for a tour de force—a lot of amendments, a lot of roll calls, some dilatory [m]otions.”

“If that’s your judgment,” said Mansfield, “that goes a long way with me.”

Mansfield did try to call the farm bill up on Friday, Feb. 21, but John Williams of Delaware blocked its consideration. He plans to try once more on Monday—but he knew from **Dirksen** what would be the Republican response, and he tried only because of his desire to give a show to the Democrats who have been screaming for this bill.

Recalling the events, **Dirksen** felt it took an unusual man, a strong man, to escort his formal Senate rival into the president’s office to suggest a method of

resolving a grave national question. “Another leader might have got his hackles up at that,” said **Dirksen**. “But there’s no false pride about Mike Mansfield.”

...

END

February 24, 1964

MacNeil to Parker

Mansfield Cover IV (Nation)

Context

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield appeared on the cover of *Time* on March 20, 1964. This report was entitled, “The Critics and Defenders.”

Lead Paragraph

Mansfield has been severely criticized as an unaggressive, mild-mannered floor leader, and has been as vigorously defended for precisely those same qualities. Twice the criticism of Mansfield has broken out into ugly incidents on the Senate floor—by Wayne Morse during the Tel-Star debate in 1962 and then by Tom Dodd during the foreign aid debate in 1963.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Mansfield’s principal critics in the Senate have been the most liberal Democrats in the chamber—Morse, Clark, Douglas, among them. And their main thrust against Mansfield has been that he works too closely with Minority Leader **Dirksen**, that **Dirksen** persuades Mansfield to compromise away the substance of liberal legislation. This same liberal group historically has been unable to count the votes in the chamber available for their bills, or counting them, been willing to give a little ground to gain a little.

“There are those in the Senate,” snaps a northern liberal senator sympathetic to Mansfield’s approach, “who would rather lose than make a necessary compromise. Mike is a winner—he wants to win. But Mike’s a compromiser, too. He’s willing to compromise if he has to. The die-hards don’t understand this: They’d rather not legislate at all. A man like Morse simply can’t understand a Mansfield.” Of course, these liberal Democrats literally detest **Dirksen**; they regard him as a moral leper, and they deeply resent his profound influence on legislation emerging from the Senate.

“Yes,” says a White House lieutenant. “They say Mansfield plays too close to **Dirksen**. But without **Dirksen** on these votes—like civil rights—we’re gone!”

...

END

February 24, 1964

MacNeil to Parker

Mansfield Cover V (Nation)

Context

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield appeared on the cover of *Time* on March 20, 1964. This report was entitled, “The Judgment of His Colleagues.”

Lead Paragraph

What is Mansfield’s strength, what his weakness? Here’s a Republican leader in the Senate’s answer: “His strength is his respect in the Senate for his honor, his political and personal integrity, and his moderation in all things. His weakness is that he is too accommodating to his colleagues, particularly his Democratic colleagues.”

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

And here’s **Dirksen’s** current view of Mansfield, his formal opponent on the Senate floor:

“Our working arrangements are excellent. Mike Mansfield is by all odds one of the most agreeable, amiable people to work with that it has been my pleasure to be associated with in the Senate chamber. He has a flexibility that is not a lack of firmness. He readily sees all sides of the picture and he can easily decide, as a result, what to do.

“There has never been a time with a divisive spirit in the Senate that Mike could not come in that door and put all his cards on the table. ‘Alright,’ he’ll say, ‘leadership is a two-way street—what do you think we should do?’

“Mansfield has humility in the deepest sense of the word. There’s no reaching for grandeur, no reaching for headlines. He is a patriot to the core. His whole public life is devoted to that which he thinks is for the benefit of the United States.

“In foreign policy, he has gone right into the teeth of the administration, and he did it in his report on Asia. He called them as he saw them, and that’s the hallmark of public courage.

“He is accessible at all times to everybody, to the humblest and the highest. Mike is like that. And those are the great Christian attributes of this fellow.”

...

George Aiken of Vermont, senior Republican in the Senate, says that there was “never a more respected leader of the Senate” than Mansfield. “He enjoys the respect of every Republican senator. I don’t know any Republican senator that would make trouble with Mike, except of course in the line of duty.” Mansfield doesn’t play “low down politics,” says Aiken. “If he tried to do that, the Republican senators would keep him in hot water at all times. We’re lucky that **Dirksen** and Mansfield like each other. It keeps us all more statesmanlike.”

Here’s another Republican leader in the Senate describing Mansfield:

... “**Dirksen** is the real leader of the Senate. He understand Mike. Mike turns to him. With 33 troops on the floor, **Dirksen** exercises more and more [power] in the Senate than Knowland did with a majority.”

...

And here’s **Dirksen** again arguing against assuming that Mansfield’s leadership is a leadership of weakness, an assumption he regards as “a great mistake”:

“Leadership can be of many types. A bold type that rides roughshod over everybody. That’s a capricious leadership, one does regardless of cost. It’s the leadership of Napoleon, who once told a general: ‘I’ll have plenty of time to listen to how you won, none to how you lost.’

“And there’s the leadership of Ghandi. He achieved independence for his country. He is worshipped in India. Ghandi was the essence of humility.”

To **Dirksen**, Mansfield has “great Christian attributes” from which he draws strength.

END

February 26, 1964

MacNeil to Parker

Mansfield Cover XII (Nation)

Context

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield appeared on the cover of *Time* on March 20, 1964.

Lead Paragraph

Mansfield, the leathery-faced ex-Marine, unhappily has a public image of being a somewhat diffident and therefore weak man, but his friends, the ones who know him best, including two presidents, have no such view of the senator from Montana. On the contrary, they see him as a man with unusual nerve, unusual political courage, and incredible willingness to sacrifice himself.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Take, for example, the view **Ev Dirksen** has of Mansfield—that he embodies in his private and public life the most powerful idea in western society: the Christian ideal.

“A soft answer turneth away wrath,” **Dirksen** quoted on Mansfield. “If thy neighbor strike thee on the right cheek, thou shalt turn to him the other also.”

...

Another example of his [Mansfield] nerve was sponsoring the cloture motion on the communications satellite bill, which was being filibustered by the northern liberals, the camp closest to Mansfield’s voting record. He did so even though the liberals denounced him privately as “selling out” a “moral” position, and Wayne Morse denounced him on the floor. (**Dirksen**, incidentally, leaped to Mansfield’s defense from Morse’s attack.) Mansfield typically did not reply to Morse’s canards. But the liberal assault cut him deeply.

...

END

February 26, 1964

MacNeil to Parker

Mansfield Cover Advisory (Nation)

Context

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield appeared on the cover of *Time* on March 20, 1964.

Lead Paragraph

We assume you have John Steele's full file from his 1957 cover research on Mike Mansfield. There were fourteen takes on Mansfield in that cover research.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

For Mansfield's working relationship with **Dirksen**, we refer you to our cover research on the **Dirksen** cover, September, 1962. At that time, Mansfield made a glowing tribute to **Dirksen's** greatness, even though the Republican leader was in the midst of a re-election campaign.

...

END

NOTE: It remains a mystery as to why there are no reports filed by MacNeil during the historic Senate filibuster on what became the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

July 16, 1964

MacNeil (San Francisco Hilton Workroom) to Applegate, Parker
The Villains Take V (Press; Copy to Nation)

Context

MacNeil was assigned to report from the Republican National Convention in San Francisco. **Everett Dirksen** played a prominent part in the convention, placing Barry Goldwater's name in nomination as the party's presidential candidate.

Lead Paragraph

We get an extraordinary reading from an extraordinary man on Barry Goldwater and the American press. The reading is from **Everett Dirksen**, the man who placed Goldwater in nomination and cinched that nomination by ending any doubt of the political course of delegate-rich Illinois.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

Under the circumstances of **Dirksen's** confidence to us, we are not free to attribute the words he used directly to him, but we believe it perfectly proper to include his name if we list others of the GOP congressional and national leaders who feel much as does **Dirksen** himself on the tendency of Goldwater to shoot from the hip in what amounts to reckless statements.

Dirksen is gravely concerned about this tendency in Goldwater in terms of national safety and international calm—and he has a solution.

“We must control him,” **Dirksen** said.

Dirksen has studied at first hand the British system of parliamentary questioning of Cabinet officers and the P. M. himself. He once heard a British Cabinet officer answer a hostile question from the opposition on the House of Commons floor with a literally bewildering array of statistics, facts, and arguments. **Dirksen** checked into the official's fabulous dexterity and discovered that, by British parliamentary rules, that question—and all others—had to be submitted in advance and in writing. The British official simply had had the entire answer worked out by his skilled and knowledgeable staff.

“We have got to stop this hip-shooting,” said **Dirksen**. “It is simply too dangerous in the world as it is, with Latin America and Vietnam.”

Dirksen's solution is to force Goldwater to insist that all further press questions be submitted to him in writing in advance to permit him and his staff to work out rational, responsive and responsible answers. It would, in **Dirksen's** view,

eliminate the possibility of rash, unconsidered words gushing from Goldwater's mouth—and disquieting this and the other nations of the earth. He intends to enlist the other leaders of the party to help him persuade Goldwater that this is a political and national necessity.

Dirksen is fully alive to the disastrous political effect this will have on Goldwater and the Republican Party that Goldwater now leads. But **Dirksen**, with a deep commitment to the nation's safety, feels that the change in the normal free-style news conference must be made even if it convicts Goldwater of what he has all along been accused by his detractors, Republican and Democratic.

“We will have to pay that price,” said **Dirksen**.

The **Dirksen** proposal would return the presidential press conference to the days of Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover—all of whom insisted on written advance questions. They then answered the questions—read the answers to the questions—to their news conferences. It was, as you know, Roosevelt who first began to open up the news conferences, freely fielding spontaneous questions from the White House press corps. The process had gradually been extended by Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy to the live TV shows.

END

August 6, 1964

MacNeil to Parker

Attack VIII (Nation) Cover—Congress and Johnson

Context

What became known as the Gulf of Tonkin episode kicked off MacNeil's reporting on the conflict in Vietnam. This report described a meeting of congressional leaders with President Lyndon Johnson.

Lead Paragraph

It was mid-afternoon, Tuesday, when the rumors began to fly about Washington that there had been a new, provocative attack on U.S. naval forces in the Gulf of Tonkin. The rumors came from the Pentagon, and soon were being carried by the wire services. Up on Capitol Hill, the congressional leaders were totally in the dark; they knew nothing. There had been no alert from the White House, no intelligence passed from any source. Only rumors—actually low-echelon leaks to the press.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

...Then, in late afternoon, the White House switchboard started to place the calls to the congressional leaders; they were being summoned to a conference with the president at the White House. The subject was not announced, but it was more than obvious. The meeting was bi-partisan; North Vietnam PT boats had attacked again. The discussion could center about nothing else.

Invited were **Dirksen** and Mansfield, Humphrey and Kuchel, Russell and Saltonstall, Fulbright and Aiken from the Senate; Speaker McCormack, Halleck, Albert, Arends, Boggs, Vinson, Morgan, and Mrs. Bolton from the House. They were the Democratic and Republican leaders of the Senate and the House and the chairmen and ranking Republican members of the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations.

...

McNamara reiterated this matter of secrecy—with the obvious implication that Congress long has been the worst place to tell a secret, the leaks are so numerous. **Dirksen** picked him up on that point, told him what was perfectly true: on this one, the leaks had come from the Pentagon, not Capitol Hill.

“Bob,” said **Dirksen**, in the closest thing to humor at the session, “maybe you’d better monitor your own shop better.”

...

Grave, deeply serious, grim and resolute, Johnson said baldly to the congressional leaders:

“I hope we can get overwhelming support on this resolution [endorsing the administration’s response].”

He not only asked for approval from those there in a general way, the president actually nodded around the table, senator by senator, representative by representative, to get an acknowledgment of personal support for the idea. He got it—in effect at least—from all. No dissent.

His old friend and rival, the key Republican on Capitol Hill, **Everett Dirksen**, did not reply verbally when Johnson looked at him and asked for his critically important support. Instead, **Dirksen** simply raised his right hand and waved a token “okay” back to the president. **Dirksen** would go along.

Everyone was behind him—as everyone is always behind the president in an hour of national peril.

...

END

August 27, 1964

From McNeil (Convention workroom, Atlantic City) to Parker, New York
Humphrey Cover, Take V (Nation, copy to Life editorial)

Context

Time featured President Lyndon Johnson and his vice presidential running mate Hubert Humphrey on its September 4 cover. MacNeil filed several reports on Senator Humphrey, this one entitled “The Senate Leader” about Humphrey’s maturation in the Senate.

Lead Paragraph

You have Sidey’s cover files in 1960, Humphrey’s early years and buildup for his attempt to win the presidential nomination.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

He [Humphrey] was a key man in executing two of the parliamentary phenomena of that past administration—the application twice of cloture in the Senate, the first such applications of cloture since 1927. In both instances, Humphrey acted the role of responsible leadership, restraining himself and guiding others to execute the terribly difficult maneuver.

The first was on applying cloture to break a filibuster by Democratic liberals on the communications satellite bill of 1962. The liberals insisted the bill was a steal for business—and Humphrey stuck with the Kennedy administration, a key act in itself, and helped Mansfield and **Dirksen** shut off debate and force a vote.

The second was this year’s civil rights bill. Mansfield was in overall charge—that is, he did the negotiations with **Dirksen**. Mansfield appointed Humphrey as floor manager for that bill, a job—unlike any other in memory—that he stuck to unfailingly day and night throughout the many weeks of the Senate fight. ...

...

END

October 2, 1964 (requested)

From McNeil to Parker

88th Congress (Nation)

Context

MacNeil provided his assessment of the historic 88th Congress.

Lead Paragraph

In the final hours of this Congress' life, the members are still passing bills, and the total record is not completed. But, beyond cavil, the record already in hand is one of the most extraordinary in the nation's legislative history.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

[Neither] Kennedy nor Johnson had serious concern for the Senate on domestic welfare problems. There a moderate-liberal majority obtained. The presidents did have trouble in the Senate only on the great ones—when two-thirds votes were needed: civil rights and the test ban. In both, **Dirksen** swept the field for them.

...

END

October 19, 1964 (requested)

From McNeil to Parker

Keating Cover

Congressional Record (Nation)

Context

MacNeil provided information about New York Republican Senator Kenneth Keating for a cover story. Note: The image for the October 30 cover is not available online but may have been the issue devoted to Keating.

Lead Paragraph

Kenneth Barnard Keating, at age 46, took the oath of office as a member of Congress for the first time on January 3, 1947. A lawyer from upstate New York, Keating could scarcely wait to start filling the *Congressional Record* with his views—a hallmark of Keating’s brand of politics.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

At a meeting of the Senate’s liberal Republicans on December 15, 1958, Keating was in full attendance. That group met to organize a fight for the Senate’s leadership. Bill Knowland had quit to run for governor of California, and **Ev Dirksen** was the candidate of the Senate’s conservatives.

...

Keating long has had a solid reputation as a hard worker in Congress. Competing as he is with Javits, as he was with Celler, Keating has scarcely been able to relax. “With his interest in New York,” reports another Senate insider, “Keating is working all the time. He’s constantly on the Senate floor or nearby in the cloakroom.” He stays in close touch with GOP leader **Ev Dirksen**—but they do not see eye to eye very often. Keating is a faithful show-up at his committee sessions and he pays attention to what his committees are doing and to all those issues that have particular relevance to New York voters.

...

END

December 18, 1964

From McNeil to Parker

House Republicans IV (Nation)

Context

MacNeil filed several reports in December analyzing House Republicans' growing disenchantment with their leader, Charles Halleck, and the resulting leadership challenge mounted by Gerald R. Ford.

Lead Paragraph

Ford made his decision to run against Halleck at a secret session in his Capitol Hill office, shortly after 6 o'clock Thursday evening.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

The younger and activist Republicans have for four years been grouching about Halleck's image, especially on the "Ev and Charlie" show, the weekly joint leadership meetings with **Dirksen**. They have pressured Halleck to bring forward some of the young and talented and attractive members of the party in the House—and they have not been satisfied with Halleck's hogging the center stage. Ford is promising to bring more of these Republicans into the limelight and to give the party in the House a fresher and more dynamic reality and appearance.

...

END

December 23, 1964

From McNeil to Parker

Congress I (Nation)

Context

MacNeil reviewed the leadership races in the House and Senate and the factionalism within the Republican and Democratic parties.

Lead Paragraph

In this week, Christmas decorations adorned the offices and doors of senators and representatives' offices all over Capitol Hill. In the lobbies of the office buildings, in the old House chamber, and on the great lawn of the esplanade facing the Washington Monument, bright beautiful Christmas trees gave the weary habitude of congressmen a festive and joyous air.

But behind the scenes, in the Senate and in the House, there was no such feeling of good-will-to-all-men as the decorations normally connote. Rather there was back-biting, bitter quarreling on a host of problems and personalities.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

On the Senate side, the Republicans appeared to have quieted down. There, there had been a brief flurry among a handful of the Republican conservatives to oust liberal Tom Kuchel as the party whip, but this maneuver faded with the announced opposition to it of Thruston Morton and the behind-the-scenes assumption that **Ev Dirksen** would not tolerate any such divisive act in his party or any such assault on his close friend and ally, despite their ideological differences.

...

END

January 13, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Fulbright Cover III (Nation)

Context

To prepare for a January 22, 1965, cover story on Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AK), MacNeil prepared a series of stories. **Dirksen** was mentioned in passing.

Lead Paragraph

Fulbright's intellectual base as a senator and his political base as a senator from Arkansas stands not on foreign affairs but on the state's economics. Representing one of the very poorest states in the union—when he came to Washington first in 1943, Arkansas had an average individual annual income of \$256. Fulbright has devoted much of his efforts to helping his state economically.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

So he gets through it [speaking in the Senate] as quickly as possible. Of course, as a forum to speak to the country, the Senate floor remains an important platform for those few who have the ability to use it. Fulbright, in this sense, has only one rival in the Senate—**Everett Dirksen**. Fulbright's set speeches, made normally to an all but vacant chamber, get the widest circulation of any man in Congress through the press.

...

END

February 4, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Congress I (Nation)

Context

This report covered the first few days of congressional activity.

Lead Paragraph

The Johnson administration this week scored two major victories in Congress—passage of the long-contested Appalachian bill by the Senate and compromise, also by the Senate, of a flatly offensive House insult to the United Arab Republic’s Nasser. In both instances, however, the measures came close to catastrophe for the administration. Both required the personal intervention of the president—the use of his awesome name—to save the day. Even then, the administration victories were scarcely avoided. Even then, the administration had to undergo a serious compromise of its own position, and even then, the administration did not escape sharp rebukes from the Senate.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

On the Nasser unpleasantness, Mansfield pleaded for a personal letter from President Johnson—a letter not forthcoming—and he was under pressure from the likes of Jake Javits to produce such an indication of presidential concern and anxiety about the crudities of Nasser and his Arabs. Confronted with an unruly Senate that threatened to reject the compromise already worked out by the State Department, the Senate Democratic leadership and Senator **Dirksen**, Mansfield again was driven to quote the private words and sentiments of the president.

...

Item: While the president’s request for relaxing the gold cover on U.S. currency was moving speedily to congressional approval, there were the gravest warnings of congressional animosity in this area too—if the administration doesn’t shortly ease the deteriorating balance of payments. The key man here—as in so many areas of national life reflected in the Senate—is **Everett Dirksen** of Illinois. **Dirksen**, by design, announced his position at the opening of the Senate hearings. He saw no choice but to go along with the Johnson administration, and he said as much in a formal statement. Then he added: “But I deem it only fair to say that my party will expect an accounting for whatever the administration does or does not do in the solution of the real problem

which confronts us, namely an adequate and durable solution for the problem of the deficit in the payments balance.” In brief: **Dirksen** okays the present bill—but warns of a new assault on the administration if they don’t change or slow the gold flow.

...

END

February 5, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Congress III (Nation)

Context

At the end of January 1965, the House passed an amendment to an agriculture appropriations bill to sever the shipment of surplus farm commodities to Egypt. The so-called “anti-Nasser” amendment was opposed by the Johnson administration.

Lead Paragraph

The State Department was caught completely by surprise by last week’s House action adding that anti-Nasser amendment to the agriculture appropriations supplemental. The department’s instinctive reaction was to fight it totally—Dean Rusk dashed up to the Senate the next day for a private meeting with any senators who would come to ask that the language be deleted from the bill by the Senate. George Ball meanwhile briefed the press secretly on the dreadfulness the parochial House had performed to U.S. foreign relations.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Over the weekend, furious telephoning had gone on between the [State] Department’s top people and ranking senators—among them **Ev Dirksen**, the fellow who is forever pulling administration chestnuts out of the fire.

Dirksen refused to support a deletion of the House language—which Ball was still idly hoping for as late as Monday in his testimony to the Appropriations Committee—but **Dirksen** would support additional language (as would Mike Mansfield) to give Johnson an option on delivering the food commodities to the UAR.

Dirksen and other senators—notably Saltonstall of Massachusetts and Holland—worked with the department on drafting that language, and not until Monday afternoon did they finally get it worked out to the satisfaction of the Senate committee and the reluctant State Department.

The State Department, whose credentials on Capitol Hill have never been honored, because the department has never understood the relationship between domestic politics and foreign realities, even then did not realize how badly off they were.

Word leaked that Lyndon Johnson was going to write a special letter to Mansfield and **Dirksen** expressing his outrage at the crudities of Nasser and the Egyptians. This allegedly was to quiet the likes of Jacob Javits, who doesn't like Arabs generally.

The assumption was that this LBJ letter was part of the deal to get **Dirksen** into line in support of the new language.

No such letter was requested by **Dirksen** and was not needed to win **Dirksen**. **Dirksen** agreed to the language and that was that. Mansfield did in fact request a presidential letter to help with the bill, but Johnson declined to send him one. The White House view was that the president simply could not be sending letters every time a bill gets in trouble in Congress—he had already been forced to pledge on Monday other regional programs to keep the Appalachia bill from being overwhelmed.

...

Dirksen, in a fine exhibition of his steamboat gothic oratorical style, made a telling speech for the administration, asking the Senate to give the president a free hand.

“Should we clench our fist and talk through our teeth in language that even Nasser would understand?” **Dirksen** asked his colleagues, clenching his fist and fairly hissing the words through his teeth.

“No,” thundered **Dirksen**—“we had better leave this matter where it is—with the president of the United States.”

[The administration won the vote, 44 to 38].

...

Dirksen saved the administration. He not only spoke and voted for it himself—but he carried five of his Republican colleagues with him.

Had **Dirksen** and his fellow Republicans all voted the way the House Republicans had unanimously voted, the vote would still have been 38 to 44 in the Senate, but LBJ would have lost.

END

February 11, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Congressional Response—Vietnam cover XI (Nation)

Context

As the U.S. commitment in Vietnam deepened, MacNeil examined the congressional response to President Lyndon Johnson's approach to the conflict. This report, prepared for *Time* covers on February 19 and 26, dealt primarily with the nature of the administration's special briefing for members of Congress and with the recent deaths of servicemen.

Lead Paragraph

In time of international crisis, the Congress always supports the president. It has no choice. It wants no choice. In these years of nuclear weapons and missiles, this attitude is not the old business of unity at the waterfront—it's more the incapacity of Congress to deal with this day's catastrophic possibilities. Only the president has the real facts of the crisis; only he can judge; the need for untrammelled judgment and decisions never is more clear.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

On Monday, Johnson had to the White House for extra-special briefing Speaker McCormack, Mansfield, **Dirksen** and Ford. It was a hush-hush business, taut with seeming high-powered tension. We talked with one of those who sat in at that session. The top leaders of Congress then were told more than has appeared in the press—but what they were given in added intelligence amounted to scarcely more than some idle, extra statistics: location of military forces, the number of planes in action or readiness, and so on. The key question of policy was not discussed by the top-ranked briefers to the leaders. "I didn't know much more after the meeting than I did before I went in," one of those there commented.

...

Dirksen was less than enamored by the administration's handling of the situation and its report to the leaders at those briefings. McNamara told them that the Americans were killed in barracks over the weekend in a "sneak attack."

"How can you have a sneak attack if you are on the alert?" **Dirksen** asked.

"However," **Dirksen** went on, "we have 23,000 men there and it's a big area that's being defended. There's some merit in the contention that we did not have manpower enough for full security. We're being stretched pretty thin."

“I raised the question—are the Vietnamese good security troops? I was told that they are well trained.”

The leaders were told that the men killed were killed by mortar fire, not rifle or machine-gun fire.

Dirksen also questioned the effect on the people in the Orient “when we evacuate our civilians.” “Does that make them think we are about to engage in a big push?” He got no answer to that for the administration’s men did not have a reading on the oriental mind.

“I raised the ultimate question,” **Dirksen** said of the White House briefing. “Suppose we pull out?”

“I can’t tell you what the president said. It wouldn’t be proper. As far as I am concerned the answer is a large, resonant, emphatic NO!”

Dirksen talked on about the Chinese ambitions in the area.

“The fact is that the Chinese have singled out Thailand as their next target. And if that’s the case, you can assume they figure that Vietnam is as good as theirs.”

Dirksen himself fully supports the president’s actions, and he reported that so do the “dominant majority” of his fellow Republican senators.

“Neutralism is like surrender,” **Dirksen** said, “and as such it has no place in my book.”

END

February 19, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Nation's Lede

Context

The intensification of the war in Vietnam resulted in heightened congressional debate. MacNeil's report, "Hawks and Doves in Congress," included substantial quotes from various Congress members both in support and in opposition to the conduct of the war.

Lead Paragraph

This week a major debate on U.S. policy around the world—and in Vietnam, in particular—arose in Congress. The debate was prompted, of course, by the intensification of the war in Vietnam, the dangers implicit in that escalation, and the dissatisfaction with the frustrations inevitable in such a tortured position for the United States.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

The Republican congressional leaders opened the debate formally Wednesday morning, with the issuance of a party statement—read by **Dirksen**—on the war in Vietnam. The statement was signed by all the Republican leaders—**Dirksen** and Ford, Kuchel and Arends, and Hickenlooper, Saltonstall, Morton, Byrnes, Laird, Brown and Wilson.

"We, the members of the Joint Senate-House Republican leadership, want to make it clear we support President Johnson's recent order for strikes against communist supply bases in North Vietnam. If we have any difference with the president in this respect, it is the belief these measures might have been used more frequently since the Bay of Tonkin decision last August and an even stronger policy formulated in the meantime."

The Republicans denounced the communist "naked aggression" and then set their feet firmly against any negotiation now in the present circumstances.

"We suggest that so long as there is communist-promoted infiltration of South Vietnam in violation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements, there can be no negotiations on the Vietnamese question, and we urge the president to make this unmistakably clear to the world. Agreements can only fail when the communists negotiate only for domination and we negotiate only for peace."

The Republicans thus placed themselves where they have been all along: for a tougher policy with greater U.S. military action in Vietnam than Johnson has been pursuing.

...

On hand for Church's speech were a dozen senators, including McGovern and McGee, who planned to speak too, and **Dirksen**. Like other senators, Church endorsed Lyndon Johnson. He spoke on overall U.S. policy, but his main thrust came on Vietnam.

...

END

February 19, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Nation's Lede—Take II

Context

The intensification of the war in Vietnam resulted in heightened congressional debate. MacNeil's report described remarks by Senator George McGovern (D-SD) and Gale McGee (D-WY).

Lead Paragraph

Senator McGovern of North [sic] Dakota followed Church with a major speech endorsing Church's position on negotiation now.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

On Thursday afternoon, as he had promised the day before, **Dirksen** took the floor to answer both Church and McGovern. **Dirksen** was unusually restrained in his oratory. It was the old **Dirksen** in the text he had prepared to read to the Senate, but it was not the style that the Senate's aficionados have come to expect from **Dirksen**. **Dirksen** spoke almost softly. There were none of the familiar flourishes of the arms, the crescendo of his voice, the flamboyance that normally marks him when he makes an important speech.

But, for all that, there was acid in his words and it had bite. He mocked Church and McGovern at first—wondering if he were not listening in an earlier period—1954, perhaps 1962—when he heard these words about negotiating.

But he translated their meaning now.

“I realized that our nation was being urged to conduct another experiment to determine if communists have stopped lying and will now, like good men, keep their promises.”

And he had this to say to Church and McGovern: “Before you try to entice free men back into the red bear trap of negotiation, tell the aggressors to show some evidence of good faith. This they can do by simply complying to [sic] their Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962.”

Dirksen said if we don't meet the communists at the outer wall of Korea and Vietnam, we shall meet them at the inner line from Alaska to Hawaii. He said Church and McGovern were singing “a chorus of despair sung to the tune of a dirge of defeat.”

“I was truly sad to hear, in this chamber, which echoes with the courageous words of brave men now gone, the opinion that we cannot win. ...All this is nothing but an unnecessary confession of defeat. However such proposals for negotiation under pressure may be explained or camouflaged by intricate rationales, it is simply a proposal to run up the white flag before the world and start running away from communism. Of course, we will eventually have no more room to run.”

He said, however, he was glad that the words of despair were spoken in the Senate now—and not at Valley Forge, not by John Paul Jones, not by the GI’s at Bastogne, nor the Marines at the Chosen Reservoir.

“I suspect that the urgings of the ‘you-can’t-win’ exponents would have been viewed less tolerantly then than now.”

Dirksen totally opposed the concept of negotiating now—for the negotiations would cover how much of the gains by the communists, made in violation of the 1954 and 1962 [missing].

“If we let South Vietnam go, another giant step in the march of communism will be taken, and the remaining nations of the Southeast Asian peninsula will be in ever-deepening danger.

“Without South Vietnam, were do we make a stand? In Thailand? Or do we defend Singapore?”

“To negotiate in South Vietnam while communist aggression is spreading throughout the entire Southeast Asian peninsula is like a man trying to paint his front porch while his house is on fire.”

Mansfield rose to congratulate his good friend, the minority leader, and the other senators who had taken part in this sporadic debate over U.S. policy in Vietnam.

...

Both sides—the hawks and the doves—were trying to influence the government’s policy. They were not agreeing with Johnson[’s] posture. The one group led by **Dirksen** wanted a far more positive military posture against the

Vietcong, even if this risked provoking China, than Johnson has been willing to take. The other group wants to do far less in a military way in this ticklish country—and to emphasize and emphasize our willingness to negotiate and to get out.

Neither group, in fact, agrees with the president's middle of the road position, such as it has been in recent months.

...

END

April 29, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Dominican Republic III (Hemisphere)

Context

Congressional reaction to the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic.

Lead Paragraph

The word went out shortly after 6:30 Wednesday evening to summon the bipartisan leaders of Congress immediately to the White House. They had already scattered all over town, the day's business completed on Capitol Hill. Carl Albert was in his Capitol office, and headed straight for the White House. Speaker McCormack was at a party, didn't reach his apartment until almost 7 o'clock to get the word. The Republicans were gathering for a \$500-a-plate fundraising dinner in honor of Senator **Dirksen**. **Dirksen** and Tommy Kuchel were reached there early, dashed off to the White House. Les Arends got the word when he arrived there at 7:20. Jerry Ford was still later. They scrambled to the White House by whatever vehicles were available, black limousines and taxicabs. Once in the White House, they were each hurried into the Cabinet room.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

The leaders had no choice but to agree to the reality of the situation and what Johnson had done. There was no dissent of any kind. Several of the most prominent of the leaders, including **Dirksen**, McCormack and Mansfield, expressed their support of the action. So did the others either by saying so or by acquiescing. There was no dissent. Vice President Humphrey, as befitting his position, said nothing from beginning to end.

...

McNamara and Johnson both were continuing to touch base with the congressional leaders on Thursday. Johnson called **Dirksen** Thursday afternoon to tell him things were going well, that food and drugs were being distributed and that the American nationals were being evacuated. McNamara called earlier to tell **Dirksen** that the U.S. had 500 Marines at the city's polo fields, and that the communists still held the center of the town.

END

April 30, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Vietnam Debate Lead (Nation)

Context

This report dealt with how President Johnson briefed Congress members, including such critics as senators Frank Church and Joe Clark, on the war in Vietnam.

Lead Paragraph

President Johnson and his top aides have been dealing as generously and candidly with the members of Congress about Vietnam as national security permits. Besides the president, the chief briefing officers have been McNamara, Rusk, Mac and Bill Bundy, with all their aides helping out whenever possible.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Fulbright and Mansfield and **Dirksen** are briefed whenever any of the top briefing officers can get at them to tell them something new.

...

END

May 7, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Vietnam Appropriations (Nation)

Context

MacNeil reported on the congressional reaction to President Johnson's request for a special appropriation to conduct the war in Vietnam.

Lead Paragraph

"When you were leader," **Everett Dirksen** said to his old friend Lyndon Baines Johnson, "you used to consult in advance."

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

That was **Dirksen's** way of telling the president that he didn't much like being taken by surprise by the president's dramatic demand this week for a \$700 million appropriation for the war in Vietnam.

Dirksen wasn't alone in annoyance, for all over Capitol Hill, there was muffled or open grumbling at the president's high-handed tactics in abruptly demanding not only the extra money, not only the insistence that it be immediately passed, but the demand also that the vote be treated as an endorsement of his Vietnam policies.

On a question like this, **Dirksen** and many others were perfectly willing to go along with the president, but **Dirksen** didn't like being mousetrapped. He had to scramble furiously to get his Senate Republicans soothed down, to flatter his many prima-donnas with the old hokum.

...

END

June 16, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Nation's Lede

Context

In a filing titled “View from Capitol Hill,” MacNeil continued his coverage of congressional debate over the conduct of the war in Vietnam. He described how House Republicans, led by Melvin Laird and Gerald Ford, had begun to depart from the straight, down-the-line support of the Johnson administration’s Vietnam policy advocated by the Senate’s Republican leaders.

Lead Paragraph

The growing danger in Vietnam, the obvious escalation, and the increased commitment of U.S. troops have brought a new wave of anxiety to Congress. In a real sense, the various congressional opinion leaders are confused about just what is going on among themselves; they support the president almost to the man, and they are backbiting among themselves.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

But in the Senate, there is no such skepticism or criticism of the president’s policy among the Republican leaders.

Dirksen was first shown a report on McNamara’s Wednesday announcement that the U.S. was sending in another 20,000 men. **Dirksen** read it. “Good for him,” he said. “I approve what the president is doing,” he added.

Laird’s views—and Ford’s—have not been taken up by the joint congressional GOP leadership; that is, with the Senate GOP leaders. **Dirksen** frankly couldn’t quite understand what Laird was up to. He suggested several reasons off the record why Laird might have released the statement, but he simply did not know the reality. None of the House leaders had called **Dirksen** on it, and that left **Dirksen** somewhat at sea about Laird’s maneuver. But flatly and unequivocally, **Dirksen** totally supports Johnson now in Vietnam.

“He is the commander in chief,” **Dirksen** said.

Dirksen does not understand and does not share the skepticism or the criticism of his House colleagues against the LBJ strategy.

“Lyndon Johnson is no damn fool,” said **Dirksen** privately. “It is unimaginable that he would take a step that had not been approved by [General Maxwell] Taylor and McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretary of state. He’d be wild to undertake a decision that flew in the face of the best military brains.”

...

Laird’s statement, however, reflects only the House wing of the party, not the Senate. In the Senate, the key Republican in Congress—**Ev Dirksen**—stands four-square for his old pal LBJ, and it will be impossible to mount a major GOP assault against Johnson with him standing in the way. The House Republican sniping will be annoying—and there is more coming—but it will not be a truly partisan issue as long as **Dirksen** keeps saying: “He’s the commander in chief.”

END

June 25, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Vietnam Lede (Nation)

Context

MacNeil warned his superior about errors in a *New York Times* piece on congressional reaction to President Johnson's conduct of the war in Vietnam. MacNeil described **Dirksen's** position on the war.

Lead Paragraph

Hold on, fellows: The *New York Times* has been tampering with the facts again. It has completely distorted the **Dirksen** news conference of Thursday afternoon, indicating that **Dirksen** made some declarations on doubling U.S. forces, and hinting LBJ asked him to do it.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

As is his wont, **Dirksen** ambled into the Press Gallery Thursday afternoon, perched himself cross-legged atop a small table he always uses at these sessions, and reported on the GOP Senate Policy Committee's lunch of last Thursday.

(Normally **Dirksen** makes these reports on Tuesday afternoon, but held off this week until Thursday.)

Tuesday's guest at the policy meeting was Bob Stevens, a New York textile manufacturer, who was briefly Army secretary under Ike. He's been out of that office since 1955 and while in it got chewed up rather badly by Joe McCarthy.

Stevens was just back from a trip to Vietnam and he talked to the Republican senators about what he had seen in Vietnam and what he thought ought to be done out there. It was these Stevens' findings that **Dirksen** relayed to the reporters on Thursday afternoon, and which Max Frankel has exploited as a **Dirksen** declaration of policy. It was no such thing.

Dirksen said that Stevens made four conclusions from his visit to Vietnam.

Parmark: The war "is a dangerous, serious business."

Parmark: "Morale is high" among American forces.

Parmark: "Our men are well equipped and well supplied."

Parmark: The U.S. will have to “substantially augment” American forces in Vietnam. Stevens’ judgment, said **Dirksen**, is that “we would roughly have to double our force out there now.”

Stevens used no figures, but reporters pressing **Dirksen** were bandying about the figure at 150,000 men, and **Dirksen** didn’t reject that number.

Dirksen went on to say that Stevens believes the U.S. needs “to grab up a chunk of that coastal plain” as a base for heavy howitzers and long-range artillery. (These have greater accuracy than plane-bombing, and also are not subject to weather conditions.)

“The general impression,” **Dirksen** said of Stevens’ remarks to the GOP lunch, “was that we were going to be there for quite a while.”

“You remember the British in Malaya,” said **Dirksen**.

Under questioning, **Dirksen** said on his own that he opposed negotiating with the Vietcong. “I want to make it emphatically clear,” **Dirksen** said, “that I do not want the Vietcong to sit down at that table.” His view is that they are communist guerillas, not a government.

Dirksen knocked down the idea of Javits’ resolution—“What good will a little resolution do?”—and he stated his concern about the effect of a prolonged Senate debate about Vietnam on the morale of American troops there. He knocked down the idea that there was a point, in committing U.S. troops, where Congress should declare war: He cited Korea as the precedent for not so doing.

“Congress has the job of raising and supporting the Army,” **Dirksen** said, “but the direction of the military is the business of the president.”

He said he didn’t agree that negotiations always meant concessions and he expressed his high confidence in General Westmoreland.

“Who am I to swap my judgment for his?” **Dirksen** asked rhetorically.

Dirksen wants the war run in the best possible way—and he doesn’t want congressmen telling LBJ how to do it.

The *Times* has sensationalized a rather mundane news conference, by putting into **Dirksen’s** mouth the ideas of Stevens whom he was also paraphrasing. As we filed to you last week, **Dirksen** consistently and ever more intimately is supporting LBJ in Vietnam.

In doing this, he has been angered and annoyed by Laird's statement of last week, suggesting that GOP support would be withdrawn if the administration continues building ground forces and not concentrating on heavier bombing. **Dirksen** regarded that Laird statement as improper and foolish. **Dirksen** specifically has approved the build up of ground forces. When he was notified of McNamara's last announcement that 21,000 more men were being sent to Vietnam, **Dirksen's** instinctive response was: "Good for him."

END

July 1, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Congress III (Nation)

Context

In this filing, MacNeil took stock at the half-year mark of the historic 89th Congress and forecast upcoming legislative battles, which the reporter believed would pit a demanding president against a divided Congress.

Lead Paragraph

At the half-year mark, the 89th Congress has written a formidable record and acted on a large number of major LBJ bills. A large part of this action took place before the Easter recess on measures pending for years, and since then the congressional pace has slowed, as the committees have ground through newer measures and prepared for the final months of activity.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

They have no doubt, any of them—the White House, or any part of the congressional leadership—on the terrible toll that passage of many of these bills will take. These bills will be tough to pass, and at least several will require basic compromises like the compromise on rent subsidies to persuade this reluctant Congress to go along.

“It depends on how much they want to pile on,” estimated **Dirksen**, in evaluating the administration’s chances of success through the long, hot summer. “Everything takes its own time.”

...

END

July 1, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Vietnam—Congressional Debate (Nation)

Context

Continuing coverage of Senate debate over the conduct of the war in Vietnam.

Lead Paragraph

The congressional debate on Vietnam this week has been sporadic and fitful. With the situation growing still worse and grave in Vietnam, the central two-some on Capitol Hill were the Senate's two party leaders, old allies Mike Mansfield and **Everett Dirksen**. They stood together, almost back to back, and beat away at the centrifugal elements within the opposing parties.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

Mansfield took on the House Republican leadership. **Dirksen** fired a round at the Senate Democrats who go less along with the president than **Dirksen** thinks they should. Mansfield argued against all-out war extremists; **Dirksen** against too-hasty negotiators. Together, they stood for the president.

It was a curious pair, embattled on behalf of the president. Both were fully briefed on the Vietnam situation, as were their chief targets.

In essence, Gerald Ford and the House Republicans have been sharply criticizing the president's build up of ground forces. They demand concentration on air and naval strikes as the price of their continued support of the government in Vietnam.

Dirksen and the top Senate Republicans disapprove of the House Republican position; they support all Johnson's actions, but **Dirksen** in particular has been sharply critical of Democrat Bill Fulbright and his proposal of June 15 to make "concessions" as a necessary price for peace and stability in Vietnam.

Mansfield agrees with **Dirksen** on the House Republicans—and fired a salvo at them this week.

...

Dirksen, meanwhile, fired away at Fulbright.

“Any who talk of concessions by the United States have an obligation to specify the kinds of concessions which they are prepared to advocate,” **Dirksen** said, in a non-sequitur.

“Senator Fulbright suggests the Geneva agreements of 1954 ‘in all their specifications’ as the basis for settling the conflict in Vietnam.”

But the ’54 agreements, **Dirksen** argued, have a fatal flaw in permitting the communists a veto on the international commission set up to supervise execution of the treaty. **Dirksen** opposed repeating that mistake or allowing a Vietnam government with communist participation.

“Bitter experience should have taught us that such a coalition merely defers a communist takeover.”

Privately, **Dirksen** spelled out his views of Vietnam still further and his ideas of eventual negotiation.

“Everybody is agreed it is serious and it is dangerous and it could become disastrous if perchance the Vietcong forces made a massive attack in such numbers as could give us real trouble. It’s just as well we face up to it. We’ve got to face up to it. We need all (underline) necessary weapons. We need adequate personnel, and we need to unfurl an adequate strategy to meet the thrust that’s sure to come.

“MacArthur said there is no substitute for victory. I don’t believe there is in this case. It would be said that a little country with 15 million people, fighting guerilla warfare, humbled the greatest power on the earth. The loss of face implicit in that is a most distressing thing to contemplate.”

Dirksen opposes any U.S. initiative in proposing negotiations. And he doubts if there can be any negotiations until the war is carried on to a much greater intensity. He’s prepared to back Johnson through that dark valley.

“It’s going to take a good deal more bombing and destruction of stores, of gasoline and petroleum.

“At one point or another, if ever we are to effectuate a truce and an end to the conflict, negotiations have to begin.

“It isn’t for the victor to initiate negotiations. If he does, he leads from weakness. It is the vanquished, the loser, who throws up his hands and cries ‘uncle.’

“You work from there—to see what must be done, what concessions should be made, what interests should be recognized or not.

“You don’t get that unless the victor is standing on top of the pile.”

Thus **Dirksen** goes fully down the line with Johnson—but he wants no premature offers of negotiations, as have already been made by the president, in **Dirksen’s** terms, and carried further by Fulbright’s proposals.

On Wednesday, Mansfield took the Senate floor to fire a counterblast at Jerry Ford and the House Republicans and complimented **Dirksen** for his unvarnished support of the president’s military policies in Vietnam.

...

Mansfield praised **Dirksen** for subscribing to the doctrine that the country’s interests are above politics, and Mansfield said that course is set by the president.

...

END

July 15, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Housing Bill (Nation)

Context

MacNeil covered Senate action on a rent subsidy bill, a key feature of the Johnson administration's Great Society.

Lead Paragraph

It was 3:29 Thursday afternoon. Robert Kennedy of New York was hunched over the vice president's desk in the Senate chamber, dawdling with the ivory gavel and reading a book. Kennedy was the Senate's presiding officer, its president pro tempore, as the Senate clerk began to call the roll of the senators.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Only a half dozen senators were on the floor [for a speech by Senator Sparkman introducing the bill]. Mansfield, fitful Mike, was listening to Sparkman. So was Paul Fannin of Arizona, who likes to sit in his back row chair and listen to even routine speeches like Sparkman's. Dick Russell was talking to a Senate aide. Daniel Brewster was conferring with a staff man. Carl Hayden was thumbing through some papers. **Dirksen** was gazing about the almost empty chamber.

...

END

July 15, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Humbert Humphrey III (Nation)

Context

As vice president, Hubert Humphrey became presiding officer of the Senate. This story focused on the role of the vice president in the nation's government and politics.

Lead Paragraph

On his first day as presiding officer of the Senate, January 22, garrulous Hubert Humphrey got a tongue-in-cheek spoffing [sic] from his old colleagues in the Senate. Mansfield and **Dirksen** teased him on his enforced future silence in the Senate, and his other Senate colleagues and friends joined in the fun.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

See **Lead Paragraph**.

END

July 16, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Add Vietnam Lede (Nation)

Context

At a meeting of the Joint Senate House Republican Leadership, House Minority Leader Jerry Ford accused the Johnson administration of misleading the country about the war in Vietnam and of manipulating the defense budget process for political purposes.

Lead Paragraph

“It’s about time the president went to the country and told the people what is going on,” said Mel Laird of Wisconsin, chairman of the House Republican Conference. “Lyndon wants to do business as usual.”

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Dirksen, at the same joint GOP leadership meeting, stuck hard to his insistence that LBJ had to make the decisions without a “humble shavetail in World War I” like himself second-guessing those decisions.

Dirksen, knowing fully how he disagrees with Ford on this very point, urged his fellow Republicans to avoid “carping over trivia” and “the hypocrisy of complaining about measures (they) would favor if (they) were in the position of policy-maker.

“This is an appropriate time,” **Dirksen** said, “to speak of bipartisanship in foreign policy. Bipartisanship signifies united support by the two major parties for such policy aims and means are required for the security of the nation.”

Bipartisan **Dirksen** said no administration “should be blamed for events beyond its control.”

Dirksen, Lyndon’s old friend and chief leader of the loyal opposition in Washington, was trying to pour oil on the troubled congressional waters.

END

July 29, 1965

MacNeil to Beshoar

Johnson Cover VIII (Nation)

Context

Time staff produced an August 6, 1965, cover feature on Lyndon Johnson. This filing dealt with a White House briefing for congressional leaders on the worsening situation in Vietnam.

Lead Paragraph

The calls went out in mid-afternoon. President Johnson was summoning the leaders of Congress to the White House for the long-expected briefing he had publicly pledged before he acted in the worsening crisis in Vietnam. It was an unusually secure meeting: only the formal leaders were invited—McCormack and Mansfield, **Dirksen** and Ford, Boggs and Albert and Kuchel and Long and Smathers and Hickenlooper, the barest minimum.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Somber and grave, the president sat at his usual place in the center of the table. At his right sat the secretary of state; at his left, the secretary of defense. The congressional leaders were ringed around the table, **Dirksen** directly opposite, Mansfield off to **Dirksen's** left.

...

After McNamara completed his report, Johnson turned to **Dirksen**.

“What have you got to say?” Johnson asked him.

Dirksen responded by stating that he thought the present crisis in Vietnam was undramatic. “Mr. President,” he said, “as far as I can see, I think there is some apathy in the country about Vietnam.” He accounted for this partially because of the time of year—summer when many people are taking vacations and therefore [are] unconcerned about such far-off places as Vietnam.

He said that if Johnson declared an emergency and called up the Reserves, people would start calling for economic controls. He urged that the president should emphasize in his report to the people how important the Vietnam conflict was to U.S. security by telling the people that the fall of Indo-China would throw us back on our second defense line—from Alaska to Hawaii. He urged the president to spell out the crisis in “the simplest possible terms.”

“This is serious business,” **Dirksen** said, “and you are playing for keeps.”

Dirksen went on to say that he would not always approve of Johnson decisions, but he told the president that when he had his day in court, when he had a chance to be consulted, he would go along. Then he said the crucial words to the president: “I support you.”

Dirksen consistently has taken this position. He held a news conference Wednesday afternoon, and he talked of Westmoreland’s request for more men and materials.

“That’s a military decision,” **Dirksen** said. “You don’t quarrel with him. You’re in no position to quarrel with him.”

...

END

August 5, 1965

MacNeil to Goodpaster

The Senate and Vietnam II (Nation)

Context

This filing is one in a series which examined the positions of various individual senators on the Johnson administration's conduct of the war in Vietnam. MacNeil's theme was that "a majority of the Senate is deeply unhappy about the Vietnam business"

Lead Paragraph

You are familiar of course with the long public spectacle that Wayne Morse has made of himself on Vietnam, and with him his only true ally, Ernest Gruening of Alaska. They are the extreme left—the radical left—in the Senate on Vietnam, and this week Morse even went so far as to suggest obliquely the impeachment of President Johnson for his policies and programs in Vietnam.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

There seems, for example, an enormous divergence within the traditional conservative bloc—the southern Democrats and the mid-west Republicans. No man in Congress has more totally committed himself to approve whatever military necessities Johnson and his top advisers decide than **Everett Dirksen**—whom we have not mentioned in this file only because his views are totally known to you.

But **Dirksen's** allies in the southern ranks are not with him on this one—they accede to the necessities but with the greatest obvious reluctance. The conservatives seem broken in half, and we've heard this explained that while the Republicans have long viewed Asia as a matter of highest foreign priority, the southerners instinctively balk at sending in white Americans to fight for a colored race, for "inferior" peoples.

...

END

September 16, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Add Mood of the Capitol (Nation)

Context

MacNeil reflected on the accomplishments and unfinished business of Congress.

Lead Paragraph

Around Capitol Hill, only a few leaves on the stately trees are showing the first glimmerings of their autumnal coloration. But all the kids are going back to school, and Congress finds itself confronted with the immediacy of fall—and yet still going full tilt, as in mid-session. Under legal requirement, Congress is supposed to adjourn by mid-summer each year, unless there's an emergency, but that's a law more honored in the breach than in the observance. (Congress hasn't adjourned before August since 1956.)

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

But a band of two-dozen senators, led by **Everett Dirksen** of Illinois, the GOP Senate leader, and Sam Ervin of North Carolina, is equally determined that it [repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act] shall not pass. They have stated boldly that they will filibuster this one to their last breath.

If LBJ insists on repeal of 14-b, how long will Congress stay in session?

Dirksen: "Until the snow flies!"

...

END

September 23, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Nation's Lede II (Nation)

Context

Senate debate over a major overhaul of the nation's immigration system.

Lead Paragraph

The Senate debate was calm and uninteresting through most of its course. Almost no senators bothered to listen to the speeches, which began last Friday and continued intermittently until the vote on Wednesday. And many senators, themselves of racial and national origins that once suffered under the old quota system, didn't even bother to voice their view or their triumphs now. Others, heirs to the great aristocratic families, were almost as silent.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

The call of the very roll of the Senate suggested tellingly the effects of the nation's immigration over the generations of American life. There are aristocrats still there whose surnames have a revered place in the history of their states and regions—Byrd of Virginia, Saltonstall of Massachusetts, most notable of all. But there are others whose people came not in the first wave from the English strand—Pastore of Rhode Island, Muskie of Maine, Fong and Inouye of Hawaii, Javits of New York, Gruening of Alaska, Lausche of Ohio, Kuchel of California, **Dirksen** of Illinois, Montoya of New Mexico, and that small host of Irishmen, the Kennedys, Mansfield, McCarthy, Monroney, McGovern, McNamara, Murphy. Their people came over not in their own ships—but in the brutal steerage passage centuries later.

...

...On Wednesday, **Dirksen** spoke—again just a set piece with none of the old maestro's vigor and color and aplomb. He just rumbled through a routine speech, scarcely raising his voice throughout, but really reciting only for the *Congressional Record*. Montoya was in the chair. Teddy Kennedy was there formally, out of courtesy to the minority leader (breaking off a reporter's interview for that very purpose.) Teddy listened politely. Holland was also there. Ervin was reading the *Congressional Record* and Hruska didn't listen to **Dirksen** either. That was all. It was dullsville.

...

END

October 7, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

Add Nation's Lede

Context

See Lead Paragraph.

Lead Paragraph

In recent days, there's been an outcropping of newspaper stories claiming that the 89th Congress is swinging into revolt against President Johnson. They cite defeat of the LBJ self-government plan for the nation's capital, the difficulty with Senate repeal of 14-b, and with House passage of the highway beautification bill.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

In reality, these reports of revolt are far overdrawn. The D.C.-home-rule bill had its own problems, unrelated to LBJ. Repeal of 14-b has a clear majority in the Senate but ran into **Dirksen** and his willingness to filibuster. The highway bill, at this hour, seems safe enough.

...

END

October 13, 1965

MacNeil to Parker

14-b—Right to Work II (Nation)

Context

The Senate took up a cloture vote to end a filibuster on considering a bill to repeal Section 14-b of the Taft-Hartley Act. **Dirksen** supported and participated in the filibuster. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield led the fight to invoke cloture, but he failed in what MacNeil called “a paralyzing defeat.”

Lead Paragraph

Mike Mansfield of Montana, patient and long-suffering, told the Senate Friday last that **Dirksen’s** filibuster was a “hugger-mugger, designed only to delay.” Therefore, as majority leader of the Senate, he offered that day a cloture petition duly signed by himself and 15 other needed senators to close the filibuster on considering a bill to repeal Section 14-b.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

He [Mansfield] asked whether the hugger-mugger were over on that question, but **Dirksen** and his troops had by no means finished—and the vote therefore on the cloture maneuver was scheduled for one o’clock this Monday afternoon.

...

Mansfield knew he didn’t have the votes to invoke cloture, but he wanted a “test of strength” to show how the two contending sides on this issue were divided. **Dirksen** refused to let him have his test last Friday—for the terms then clearly favored Mansfield’s side. Mansfield then only needed a majority vote to win, and there was no abstract emotionalism playing on his motion then to confuse and hurt his cause.

...

The Senate met Monday at noon and fussed away a half-hour on trivia. Then with scarcely a half-hour left before the vote, **Dirksen** took the floor. He pleaded against invoking cloture, even on this procedural point of agreeing to consider the bill. Time was needed to educate the people on this question.

“The job we are trying to do for the right of all to work, to live, to survive, and perhaps to start on some of the union abuses,” **Dirksen** said, escalating the stakes involved somewhat boldly, “would be rather cavalierly shut off if the cloture petition were adopted. ...”

“What a crying shame,” **Dirksen** bellowed, “it would be if the Senate did not take abundant time to educate the people on the bill. Education takes time.”

Wayne Morse of Oregon spoke briefly and denounced **Dirksen** and his tactics. Senators now were coming into the chamber in heavy numbers, with but fifteen minutes to go to the vote.

“The time has come for the Senate to invoke cloture,” Morse shouted angrily. “In spite of everything the senator from Illinois has said, what he really designs [sic] is to kill the bill by dilatory tactics known as a filibuster, irrespective of the adjectives he applies to describe his tactics.”

Then it was Mansfield, summing up for his side. ...Mansfield was tense, standing behind his front row desk across the aisle from his antagonist, **Everett Dirksen**. ...

In the back of the chamber, Senate aides stood nervously, and a half-dozen representatives (including Bob Griffin of the Landrum-Griffin bill) had come over for the vote too. Mansfield sat impassive, his chin cradled in the palm of his hand. **Dirksen**, his arms folded on his chest, slouched in his chair, listening intently to the vote but in almost a careless, relaxed ease.

...

The battle was over at 5:49 and **Dirksen** had won.

Of course **Dirksen** was elated. He had won the biggest victory against the administration program of this year—one of its few losses. He had no doubt that he had won permanently—he is sure that his colleagues will come back in January even more reluctant to press on with repeal of 14-b, once they’ve talked to the folks back home.

And the old fire horse, privately, was still ready to respond to the bell, nostrils flaring, and snorting. He had no doubt that he and his stalwarts could filibuster indefinitely.

“We could have gone until Christmas,” he chortled, almost as though he were sorry that struggle was over so soon.

END

October 20, 1965

MacNeil to Time Nation

Congress Box

Context

In this filing, MacNeil provided a comprehensive summary of the legislation enacted by the first session of the 89th Congress.

Lead Paragraph

In a real sense, the first session of the 89th Congress, now coming to a close after almost ten months of frenetic activity, has all but wiped clean the Johnson legislative list, a list still containing the dreg ends of Democratic programs left unenacted for decades.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Everett Dirksen tried to persuade the Senate to adopt a constitutional amendment to let each state determine the composition of its state senate, but the U.S. Senate refused. The president stayed aloof on this one.

...

END

October 21, 1965

MacNeil to Time Nation

Congressional Adjournment I

Context

MacNeil reported on the congressional session as adjournment approached.

Lead Paragraph

As Congress moved implacably toward its final adjournment for the year—adjournment sine die—it was that inevitable time when those most intimately involved in the great business of running the federal government would assess the year's results. Not unnaturally, the administration's advocates were adamantly pointing with pride at their achievements, while the opponents were viewing with alarm the self-same actions.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

And the Republicans did make important contributions to the bills passed, including some of the most important. A major segment of the Medicare bill was originally proposed by the House Republicans. It was no secret that the original voting rights bill was written in **Everett Dirksen's** Capitol office, with Mansfield and Katzenbach helping officiate at the birth. The Republicans did block repeal of 14-b and helped stymie home rule for the District, and, in the very end, they clipped off any funds for the rent subsidies LBJ wanted.

But they found little heart in that. The Republicans in Congress had been run over by the Johnson forces, and they knew it. **Dirksen** alone in the Republican forces emerged as a commanding figure. He had made himself decisively felt right through the session—on voting rights above all, but across the board on other bills as well. His staunch support of Johnson in Vietnam stifled any effective firing at the president not only from the Republican ranks—although Gerry Ford tried—but from the Democratic ranks as well.

END

October 23, 1965

MacNeil to Time Nation

Congressional Adjournment III

Context

MacNeil described in detail the final day of Senate action.

Lead Paragraph

The Senate met Friday morning at 9 and staggered through a session almost 16 hours long before finally closing up for the year. It was a session of infinite dullness and trivialities, as the Senate cleaned up the tag ends of the year's work. It spent until 2:30 in the afternoon fussing over a minor nomination. Then the Senate approved the federal pay raise bill (it will give 1.7 million white-collar workers for the federal government a 3.6 percent across-the-board pay raise; annual cost: \$641 million).

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

At 10:45, Douglas, an opponent of the sugar bill, seemed about to start a last-minute filibuster. He began a speech with a fat pile of notes and materials, and he droned sing-song in the familiar chant of the senator sparing his voice for a long, long speech. Typically, no one was listening. Smathers was reading a newspaper. McCarthy was chatting with a Senate aide. **Dirksen** was consulting the parliamentarian. Prouty, Williams of Delaware and Mundt were laughingly telling each other stories in the back.

...

He [Russell Long, who had been escorted from the Senate by two colleagues and an aide after wildly attempting to address the Senate—MacNeil believed him to be drunk] came in, stood shakily, and voted “aye.” Mansfield was scurrying back and forth. **Dirksen** looked worried. They couldn't be sure of holding that tenuous quorum in the chamber long enough to count their votes [on a sugar bill]. “Have we got enough?” came the anxious question to Mansfield. They did, just barely.

At midnight exactly, presiding officer Bob Byrd of West Virginia announced the vote, 41 to 10 for the bill—exactly a quorum of 51 voting. The conference report was passed—the last bill of the session. The other senators were already gone.

Mansfield moved immediately to amend the House's resolution on adjournment, changing the date to Saturday, October 23, instead of the Friday date the House had voted. Then, in rapid succession, Mansfield and **Dirksen** relayed routine resolutions to the chair for automatic approval—thanking Vice President

Humphrey for presiding fairly, the same thanks to the President Pro Tempore Carl Hayden of Arizona.

Finally, at 12:20, that was done, and Mansfield and **Dirksen**, as the Senate's leaders, formally left the chamber to telephone the president that the Senate had completed its work. Again the Senate waited and waited.

...

It took Mansfield and **Dirksen** almost a half hour to complete their chore. They had gone to Mansfield's office to put the call to the president. A new girl on the White House switchboard didn't know what to do. The president was on the telephone, talking to someone else, and she didn't dare cut in. Mansfield and **Dirksen** waited and waited. "Just a minute," the operator kept saying, nervously. Finally, Mansfield—ever patient—got angry. He snapped at the girl that she was keeping the Senate waiting, and intimidated, she put through the call.

"The Senate has completed its business," was Mansfield's formal message, and he and the president, and then **Dirksen** and the president, chatted amiably for a few minutes.

It was 12:48 when Mansfield and **Dirksen** returned to the Senate floor. Mansfield told the few remaining senators that he had delivered their message to him—that the Senate had completed its business for the year. And Mansfield relayed back the president's message to the Senate.

...

END

December 9, 1965

MacNeil to Time Nation

Nation's Lede

Context

MacNeil provided insight into the upcoming second session of the 89th Congress.

Lead Paragraph

Rumors of the coming war between Congress and President Johnson are much exaggerated. There have been such reports, periodically, since Johnson took over as president more than two years ago. There was the big scare in the spring of 1964, shared by his own White House liaison staff, that Johnson had been oversold in the press as a legislative miracle worker, and that Congress would not respond. Then there were the two or three scares of 1965, when the word was that he had pushed Congress too far.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

The second session of the 89th Congress, Johnson himself has promised will be short, because he has next to no work for that congressional session to do. Pending are two uncompleted struggles in the Senate (on one of which LBJ has professed himself neutral). We can expect a filibuster on **Dirksen's** amendment to undercut the Supreme Court's one-man-one-vote decision (which doesn't affect LBJ), and another on repeal of Section 14-b of the Taft-Hartley law. Neither of these proposals is likely to pass.

...

END

December 28, 1965

MacNeil to Time Nation

Vietnam Project IX

Context

Entitled “domestic political front,” this filing provided an overview of the Vietnam War’s impact on congressional and electoral politics.

Lead Paragraph

In the 20th century, by the vicissitudes of international affairs, the Democratic Party has always been the party in control of the White House and Congress when the U.S. has gone to war—1917, 1941, 1950, and now 1965. And, historically, the Democrats in Congress have suffered massive losses in the off-year elections that followed. In 1918, Wilson actually lost control of Congress. In 1942, Roosevelt lost the great Democratic majority he once controlled on Capitol Hill. In 1950, Truman suffered a major defeat for his party in Congress with Joe McCarthy first taking wing on communism in government.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Neither Ford nor Laird, however, has been able to command national attention. They are not well enough known, and the arguments they have been pushing have been, relatively, restrained and temperate—nothing like “twenty years of treason!”

More significant, however, in their failure to date to command national attention and thereby put LBJ under fire has been the position of Senator **Everett Dirksen**—the “Mr. Republican” in Congress today.

Dirksen has muffled any substantive criticism of Johnson, anything smacking of the partisan violence of 1950, by his own firm commitment to support the president totally. “He is my president,” says **Dirksen**, and that’s not the stuff for making partisan points.

Throughout the legislative session, **Dirksen**, time after time, declined to engage in the arguments over military strategy. He simply denied that he was a military expert, and he denied that anyone but the president had the military information needed to make the national decisions in Vietnam.

“When you’ve got competent people on the ground,” **Dirksen** said of the U.S. forces in Vietnam, “how do you quarrel with them? Far be it from me to make those judgments—for they would be foolish.”

Another time, he put it this way, in declining to second-guess the president on military questions: “That’s a military decision. His top field man, General Westmoreland, came along and said, ‘Look, if I am to carry on, I need more men.’ You don’t quarrel with him. You’re in no [missing].”

Dirksen has wanted, and has received, consultations in the time of major decisions in Vietnam, and he has said this to LBJ about Vietnam: “I may not always approve of what you do, but when I have had my day in court, I support you.”

Dirksen thus all year long tended to muffle the snipers from the GOP flank on Capitol Hill.

Even now, however, **Dirksen** seems to have moved, not yet with great drama, away from the position he has held so long toward the Democratic president in time of international crisis. Since Congress adjourned, **Dirksen** has been talking about the fine boys sent out to Vietnam who have been coming back in wooden coffins—a suggestion of that most dreaded idea, politically speaking of the Democrats: the emotionalism of the U.S. casualties.

And now, **Dirksen** has joined with his fellow Republicans in attacking the LBJ military strategy in Vietnam. On his own, **Dirksen** has suggested a quarantine of the port of Haiphong (quotes available if desired) and with the Republican Coordinating Committee urged “the maximum use” of air and sea strikes at “significant” military targets in North Vietnam.

This is a different **Dirksen**, perhaps feeling now, like the old fire horse that he is, the ringing bells of the election campaigns in the immediate future. **Dirksen’s** participation in the criticism will tend to unleash other GOP senators, and the cacophony may reach formidable proportions by election time.

...

END

January 13, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

*State & Mood of the Nation, Specifics of the LBJ speech, Reaction to speech
State of the Union*

Context

MacNeil reported on the president's State of the Union message.

Lead Paragraph

The bells rang out across the House wing of the Capitol and through the three office buildings to the south at 8:30 Wednesday evening, summoning members of the House to the chamber, but already the members were foregathering in the hall of the House for the great occasion of state at hand.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

McCormack named the members of the House designated to escort the president into the chamber—Carl Albert, Hale Boggs, Jerry Ford and Les Arends, the leaders on the floor, and Manny Celler, dean of the House. Then Hayden mumbled the names of the senators so designated too—Mansfield, Long, Russell, Fulbright, **Dirksen**, Kuchel, Saltonstall, and Hickenlooper. The special committee rose from their seats and left the chamber.

...

Dirksen, his weathered, leathery face a model for a Greek tragic mask, sat as stonily as any as LBJ asked for repeal of the right-to-work laws, and through much of the other materials. Ford was grim and foreboding as he listened gloomily to the battles announced for the days ahead. Les Arends of Illinois, seated by Ford, kept smiling and smiling, almost in disbelief, but partly in admiration too at the daring of the essential theme of this political program; guns and butter together.

...

END

January 14, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

State of the Union—Congressional Reaction

Context

In addition to reporting on congressional reaction to President Lyndon Johnson's State of the Union message, MacNeil described the administration's decision to seek an ambitious legislative program.

Lead Paragraph

In simple, blunt terms, President Johnson caught his own most trusted leaders in Congress—McCormack, Mansfield, Albert—by surprise with the astonishingly imaginative and extensive legislative program that he proposed for the second session of the new Congress.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

He astonished as well the Republican leaders, **Dirksen** and Ford, who were hard put to respond initially to the dramatic program the president requested.

...

After the 14-b filibuster, Mansfield has scheduled **Dirksen's** apportionment resolution—proposing a constitutional amendment to undo the Supreme Court's one-man, one-vote decision on state legislatures. That, too, faces filibuster—and defeat in invoking cloture, this time with the liberals not allowing a vote.

At this point, there seems no prospects for a deal that would put repeal of 14-b as the price of **Dirksen's** amendment to the Constitution, but it's not out of the question.

...

END

January 20, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

Russell Long Cover—Take XIII

Context

MacNeil produced a series of lengthy profiles of Senator Russell Long (D-LA) for a proposed cover feature. Apparently, however, *Time* did not publish the cover in 1966. This filing dealt with Long's role as Senate Democratic whip.

Lead Paragraph

The post of party whip of the U.S. Senate has several functions—1) to act as assistant majority floor leader, in the absence of the floor leader, and thereby keep the Senate moving on its appointed tasks; 2) to keep tabs on the party's senators and alert them to administration desires, and to persuade them to that end; 3) to relay to the president and the White House the hopes and desires of the rank-and-file members of the party in the Senate; and 4) to act as part of the congressional Democratic leadership as adviser and adherent to the president on all questions of national concern, including legislation.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Now Mansfield and Long have had tiffs since Long became whip last year. The first such fight took place in the Democratic Steering Committee last year on granting committee assignments. Mansfield wanted to put **Dirksen** on the Finance Committee. To do so would throw the committee out of the two-to-one Democratic preponderance of other committees, so Mansfield proposed adding two extra Democratic members to the committee.

Long fought back furiously. He didn't want the size of the committee increased—that lessened its wallop. He didn't care about **Dirksen**. Long beat Mansfield on increasing the committee, but Mansfield got **Dirksen** on the committee anyway, by letting the party balance be 11 to 6, instead of 12 to 5 to match other committees. Harry Reid and Dick Russell supported **Dirksen's** assignment to the Finance Committee.

...

One last point that quietly points out the estrangement between the two [Mansfield and Long]—from the very beginning.

It has been normal for the party whip to have his desk at the immediate side of the desk of the party's floor leader. Mansfield did this with Johnson; Humphrey

did it with Mansfield; Kuchel does it with **Dirksen**. (The floor leaders sit in the first row seats on either side of the center aisle.) Russell Long kept his desk (his Daddy's and Calhoun's) right where it has been for years, after he was elected whip, in the third row back.

...

END

January 27, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

Rusk Cover-I

Context

To prepare for the *Time* cover on Secretary of State Dean Rusk published on February 4, 1966, MacNeil filed a report on congressional opinion about the war in Vietnam entitled “The battle lines in Congress.”

Lead Paragraph

Within Congress this week, there grew the expectation that President Johnson was about to order the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam. The totally pessimistic reports on the utter failure of the peace offensive gave credence to that expectation. So did the dramatic summoning of the leaders of Congress to the White House Tuesday evening for a top-level briefing. Even more so did the president’s handling of that bipartisan leadership conference in the public prints.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Mansfield, when called, pulled out of his breast pocket a two-page statement he had written hurriedly, and this he read to the president. When Johnson saw Mike’s action, his face went cold, “frozen as concrete,” in the words of a concerned participant. LBJ knew what was coming—as had happened before: Mansfield was asking for continued restraint.

Dirksen had no such quibbling or hesitations. He yielded the options to the president. He was the commander-in-chief; **Dirksen** would support the decisions that were made.

...

“If there’s any political hay to be made out of this for us,” said one Republican congressional leader, “well and good. I don’t want to get caught in a box and I hope the Republican Party doesn’t get caught in a box. These are decisions that the president has to make.”

The leader quoted above wanted his party to follow **Dirksen’s** lead—to give the option to the president, where it belongs, and not try to second-guess what he should or should not do. Then if Johnson succeeded, the Republicans would be politically protected. If he failed, they would be free to criticize. But here, in those White House leaks, the president was maneuvering to box the Republicans and the other leaders of Congress.

...

Item. The president plainly indicated that he really did not want advice: he wanted full support for bombing again in North Vietnam. The evidence comes hard and overwhelming in his reaction to Mansfield and Fulbright—and **Dirksen**.

...

END

January 28, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

Rusk Cover-VI

Context

Another filing, this one entitled “Congressional response,” for the February 4 issue of *Time* featuring Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

Lead Paragraph

There are 535 members of Congress, each one doubtlessly with a somewhat different view of the war in Vietnam and what the United States ought to do in that war. There is, however, a correlation between the views of the congressmen in domestic politics and their views on the war in Vietnam. It is not unlike the relationship between their views on economic legislation and communism domestically.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

The towering Republican in Congress is, of course, **Dirksen**—and **Dirksen** has been positioned by many factors, including LBJ himself, into full-hearted support of the president. This has tended to temper the militant Republicans, like Ford and Laird, who really want pretty severe air assaults on North Vietnam and want to criticize the president for failing to act.

...

In leadership terms, this is how the division rests in Congress:

The Senate majority leader Mansfield is urging maximum restraint, along with Fulbright. Russell Long with Dick Russell and Stennis are urging full implementation of the commitment.

The Senate minority leader **Dirksen** has handed the option to LBJ, promising full support. Kuchel also is supporting LBJ fully, but obviously hoping for restraint.

...

END

February 4, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

Add Nation's Lede

Context

MacNeil described congressional reaction to the resumption of bombing in North Vietnam.

Lead Paragraph

On Monday morning, President Johnson announced his decision to resume American air strikes on North Vietnam, and within hours he had on his hands, in effect, a guerrilla cross-fire on his Vietnam policy from Capitol Hill.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Congressional Republican leaders gave hearty endorsement too. **Dirksen** gave an unqualified endorsement. Jerry Ford: "the president had no other choice."

...

The immediate trouble [preventing a Senate debate on Vietnam] was that **Dirksen's** filibuster of repeal of Section 14(b) stood in the way. **Dirksen** was blocking the meeting of any of the Senate's legislative committees. Fulbright, as we filed on 14-b, protested vigorously on Wednesday—with no effect—trying to get his committee free to hold hearings on that administrative request [a supplemental foreign aid bill that contained funds for Vietnam].

Not until Thursday was the way cleared for normal sessions of the Foreign Relations Committee. Meanwhile, however, Fulbright scheduled hearings at odd-ball hours, starting at 8:30 Friday morning—thus sidestepping the Senate's prohibition against committee meetings while the Senate was in session.

When Mansfield announced he would file a cloture petition against 14-b, the heat was removed on that issue, allowing **Dirksen** to withdraw his objection to granting permission to Fulbright's committee to meet.

END

February 10, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

Congress Week—Take I—the Non-Repeal of 14-b

Context

Everett Dirksen expended substantial effort in his last years combatting efforts to repeal Section 14-b of the Taft-Hartley Act. This section, the “right-to-work” section, prohibited agreements between labor unions and employers that required union membership as a condition of employment.

Lead Paragraph

Everett McKinley Dirksen was in high form. It was not merely that he had in his mouth a thesis to whose cause he could wing in flights of rhetorical splendor. He also had the votes.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

The Senate minority leader, from the very heart of the Senate’s cockpit, flamboyantly flayed the devils of this world, the concept of gagging free debate in the great deliberative body on earth, the attempt to foist “compulsory unionism” on hundreds of thousands of free Americans, and the insidious guile of the “labor oligarchy” to rob this land of freedom.

There were the boys in Vietnam too.

“Is it not freedom that sustains them in an anxious and bloody hour?” **Dirksen** cried, summoning the armed services to his cause. “Is it not their hope and belief that as they come back, this will still be a free land, and they will be free from coercion?”

“The basic concept upon which the whole structure of government rests,” **Dirksen** concluded, “is the concept of freedom. God help us if we impair it, if we tarnish it, if we sully it, if we transmit it to the next generation in impaired form.”

That was the substance of **Dirksen’s** final fling before the Senate prepared to vote on a motion to halt **Dirksen’s** filibuster against repealing Section 14-b of the Taft-Hartley labor law—the section that allows state governments to enact so-called “right-to-work” laws.

Dirksen, naturally enough, brushed lightly over the real vote, which did not affect the repeal of the section directly—rather, the filibuster had been conducted against even taking the bill up for consideration, and it was to that point that Mike Mansfield’s cloture motion was addressed.

Dirksen, using published polls, claimed the support of the American people for his cause. He denied anti-unionism, and he belted the labor “arm-twisters” who ineffectually had been trying to sway the Senate’s decision on this major question.

Dirksen’s extravagant imagery brought Warren Magnuson of Washington, chairman of the Commerce Committee, into the debate. He questioned **Dirksen’s** rendering of the will of the people.

...

He [Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield] defended his leadership decision against holding round-the-clock sessions, as demanded by the AFL-CIO’s George Meany, to break **Dirksen’s** filibuster on such a procedural motion as he had made. He reviewed last year’s fight and this, from the time he made his first motion to take up the bill last October 1.

...

At 11 sharp, Tuesday morning, Mansfield asked for a live quorum call, and then the roll-call vote began. A dozen and more senators kept their own tallies of the mounting votes—including **Dirksen** and his co-captain in the filibuster, Sam Ervin of North Carolina.

...

[On the vote, there were 51 yeas and 48 nays. Two-thirds of the senators present and voting not having voted in the affirmative meant that the cloture vote failed]

It was the death of repeal of 14-b. The “right-to-work” laws in 19 states had been saved by **Dirksen’s** efforts for the indefinite future. **Dirksen** had incontrovertibly seen triumph in his fight to kill this bill.

“After I looked at Andy Biemiller’s face,” **Dirksen** sighed, joyously, “I thought it would never be brought up again until doomsday.”

Only one senator missed the vote—Pat McNamara of Michigan, ill with a thyroid problem. He is the sponsor of the bill in the Senate.

Dirksen had taken no chances on his troops. He had a perfect score—every senator opposed to cloture was present and voting, all 48 of them: 26 Republicans and 22 Democrats.

It wasn’t as if **Dirksen** had not worried about getting them all in town and into the Senate chamber at the right moment. Fong of Hawaii had gone out to

Hawaii with the president. Hickenlooper and Miller were in New York the day before. Ellender was in New Orleans. Morton was in Chicago. Tower was in Texas.

“We got them all back,” **Dirksen** chortled.

He had many considerations. **Dirksen** himself lives in Leesburg, Virginia, roughly 50 miles from town. He didn’t dare go home himself, fearful that he might be snowbound if the weather changed. He stayed in town Monday night at a hotel—to be certain to be present Tuesday morning.

He was fearful as well about flying conditions Tuesday morning. He wouldn’t let Hickenlooper and Miller depend on a morning plane to bring them from New York to Washington. He telephoned them, as he did the others.

“By God,” he told Hickenlooper, “you’re going to be here. You get a train back tonight—none of this business about getting a plane in the morning.”

George Smathers had been ill. **Dirksen** checked him too. “I’ll be there,” said Smathers.

They all were.

Mansfield had not quite played out the string. Instantly after Humphrey announced the 51-48 vote, Mansfield filed another cloture petition—this one to force another vote on the very same point Thursday morning. It was a hopeless gesture—even as had been the first—but Mansfield had to make it to play the lost cause out to the very end.

The Senate ground through a desultory debate on Wednesday, and then, on Thursday morning, the second vote on shutting off **Dirksen’s** filibuster took place. It fell 50 to 49 in favor of cloture—far from the necessary two-thirds.

...

END

February 10, 1966

MacNeil to Time, Nation

Long—Take I

Context

Russell Long, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, ran into trouble as he managed a campaign finance reform bill on the Senate floor. MacNeil reported on the various amendments and strategies employed during the fight. His mention of **Dirksen** is brief and inconsequential.

Lead Paragraph

Last week, almost in desperation, the Senate's Democratic leaders tried to paper over the ugly quarrel that illustrated once again the testiness of their personal and professional relations.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Mansfield had had a staff aide draft a motion—the motion he ultimately made—and Mansfield started conferring with other senators. On Thursday he had a crucial talk with **Ev Dirksen** and Williams and Gore. He talked to Long about what he wanted to do. There is confusion here in the minds of those who took part in these discussions as to what was verbally agreed among them.

...

END

March 11, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

LBJ Program

Context

MacNeil recounted the slow pace of congressional action on President Johnson's legislative program.

Lead Paragraph

Congress, in its first two months, has been almost totally pre-occupied with the war in Vietnam. What little legislative action Congress has taken has been directly related to the war—and there's not been much of that, and it rather slowly acted upon.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Already defeated—by **Dirksen's** successful filibuster—was the president's request to repeal Section 14-b of the Taft-Hartley law—the so-called “right-to-work” provision. This, in turn, has all but alienated organized labor (combined with the LBJ downhold on wage increases) with the administration program. Labor hasn't got a thing from the Congress in 1965 or this year. Lying un-enacted besides repeal of 14-b, are labor's request for higher minimum wages, shorter work week, and double-time for overtime.

...

END

March 23, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

Humphrey Cover—Take VII

Context

MacNeil contributed reports for *Time's* April 1 cover on Vice President Hubert Humphrey. In this filing, MacNeil examined the evolution in Humphrey's relationship with the House and Senate now that he served as vice president.

Lead Paragraph

“Senators will hear little from me from this podium,” Hubert Humphrey told the Senate on assuming the presiding officer's chair for the first time a year ago, January. “But I want them to know that I shall be working the lobbies. I shall be in the cloakroom.”

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

By late summer Humphrey was spreading his wings. He was hustling for votes in the Senate against **Ev Dirksen's** constitutional amendment on apportionment—so openly that **Dirksen** protested to his pal LBJ.

...

END

April 6, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

Congress—Take I

Context

MacNeil reported on the lack of legislative accomplishments compared to the previous Congress.

Lead Paragraph

The whole tone and temper of the second session of the 89th Congress, to the point that it now reaches the traditional Easter recess, has been dictated by the ominous and oppressing war in Vietnam. The fact of the American commitment and its hazards, the reality of the increasing casualty rates, and the fears of rising domestic inflation all have played a part in molding the actions and responses of Congress for the past three months. They have made the deliberations less than gay and exuberant, and the immediacy of the congressional elections this fall has added an edge of biting partisanship.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

The one big loss the administration has suffered to date came on the labor-demanded repeal of Section 14-b of the Taft-Hartley labor law, which allows the so-called “right-to-work” state laws. LBJ and labor had the votes in the Senate, but **Ev Dirksen’s** filibuster prevented those votes from being cast. LBJ’s relations with labor leaders have been damaged by this defeat.

...

END

June 30, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

McNamara Cover V

Context

Time's July 8 edition featured Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on its cover. This report is one in a series submitted by MacNeil.

Lead Paragraph

The response in Congress to the Hanoi and Haiphong raids was as predictable as rain. From either end of the Capitol, the Democrats and Republicans to the man responded in utter keeping with their own now convinced stands on this war in Vietnam. It ranged from the hysterical cry of Wayne Morse that this was international outlawry to the solid pleasure and approval of Mendel Rivers: "I'm glad it happened." Fulbright, Mansfield, Aiken, McCarthy, Hartke, Clark and that group of senators were grievously unhappy. John McCormack, Dick Russell and the other hawks were firm in their support—as they have been right along.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Ford, and **Dirksen** too, proudly pointed to the action by the GOP Coordinating Committee of last Dec. 13 urging just such action as now taken.

"That's what you had yesterday," **Dirksen** said, citing the Dec. 13 GOP statement. "We proposed this seven months ago."

Dirksen cites reports he's been given that Viet Cong morale has been falling—reports from Viet Cong prisoners taken. Thus, he analyzed that these raids could further debilitate the Viet Cong's morale and bring the conference table and negotiations much closer. He doubted as well any entrance by China in this unpleasantness. "I think there's an overriding fear in China to tangle with us and let our bombers in to wipe out her nuclear installations." And he opposed a new peace offensive now: "A peace offensive might be a show of weakness at this time."

...

END

August 24, 1966

MacNeil to Time, Nation

The Republican Kickoff I, and Nation Mood I

Context

As was his custom, MacNeil took stock of the nation's mood periodically. In this filing, he analyzed the divisions emerging in Congress between the hawks and doves on the conduct of the war in Vietnam. He focused on what he called the "Republican peace offensive" embodied in a proposal for an all-Asian peace conference.

Lead Paragraph

Within the Republican Party's highest echelons, a growing disquiet has been developing on the party's stance in Vietnam. In sum, the Republican leaders have taken the position that they fully support the president in his varied endeavors to bring, by force, the Viet Cong and the Hanoi regime to terms. They have, in fact, been far more militant than President Johnson. On December 13, the GOP Coordinating Committee advocated much greater use of American air and naval superiority in Southeast Asia—striking more sensitive targets than then assaulted. Having thus positioned themselves, the Republicans fell silent, confidently expecting that the Democrats would be clobbered in election terms by the deep division within their party over the war. The chief critics of the president were the Senate Democrats, led since late January by Bill Fulbright. This dove-like assault on the president's attempts to throw back communist aggression could only help elect Republicans, who were supporting the president in the hour of the nation's peril. The Republicans expected the Fulbright-Morse-Gruening-McGovern-Hartke bloc to do a large part of the Republicans' job in persuading voters to vote GOP in 1966.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

For the party's dread need, a major Republican Party candidate—senatorial aspirant Chuck Percy in Illinois—fortuitously provided the needed vehicle. On July 2, even as the headlines still reverberated with LBJ's air attacks on the oil fields in North Vietnam, Percy called for a conference of all Asian nations to work for a settlement of the Vietnam war.

...

In all of this maneuver and fun-and-games on this issue, the Republicans, of course, are very pleased to give credit to Republican Percy—to give him possibly the lift he needs to defeat [incumbent Illinois Senator Paul] Douglas. Douglas had

dismissed the all-Asian peace conference as “half-baked.” (Ironically, as we will detail, his Senate colleague and ancient enemy **Ev Dirksen** agrees with Douglas.)

...

Nixon, running for something he won't mention, came to Washington this week, just as the GOP leaders in Congress—**Dirksen** notably excepted—were coalescing around the Percy proposal. He had been invited by **Dirksen** to sit in with the Senate Republicans at their usual Tuesday lunch—and this he did. (He had breakfast with the House Republicans Wednesday.) Morton had Nixon for a private conference with some of the boys in Morton's office before the lunch, and there, beyond redemption, Nixon was persuaded that Percy's proposal was the thing to suggest.

...

Thus, when Nixon faced the press Tuesday after the GOP senatorial lunch, with **Dirksen** seated at his right elbow, he was briefed and prepared to endorse the party's new stance in Vietnam. ...

...

Republicans are jumping on the all-Asian peace conference right and left, to coin a cliché—Cliff Case from the left, John Tower from the right. But not all of the Republicans are so keen about the idea, and the most surly of all about the whole concept is LBJ's favorite Republican, **Everett McKinley Dirksen**. **Dirksen**, of course, is not without influence on party matters and policies, and he may yet squelch this one—and he broadly hinted as much to us, in deep secrecy, Wednesday if he can so maneuver it. Other Republican senators, like influential Roman Hruska of Nebraska, follow **Dirksen's** lead.

Dirksen confided in us totally his objections to the Percy plan on an off-the-record basis. We can say on our own: that he opposes it. But we can't use the quotes immediately below this as coming directly from him. If you want to use them, cite them as coming from a GOP senator in the **Dirksen** camp, which at this point seems to be a minority within the GOP leadership. (The House GOP leaders are gung-ho for Percy's plan.) (As you know, **Dirksen** isn't exactly an intimate of Chuck Percy, which aggravates his problem on this one.)

The Republicans in the **Dirksen** camp analyze the Far East on the assumption that the Asians won't accept dictation from the West. ...France, England, Netherlands, U.S. or even India. Asia is for Asians, runs the thesis. The Percy plan doesn't take into account the real situation in the Far East. “It's not going to amount to a god-damn,” said one GOP senator, “and the Asians know it. In the face of China, it won't amount to anything, if China really turned on the steam. ...

The key to Vietnam is Hanoi, and the hand that holds the key is in the grip of China. The hand can't turn the key unless China lets loose."

"It's like being against sin," said this GOP senator, of the Percy plan, "or for the ten commandments."

Thus stands the GOP peace offensive at this moment. We expect the subject to be fully discussed at Thursday's GOP joint leadership conference, which Nixon will attend. We'll be covering that, of course—but we can't predict the outcome. The Ford-Laird-Morton group wants a party endorsement of the Percy plan, but **Dirksen** is rebellious. Needless to say, don't pay any attention to some of the press reports that **Dirksen**, too, supports the all-Asian conference. He's leading the opposition to it within the party.

END

August 25, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

The Republican Kickoff II, and Nation Mood III

Context

MacNeil continued to report on what he called the “Republican peace offensive” embodied in a proposal for an all-Asian peace conference.

Lead Paragraph

We have a further reading on how and why Nixon was spun around to endorse the GOP-sponsored all-Asian peace conference.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Thus came the Nixon endorsement.

Now, on Thursday, Nixon met with the GOP congressional leadership—**Dirksen**, Ford, etcetera—and they worked out a party stance squarely on the all-Asian issue.

We have already cited to you our private reading from **Dirksen**, as of Wednesday, on his personal objections to the Percy proposal. Among his objections—though totally unspoken even privately by him—was his personal hostility toward Percy. Here was a young pup not even in the Senate. Others had been around for years. Besides, there had been abrasiveness between them in the past.

Added to **Dirksen’s** personal disinclination to jump on any Percy bandwagon, something else was afoot within the party in Congress. Some of the GOP senators had toyed off and on—some as early as February—with the idea of a peace conference in which Asian nations would take part. They began to complain about all this publicity for Percy. Why should he get all this credit? (An easy answer: he needs help against Douglas—but the jealousy of these other Republicans wouldn’t brook that.)

As a result, at Thursday’s leadership session (today, that is) the leaders decided to adopt the all-Asian peace conference as a formal party position, but not to give any single Republican credit for it. That would mollify those who were sulking in their tents. **Dirksen** reluctantly went along with the all-Asian peace conference. Morton had swung the rest of the fellows, with Ford and Laird handling the House side, into support of the plan. The decision was to credit the idea to the Foreign Minister of Thailand—not Chuck Percy.

At a formal news conference after the leadership meeting, **Dirksen**—on behalf of the GOP leadership—read the party’s formal endorsement of the all-Asian peace conference.

“Because the securing of a just and honorable peace is the clear desire of every loyal American,” **Dirksen** intoned into the TV cameras, “we believe that the proposal of an all-Asian peace conference deserves prompt and thorough consideration. ...”

“Our encouragement and endorsement of the proposal of an all-Asian peace conference represents, in one respect, a new and important Republican foreign policy position. It emphasizes once more, however, our determination that the Republican Party shall continue strongly to maintain its historic and cherished position as the party of peace.”

...

END

August 25, 1966

MacNeil to Time, Nation

Republican Kick-Off—Take III

Context

In this report, MacNeil covered the upcoming 1966 congressional elections.

Lead Paragraph

“Vietnam,” cried Jerry Ford to the partisan audience. “Inflation. High interest. Violence. These are the issues of 1966. We did not create them. They are simply there. We would rather the administration had not let them develop. ...”

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Within the Senate Republican leadership, there is no such sense of exhilaration. By the vicissitudes of politics and prospects, they do not expect more than a tiny marginal gain in GOP Senate seats this November. “Maybe three or four,” **Dirksen** said this week when asked privately for his estimate on the number of seats he hoped to win for his party.

Even that estimate, however, is optimistic within the Senate’s Republican ranks. One or two—possibly three, runs the refrain: marginal gains that won’t alter the substantive liberalism and pro-Johnson aspect of the Senate in the 90th Congress.

Dirksen expects Vietnam to work for the Republican Party in the elections.

“The party has not made it an issue,” **Dirksen** said this week. “The people made it. The question is what do you do about Vietnam. You haven’t many choices. The war is going to continue for some time. It’s going to get under people’s skin as these boxes come home, and the amputees. You can’t keep that from bringing an issue.”

Dirksen, like Ford, sees other issues too—but he doesn’t press them with Ford’s vigor: peace, domestic tranquility, inflation, fiscal and monetary soundness, the economy. **Dirksen** concentrates on the war issue.

“It will help the Republicans. In the back of every man’s mind, every mother’s mind, every young wife’s mind, and in the minds of the mothers of the hitherto rejected persons will be the war. That will be in their mind when they walk into the polling place.”

Despite his reiterated sureness about the Vietnam war working as an issue for Republicans, **Dirksen** still can't find even four safe victories for Republicans over Democratic incumbents in the Senate. He's predicting victory in the Montana race, the Oregon race, and in Tennessee (where the GOP candidate is his son-in-law.) But the war issue is not sweeping Democratic senators out of office in droves, or even handfuls.

...

END

September 6, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

Kennedy Cover—Take V

Context

Time published a cover issue featuring Senator Robert Kennedy on September 16. MacNeil contributed several reports—this one entitled, “The Senator,” which described Kennedy’s position in the Senate, colleagues’ opinions of him, and comparisons with Ted Kennedy.

Lead Paragraphs

“Who says he’s a good senator?”

The rhetorical question, thrown by a bitter Humphrey man, challenges Robert Kennedy at a sensitive point, although a point not yet broadly discussed in the nation’s political dialogue. What has Kennedy done as a senator? What can he do? Senator Kennedy is perhaps the best known senator in the ancient hall—rivalled only by **Everett Dirksen** in public awareness. When Bobby enters the chamber, the outland tourists count themselves as lucky mortals, straining to watch his every move, their faces intent and pleased at the man’s youthful good looks, the grace of his boyishness, the careless ease of his manner. The public knows Bobby Kennedy far better than any Senate committee chairman or any of the legislative or political leaders within the Senate—the men who hold real power and shape the destiny of the nation with their decisions on the judgment of the Senate.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

He [Kennedy] has been, in his votes, a pretty consistent supporter of the president’s liberal domestic programs (the ADA last year gave him a 94 percent rating, just about tops for them) and the president’s foreign programs. He voted twice to invoke cloture this year on the bill to repeal Section 14-b of the Taft-Hartley labor law. He voted, in effect, to let stand the “Tonkin Resolution,” and against prohibiting the use of draftees in Vietnam. He voted for the tax adjustment bill LBJ requested, the \$13 billion Vietnam supplemental appropriation, tire safety, traffic safety, school lunch increase, water pollution, and foreign aid bills. He voted against **Dirksen’s** constitutional amendment to undo the Supreme Court’s one-man, one-

vote ruling. The Senate voted 46 to 45 to provide rent supplements, and Kennedy's vote was in favor—the margin of the LBJ victory. He favored truth in packaging, a federal pay raise, and the clean air bill.

...

END

September 30, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

Add the Campaign—The Abortive Issues

Context

MacNeil continued to file stories on the congressional elections, 1966.

Lead Paragraph

No assumed issue has collapsed so badly—in terms of affecting the outcome of this fall’s elections—as the war in Vietnam. Presumably, this new Democratic war could affect the voters much as did the three previous “Democratic” wars—World Wars I and II and Korea. In 1918, the Republicans won Congress from the Democrats. In 1942 and 1950, the Republicans made enormous gains in the House and Senate. Why not in 1966, the first election since entering another war on a major scale?

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

Early this year, the Republican leaders of Congress assumed that the war would give them tremendous impetus in this fall’s elections. Even earlier, they had been pressing this political advantage. **Dirksen** talked in late 1965 of the fine boys returning in wooden boxes—the bite that American casualties have in elections. In December, 1965, the Republican leadership formally endorsed the concept of escalating much faster than LBJ the war—pushing heavier bombing and naval attack, cutting off Haiphong, and so on. They watched in glee as the Senate’s liberal Democrats—one third of the whole Senate—moved through various antics to express their growing distaste for Johnson’s war. The Republicans assumed that they would profit from the Democratic divisiveness. ...

It hasn’t worked out that way

...

A major problem for the congressional Republicans has been the stance of Senator **Dirksen**. He has stood staunchly with his friend Lyndon from the beginning. He has undercut the House Republicans’ efforts to push for a bigger war by baldly stating that the members of Congress don’t have the means of making such judgments. Just this week, he undercut Jerry Ford’s attack on LBJ’s projected trip to the Philippines by coming out fully for it. **Dirksen** is for Johnson, and that’s that. It has greatly handicapped the Fords, Lairds, and others in the party who wanted to mount an attack on LBJ and his war.

The Republicans haven't been able to find a handle on the war because the war itself is quite unpopular, but even their efforts to do so have been blocked by **Dirksen**—by far the most prominent and influential Republican in Washington.

...

At the same time, Lyndon's announced trip to the Philippines has sent a political chill through the Republicans. Presumably, he might come up with some kind of a truce—or new peace effort. The trip itself suggests just that. Jerry Ford, instantly recognizing this danger, fired off a blast that the president's trip was “a political gimmick.” That got short shrift from some of his fellow Republicans. **Dirksen** denied it, and Jacob Javits said this: “I'm sorry but I don't agree. I don't think there are any gimmicks in trying to bring peace to the world or even in rallying those who are with us.”

...

END

October 22, 1966

MacNeil to Time Nation

Add Congress

Context

MacNeil filed reports in this period about adjourning the Senate, a process complicated in 1966 by absent senators who were on the campaign trail.

Lead Paragraph

The main burden of producing a quorum fell on Mike Mansfield. **Ev Dirksen** lay in Walter Reed Hospital, recovering from surgery, and the leadership of the Senate Republicans fell to Tommy Kuchel of California, the assistant GOP leader. Kuchel dispatched telegrams Friday night to all the missing Republican senators urging them to return to the Senate Saturday to help complete the uncompleted session.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

See **Lead Paragraph**.

END

October 24, 1966

Washington staff to Boyle, New York (Confidential)

The Washington Memo

Context

Several reporters contributed stories for this filing, which ran to 26 pages. Journalist [Hays?] Gorey wrote about House GOP leader Gerald R. Ford.

Lead Paragraph (of this section entitled, “Some Funny Things Happened”)

(Gorey). As the 89th Congress gobbled up every scrap of legislation left on the table (on any table, it seemed), House Minority Leader Gerald Ford had precious little time for reflection. But one day near the end, dazed from lack of sleep and bored beyond endurance by the session-end oratory, Ford slipped out of the chamber and mused briefly on the state of the Congress and the Republican segment thereof.

...

But Ford conceded there is one area in which the Republican leaders will have to improve. That is in the **Dirksen**-Ford relationship.

“We sounded sometimes this year as if we were going in different directions,” Ford lamented. He recalled criticisms of Defense Secretary McNamara, in particular, and other issues in general on which he spoke out only to have **Dirksen** pull the rug out from under him.

“Lots of the press really gave it to us for not being coordinated,” Ford said thoughtfully. “I guess they were right. Next year we’ll have to work out agreements ahead of time. But you know—that’s what I thought we did this time.”

...

END

January 12, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation

State of the Union—Take IV

Context

MacNeil provided a detailed account of President Johnson's State of the Union message.

Lead Paragraph

As theater, the president's State of the Union address badly needed editing. It was really—as it always is—a one-act play and the president has almost all the lines. This time he had too many, a mistake he's made before. **Everett Dirksen** was a little cruel when he described the effect as causing him "mental indigestion," but there were, of course, other and more important elements within the address and the performance, and these suggest the real drama of the act.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Jerry Ford, the House Republican leader, smiled as the president committed himself anew to the war on poverty. Senator **Dirksen**, hunched down in his seat, gazed impassively at this old friend the president. Mike Mansfield carefully followed the president's speech in a mimeographed copy of the same.

...

END

January 12, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation

Congress—Take II

Context

MacNeil reported on the new Congress and its leadership.

Lead Paragraph

The House of Representatives this year and next clearly holds the key to congressional action, for its political bent—by the election returns—has made it the single conservatively oriented branch of the federal government. The Republicans elected 187 members—a net gain of 47 over last year—and despite press reports to the contrary most of the new Republicans, like most of those who survived, are conservative.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

We expect the House Republican leaders to emerge as major if not dominant figures in the new House. Ford, of course, and Laird. And there may be others—for Ford believes in team play and sharing the klieg lights. **Dirksen**, of course, in the Senate will be most in evidence.

...

END

January 13, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation

State of the Union—Take VI

Context

MacNeil updated his account of President Johnson's State of the Union address in this report.

Lead Paragraph

There was one touch of levity in the president's performance, and that was but a slight, idle thing, although it went over well with the Republicans. He turned directly to face the Republican side of the chamber.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

In the final ovation, the president was grinning broadly. He turned and shook the Speaker's hand, then the vice president's, then that of the House parliamentarian, Lewis Deschler, an old friend, then **Dirksen** as he came down from the podium. He worked his way back to the center aisle, shaking hands in the roar of applause, and then he was gone.

...

END

January 20, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation

GOP State of the Union

Context

Everett Dirksen and Gerald Ford delivered the Republicans' response to President Lyndon Johnson's State of the Union message, and MacNeil described the behind-the-scenes preparations for the broadcast. A second part of the filing relates to the beginning of the new Congress.

Lead Paragraph

"I've tried that consultation business," **Everett McKinley Dirksen** said, "and I find it takes a year to get a consensus. The devil with that. If they want to try me for party deviation, they can."

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

Dirksen, in short, wrote his own version of the State of the Union without bothering his Senate colleagues about what it would contain.

"I wrote it in my notebook in Florida," **Dirksen** said. This was before the new Congress convened. "I never thought about it after that."

Not until Thursday morning was he troubled, and so he arose at 4:30 that morning—the day of the broadcast—to recheck what he had written and to rejigger the verbiage. He did consult a pair of non-congressional friends about the verbiage, but that was non-substantive. He reshaped it himself.

He found the process somewhat painful at 4:30 Thursday morning—"I felt as much like doing it as eating a baloney sandwich."

Then he didn't look back on it until practically broadcast time. He was simply too jammed for time. Lyndon Johnson had a flock of U.S. senators—50 of them—down to the White House at 6 o'clock Thursday for briefings on Vietnam by himself, Dean Rusk, and Robert McNamara.

I had one drink and some hors d'oeuvres," **Dirksen** [said], "and I didn't get any dinner."

There were the usual hollers from the TV people—make-up and the others to be there an hour early, and **Dirksen** and Ford went through that business without incident.

Ford, on his part, did talk to a number of the top House Republicans—stray leaders, ranking GOP members of standing committees and so-on, and his speech in effect reflected—in vague ways—some of their ideas. Basically, however, it's Ford's own production (as **Dirksen's** was **Dirksen's**), although Ford depended much more on his staff members to draft and redraft the living document. He also played something of a game with the press because he put out for press consumption an advanced text of his speech that he couldn't possibly have read in the full half-hour. That was for reprints in the *NY Times* and other such. His actual reading version ran about one-third of that, a heavily stripped-down version, indeed. Even that he had to slash, and even slashed, he impinged on **Dirksen's** time.

Dirksen's opus was intended to fit the time allotted to him—the last 13 and one half minutes. But he ran short by a full seven minutes, partially because of Ford but principally because he played for effect on his audience. He took longer than he expected.

...

Ford and then **Dirksen** spoke from the old spot [in the old Senate chamber] where the vice president used to sit, and where later the chief justice succeeded him. Above their heads, a gorgeous golden eagle hung from the wall, atop the gleaming mahogany doors. Immediately to their left, on a stand, stood the American flag.

...

Ford spoke first. As he did last year, Ford concentrated on domestic matters—while **Dirksen** handled foreign policy. And like last year, Ford was a good deal more anti-LBJ administration than was the senator. (At the White House prior to the speech-making, LBJ said not a word to **Dirksen** about his speech that evening.)

The two leaders have utterly different slants on GOP policy—although these don't [be]come too clear in these speeches. **Dirksen** glories in his long-time intimate friendship with Johnson—a friendship Lyndon is careful to nurture in these trying days. Ford makes no bones, privately, of his intent to tear away at LBJ and destroy him—Ford takes credit privately for destroying Johnson's credibility last year, something **Dirksen** wouldn't even want to do, no less claim to have done.

...

Ford made a better appearance than normal for him

Dirksen, of course, was something else. He began with a deep rumbling voice, like distant thunder, the master tragedian at center stage.

He endorsed totally the U.S. commitment in Vietnam—and it almost seemed that he was scratching around in the yard looking for some way to make what he said sound partisan and critical of the president. But he praised the president for his realism and candor. He quoted him and paraphrased him in his State of the Union, and the only burden of **Dirksen's** thrust was that Lyndon indeed was right in Vietnam. He underscored that the congressional Republicans supported Lyndon.

“We in the loyal opposition, with a primary accent on loyal . . .” he said.

He asked the administration [regarding] Vietnam [to] be more for what it was for than it had been. His only real criticism was to point out that the U.S. should be thinking more about the future in Vietnam.

“Foresight is the essence of leadership. We stand in need of it as never before.”

He seemed to be chiding Lyndon—but it wasn't anything more than semantics. **Dirksen's** for LBJ in Vietnam—and that's what his words meant.

Dirksen ran out of time—and a TV technician signaled him the 15-second card and **Dirksen** signed off, telling the TV audience in a slip of the tongue that he'd just got the 15 minute sign—minute not second.

“Good bye, folks on the air,” he rumbled. “Those who are here are captives. I'm going to keep them a few minutes more.”

He waved off—and then resumed his speech and read it out to the end, which took seven minutes more. NBC, by the way, broadcast **Dirksen's** entire speech.

...

The deference to **Dirksen** is sensible—by the youngsters. In a quite real sense, he not only deserves it—as the grand old man—but he also demands it. This is scarcely the time for these freshmen senators to be kicking around the party's principal leader in Congress in the shins. We don't read much more than that into it. They need his help and counseling, and they're getting it. There's no reason to suppose that they'll be pushovers for **Dirksen** when the voting comes. Then it's each man for himself, and those looking to the future, and not just the immediate present, will be voting the ways that suits them best, not **Dirksen**.

END

February 1, 1967

Parker to Washington Bureau

Context

This filing, authored by MacNeil's superior (Parker) in New York, proposed a story on congressional ethics, the role of campaign donations, the use of gifts, and lobbying and their effect on Congress members. Parker occasionally omitted words in his message.

Lead Paragraph

Essay tackling for week after next sticky subject of ethics in government, naturally taking off from Powell and Dodd. This is not intended to be a cry of outrage at the obvious outrages of Adam or even a clucking over the disingenuousness of Dodd, but rather a level-eyed and even-voiced assessment of what in current preachment and practice actually is considered acceptable and what is not. This basic sketch will naturally have to be flanked by both the critiques of the idealists, and the complaints of the cynics, other eras, other standards, from Albert Fall to Boies Penrose, who (I think) boasted he "owned" some senator.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

All this should be set against the past, with an assessment of how stands today's standards. ...Here we should also discuss distinction Congress has made between purity of executive branch and standards for themselves, demanding disclosure or divestment for the execs but resisting disclosure for themselves, despite fact their law firm back home, say, may have major interests in particular bill. Would like to stud this area with examples, including charges from idealists like Case, and complaints from conservatives like **Dirksen** (who once, I think, complained that congressmen would be made second-class citizens by being required to disclose their holdings).

...

END

February 13, 1967

MacNeil to Time Essay

Ethics in Government—Take II

Context

This report examined the history of ethical breaches and issues in government.

Lead Paragraph

For the senator or representative there can be no doubt about what he cannot do without breaking the law—for the law on such matters is part of the U.S. Code.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

A more involved problem of conflict of interest falls on the lawyers in Congress—and there are more lawyers traditionally than any other brand of professional in Congress. Many go on their firm's inactive list while they serve in Congress—but this can be a public dodge, as we are told reliably is, for example, the case of Senator George Smathers of Florida. ...Others actually resign from their firms for the time they are in Congress. Still others—and these include such men as Senator **Dirksen** and Representative Manny Celler—continue to function with the law firms, going through the form at least of bypassing any cases that touch their jobs. That, however, may only be public form; it certainly doesn't stop the gossip about the clients their firms are able to grab because one of the partners is a key man in Congress.

...

END

February 13, 1967

MacNeil to Time Essay

Ethics in Government—Take IV

Context

Another in a series of reports examining ethical standards in the federal government.

Lead Paragraph

[The leads in this story consisted of a series of quotes from Senator Russell Long, Edmund Burke, T.V. Smith, and Senator Robert Kerr related to ethics.]

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

In the modern Senate, the great pragmatic craftsmen, besides Lyndon Johnson, have been Robert Kerr and **Everett Dirksen**—and Bobby Baker. There have been and are other skilled practitioners of this cabalistic art, including Russell Long of Louisiana, Robert Byrd of West Virginia, and George Smathers of Florida.

We don't mean to suggest criminality in the pragmatic approach. Far from it. It has been and can be defended by men who would look strangely out of place in a prisoner's dock. But, on ethical grounds, there seems to be a tendency among the pragmatics in at least some cases for slippage into far less defensible actions than the claim that they can get things done.

...

END

February 14, 1967

MacNeil to Time, Essay

Ethics in Government—Take V

Context

Another in the series.

Lead Paragraph

We assume you have a list of the sieges of the most notorious improprieties with the executive branch, and we've cited some in the previous files. The worst came under Washington, but that was primarily congressional speculation; again under Jackson, particularly congressional, but the Jackson administration began the long corruption known as the patronage system.... The Truman regime's second half was likewise marred by the peculations of presidential cronies, and a couple or three went to jail, followed a few years later by Ike's forced firing of Sherman Adams for his relationship with bumbling Goldfine.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

The theory [which holds the executive branch to a higher ethical standard than Congress members] makes sense on paper—but hardly in fact—and, of course, not all members of Congress agree with it. A major drive has been under way in the past several years to require members of Congress to list publicly their annual income and their assets—to demonstrate beyond cavil any conflict of interest in their actions, words, and votes. That drive does not seem likely of fulfillment at least in the immediate future. Many members of Congress are extremely reluctant to yield to this “reform,” and for two separate reasons: 1) the **Dirksen** claim that the elected official does not lose his right of privacy, and 2) the dangers of exploitation by a hostile opponent or the press of such information for political embarrassments.

...

Most of the substantive men in Congress—McCormack, Mills, Mansfield, **Dirksen**, Ford, and many others—lead extremely quiet private lives. When they get up in the morning, they go to work on the Hill. When they've finished work on the Hill, they go home—usually with a briefcase of night work. Many of the members cherish their family life—what they can get of it—and they resist accepting even ordinary dinner invitations. ...

END

February 16, 1967

Parker to Washington Bureau

Context

More about ethics in government from MacNeil's superior in New York.

Lead Paragraph

For ethics in government essay. As discussed with MacNeil on telephone, want essentially discuss and lay out what consensus considers reasonable behavior on part of a) congressman-senator and b) executive like FCC administrator, Pentagon procurement officer, White House aide, whatever. ...

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

The speaking date with travel expenses paid over weekend at home; offers of free airlifts home in company plane; wife or relative on payroll; the junket; use or abuse of franking privileges; the weekend at Roy Chalks, or dinner on Fogash's yacht or Stanley Sommer's (who HT reported picked up weekend tab for **Ev Dirksen** and wife).

...

END

March 9, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation

Congressional Reorganization

Context

Senator Mike Monroney (D-OK) introduced a bill to reorganize Congress. The bill languished for a time before, surprisingly, it came to a vote.

Lead Paragraphs

“Do you know why the congressional reorganization bill was passed? I can tell you. It carried a \$10,000 increase in Congressmen’s salaries.”

That was the bluntly candid explanation of why the 1946 act reorganizing Congress was approved, and the explanation was given by one of the most powerful and influential men in Congress—who, unhappily, insisted on no attribution of these sentiments to him.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Dirksen opposed the bill [Monroney’s 1967 bill] as it came to the Senate floor. So did the Democratic whip, Russell Long. Its prospects seemed bleak even without the opposition of these leaders of both parties.

...

From the grim beginnings, from the bleak prospects, Monroney had carried the day, and he had far more support for his bill in the end than he had ever dreamed of having.

Dirksen voted for it. So did Russell Long and 63 other senators of both parties.

...

END

May 4, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation

Long—Take I

Context

This report dealt with Senator Russell Long's (D-LA) intricate parliamentary maneuvering to head off amendments to a presidential campaign finance reform bill. The resulting bitterness involved senators Long, Al Gore, and John Williams, among others.

Lead Paragraph

Last week, almost in desperation, the Senate's Democratic leaders tried to patch up and paper over the ugly quarrel that illustrated once again the testiness of the personal and professional relations.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Mansfield had had a staff aide draft a motion—the motion he ultimately made—and Mansfield started conferring with other senators. On Thursday he had a crucial talk with **Ev Dirksen** and Williams and Gore. He talked to Long about what he intended to do. There is confusion here in the minds of those who took part in these discussions as to what was verbally agreed among them.

...

END

May 4, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation, Essay

Nation's Lede, Take V—Dissent Essay, Take III

Context

MacNeil reported on dissent in the Senate over the conduct of the war in Vietnam.

Lead Paragraph

As you of course are aware, the Senate has been undergoing a sporadic debate over the right to dissent for the past two weeks, and we refer you to our files of last week on Senators McGovern, Fulbright and others on that theme. You've doubtlessly seen Scotty Reston's piece of last Friday which quotes lines of Learned Hand that Robert McNamara keeps in his wallet.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Fulbright, of course, as we indicated in our files last week, has always been a pessimist and one who takes a somber view of his times. This week, he was obviously startled and pleased by the "dissent" he saw in the GOP staff paper on Vietnam from the Republican Senate Policy Committee—and for the moment the pessimism vanished, as did his fear that free speech was dead or dying. Indeed, he all but kissed the GOP policy paper to death, if it hadn't already been repudiated in its implications by **Everett Dirksen** himself. (We are filing separately on this for Nation's lede and will cross file to you.)

...

END

May 4, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation (copy to Essay)

Nation's Lede—Take VI

Context

MacNeil reported on the growing divisions among Senate Republicans over the course of the war in Vietnam.

Lead Paragraph

This week the burgeoning debate on Vietnam and the right to dissent exploded in confusion over the stance of the Senate's Republicans, long staunch supporters of the president in that unhappy war. It all sprang from a 91-page report entitled "The War in Viet Nam" released by Senator Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa, chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Among those who had not read the report—no less approved it or its implications—was **Everett Dirksen**, the firmest of all the Republican supporters of Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam. All last week, **Dirksen** had been confined at Walter Reed Army Hospital in northwest Washington. There, Monday evening, he heard David Brinkley report on the GOP report—and he didn't like what he heard, nor what he heard on the 11 o'clock news reports either.

Dirksen was aghast. Here he'd been away from the Senate for a week and his colleagues were being described as moving to dissent from the president and his commitment in the Vietnam war.

He turned out the lights and tried to go to sleep. The whole business troubled him and he was sleeping only fitfully because of it. At about 2:30, he could sleep no more—this was Tuesday morning—and he got up. For an hour and a half, until 4 in the morning, **Dirksen** wrote. He was preparing a policy statement of his own, one for his party. That done, he returned to his bed.

"Then I slept pretty well," he said.

Already, he had fairly well recuperated from the pneumonia that had confined him to the hospital, and at 11:15, with his doctor's permission, he left the hospital by limousine for the GOP lunch in the Capitol. There he read his statement to his Republican senatorial colleagues:

The sudden, extreme, and completely unwarranted interpretation of the Republican policy staff report by some commentators, is to say the least, rather astonishing. I got no such impressions and came to no such conclusions. In a capsule, it is a complete, authentic, well-documented, historical report on our involvement in Vietnam; a recital of Republican positions in the past, and two basic questions concerning the party commitments in the future. The questions do not suggest what position if any, the party should take. The only suggestion is that the party might agree to seek answers to the two questions of our national interest in Southeast Asia and how far to go in support of that interest.

It makes no suggestion that (1) We modify our support of the president (2) that we increase or diminish our troop strength (3) that we escalate or de-escalate the conduct of the war (4) that we retreat or withdraw (5) that we disavow our obligations under the SEATO Treaty (6) that we pressure Vietnam into a course of action which it might be reluctant to take.

The basic questions have been and are being raised in many quarters by many people and many organizations and are indeed a proper field of inquiry and exploration at any time.

There is an over-riding fact which the report does not dispute or ignore. It is the fact that we are in Vietnam, 400,000 strong, and that our peace efforts through many approaches, in the utmost of good faith, have proved abortive. Nor does it hint that the position which the Republican Party should take, should be altered, regardless of what a further examination of our national interest or further involvement might disclose.

Preserving wholly the right of full and fair inquiry and criticism, we reiterate our wholehearted support of the Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces. We reaffirm our position of standing four-square behind him and our field, air and sea commanders in Southeast Asia as, with our superb fighting men, they fight to win this struggle against communist aggression.

His colleagues had already taken considerable alarm and annoyance at the whole business. Thruston Morton resented the whole business, and he didn't care who knew it. The publication of the report, in Morton's judgment, was forcing the Senate Republicans to suggest "alternatives" to the president's actions in the war. Strom Thurmond at the Policy Committee meeting—of all GOP senators—bitterly assailed the document as giving aid and comfort to Ho Chi Min.

Dirksen's total repudiation of the document as a political stance helped quiet things, and Hickenlooper joined in to dissociate its publication, or rather its release, from any political context. "This is not a political document," Hickenlooper

later told reporters. It was meant only, he said, to be “a factual, historical study. ... We took no position.”

The words and tone of the report don't suggest such dispassionate disinterest in politics. It labels LBJ's attempt to stick Ike with blame for initiating the commitment, for example, as “diplomatic Darwinism.”

For a moment, Republicans in the Senate seemed to be coming unhinged in their stance on Vietnam, and **Dirksen** moved swiftly to counteract that trend. (He was coming to the Senate Tuesday for a vote on presidential campaign funds and returned to the hospital after that vote.)

Almost desperately, **Dirksen** sought to patch over the seeming break—certainly the public break—with Johnson and to plant his party firmly again behind the president. For his senatorial colleagues to swing away from Johnson would be a repudiation of his leadership in this painful business, and he acted to prevent it. His endorsement of Johnson as commander in chief could not be more total.

At the same time, **Dirksen** was not about to pin down his colleagues and party so that they could not escape to criticize Johnson's handling of the war.

“Do you think an administration is not responsible for its mistake?” he asked. “We'd certainly have to be blind and deaf and completely oblivious to the role of the loyal opposition.”

But he was not getting away from his strategy from the start.

“We have never made it a political issue,” **Dirksen** said, “and we do not make it a political issue. The people make it an issue.”

From the meeting, from the talk of his fellows, [from] the canvass he could sense of their views [sic], he had this to say of his own hard endorsement of the commander in chief: “From the standpoint of the war, I think you had an absolute consensus here.”

...

END

May 5, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation

Add Long

Context

This filing dealt with Senator Russell Long's deteriorating standing in the Senate and his mis-handling of the investment credit bill and the presidential campaign finance bill.

Lead Paragraph

We assume you've seen the *Wall Street Journal's* piece on Long in the May 2 issue. That's accurate in most details. There was more, however, to the final incident revealing the scrap between Long and Scott. When Scott called the Senate "a laughing stock," Long moved a point of order against Scott that he was in violation of Senate Rule 19—a rule forbidding any senator to refer to another senator in terms "unbecoming" a senator.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Dirksen, fresh from the hospital, took Long to task as well, condemning him for his threats to kill the investment credit bill if that was the only way to kill the repeal of the presidential campaign fund. **Dirksen** referred to Long's "boastful...and quite unwarranted remarks as to what he proposed to do with investment credit unless the Senate bowed to his will. That certainly was not the language that is becoming the dignity of the Senate and could best have been left unuttered."

...

END

May 11, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation

Congress at Mid-Session—Take I

Context

An overview of congressional action and prospects for future legislative business.

Lead Paragraph

In the aftermath of last November’s congressional elections, President Johnson found that he was confronted with a Congress far more hostile than the one before, the 89th, that had all but wiped clean the FDR-HST-JFK-LBJ slate of unenacted proposals. With the war mounting in Vietnam, he and his advisers considered—and rejected—the idea of concentration in the new Congress on military and defense matters. By doing so, went the argument, the Democratic administration could cut losses certain to come in the domestic field—ask for less, suffer fewer losses.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Among the Republicans, there was an agreed-upon silence about the war—endangered by last week’s flap over the Senate Republican Policy Committee staff’s “Report on the War in Viet Nam.” **Dirksen** rushed in quickly—and from a hospital bed—to put the quietus on that. “When I put on the silencer,” **Dirksen** cracked this week, “they are silent!”

...

In the Senate, the Republican leaders are far more tolerant of the president, more reluctant to engage in actual political war with him. They don’t have the votes there to swing the chamber, as do Ford and Laird and the House Republicans. And, besides, the key Senate Republican—**Dirksen**—is still a favorite of the president, and the president is a favorite of his.

Dirksen doesn’t care who knows it.

Last week, after **Dirksen** rushed to the Capitol and put “the silencer” on what seemed momentarily to be major GOP dissent on the war, he got a call, from “Lyndon.”

There was no need for many words. All the president said to **Dirksen** was: “Thanks.”

Then they went on to other business—and it involved a man **Dirksen** wants the president to appoint to a federal office. (**Dirksen** won't say whom or what office, but he's willing to bet his man will get the job.) "I wanted to get something out of him," **Dirksen** said, and he's apparently got it.

What are you going to give him?

"Nothing!" **Dirksen** said. He paused a moment, reflecting. Then he said: "I done give!"

END

June 15, 1967

MacNeil to Time, Nation

Add Thurgood Marshall

Context

The Senate was considering the confirmation of Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court.

Lead Paragraph

We see no real problem in the Senate confirming Marshall to the court. In a real sense, the Senate has already cleared him twice with its confirmation to the other two high federal posts he's received—and that makes it just about impossible to build a case against him other than a straight racist vote—which, however real still, has become embarrassing to even the southerners.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Perhaps the best single indication on how solid are the assurances of Marshall's Senate confirmation came from Senator **Everett Dirksen**, the GOP Senate leader.

"I haven't the slightest doubt that he will be confirmed," **Dirksen** said.

(**Dirksen**, incidentally, was tipped off in advance by LBJ on the Marshall appointment—a nice precautionary touch by the president).

"He's a good lawyer," **Dirksen** said of Marshall, "and the fact of his color should make no difference."

Dirksen has committed himself to vote for Marshall's confirmation.

In his sensitive position, as the opposition's leader, **Dirksen's** flat endorsement, flat prediction of certain Senate approval, speaks loudly of the coming event.

...

END

July 13, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation

NAACP

Context

This filing began with reporting on House action on an anti-riot bill but then moved to Senate consideration of fair housing legislation. The section-lead paragraph below begins the latter section.

Lead Paragraph

See below for section lead.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

On Wednesday, the Senate rejected an effort to tie fair housing to a federal project—the atom smasher designated to be built in Weston, Illinois, west of Chicago. Sponsoring the idea was John Pastore of Rhode Island, chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. Defending the funds to get the plant started was that old walrus, **Everett Dirksen**, and the two had a fiery debate over the matter, the real feature of the struggle, although others engaged in it too.

The money—\$7,333,000—for the 200 SEV accelerator was contained in an overall bill to authorize some \$2.6 billion for the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] in the coming year. This was the first money authorization for the Weston project—which will cost eventually about \$375 million. Pastore moved that the item be struck from the bill.

This was nothing startling, for the idea of denying the funds to Weston has been rampant in town for several weeks, and **Dirksen** has publicly stated—or rather threatened—that if the funds were knocked out for Weston, he would retaliate on other projects in other states. The complaint against Weston came from the AEC—that it did not provide adequate fair housing for the large number of workers that the new plant would automatically need.

Dirksen was not about to let so valuable a federal plum slip from the grasp of his state. The Illinois legislature grappled with the problem of enacting a fair housing bill last month—with **Dirksen** in telephone conversation with the state legislature's GOP leaders all the way—and failed.

Pastore made the argument that Negroes working in Weston would have to drive miles and miles every day to get from home to work and from work to home, while whites could live nearby.

“We ought to make sure,” Pastore told the Senate, “that every American of any religion or color can live within the vicinity of that project so that, being close enough to it, he can avail himself of the equal opportunity of employment in that project.”

Dirksen mocked and ridiculed Pastore’s stand—and that of other states. He said Rhode Island could be dropped in Illinois and not [be] noticed, and he threatened again to retaliate on other states’ projects if his state’s was cut off in this fashion.

“I would not say,” mocked **Dirksen**, “that he (Pastore) has the only throbbing heart in the Senate for humanity.”

Ed Brooke of Massachusetts supported Pastore. ...

Chuck Percy took a more reasoned and quiet position than **Dirksen**—that Illinois had race and housing problems and was trying to solve them, but this was not a proper method to blackjack the state.

The Senate shrank back from this new civil rights hooker—if carried to the ultimate, it would cut off federal projects in some thirty states that don’t have fair housing laws. The vote against Pastore was 47 to 37.

The bill then passed. It will have to be adjusted with the House version, then signed by the president. The bill itself merely authorizes the appropriation for Weston; it does not provide it. The money will have to come later this session, in an appropriation bill.

END

August 10, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation

Arms and the Bank

Context

In August 1967, the Senate debated the fate of foreign aid and the role of the Export-Import Bank in financing the sale of armaments.

Lead Paragraphs

It was 3:14 Wednesday afternoon, and Teddy Kennedy was in the chair.

“On this vote,” he announced, “there are 40 yeas and 48 nays. The amendment is not agreed to.

Thus the drive in the Senate to slow down the arms race—at least among undeveloped countries—came to a screeching halt. The whole business was an institutional embarrassment, for the senators themselves are to blame for not being aware that the Export-Import Bank was providing funds for arms purchases under a grant from Congress itself for such authority.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Everett Dirksen and a band of Republican senators put in an amendment to bar any Ex-Im credits for sales or purchases from communist countries.

The Senate haggled over this for the better part of a day, and then rejected it on Thursday, 35 to 51.

...

END

September 28, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation

Vietnam Cover—Take IX

Context

MacNeil filed several reports for a *Time* cover issue on Vietnam, October 6, 1967.

Lead Paragraph

Within Congress, the principal symptom of the unrest over the war in Vietnam came not from the sporadic outbursts by senators in their anti-war speeches, nor in the extraordinary proposal of those 52 members of the House to reassess the whole business. It has come, and is still coming, in the near-rebellion of the congressmen over the federal budget. The president's request for a ten-percent surcharge is scarcely a request for heroic sacrifice on the part of U.S. taxpayers. But it has had the effect of acting as a goad to the latest frustration and anxiety over the war and produced the twin horrors (in administration terms) of immense hostility to the idea of increasing taxes and of parallel hostility to the huge costs of government—and that budget deficit with its anti-social after-effects.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Everett Dirksen, the Republican leader in the Senate, is watching the crumbling support for the war with an uneasy and wary eye. He's the party leader, and, as such, he can't cease to lead—he can't be abandoned by his rank and file and still be leader. He is lying quiet these days, essentially, although taking random shots at even his own party people who have been talking of pulling back, if not out, in Vietnam.

"There's a fatigue in the country," **Dirksen** tells us, analyzing the root problem with the members of Congress of both parties. "They're all getting iffy. I don't know what the hell's wrong with them."

Dirksen himself is standing with the commander-in-chief as he has from the beginning. But he sees the erosion of support within his own party, and he does not pretend to know how to cure it. There was no mistaking his private mind: he didn't like the Morton attack. "You don't pull your people back," said **Dirksen** somberly. He was talking of troop withdrawals.

...

Dirksen didn't like the whole business [proposals to investigate the conduct of the war]. He told a news conference that the words in these debates would be used by the communists for their own purpose.

"The fellows in uniform over there aren't going to appreciate it one damn," **Dirksen** said of the Case-Findley-Morse assaults. "It's not a happy thing to see."

Dirksen stated publicly thus that in war you don't give the enemy help.

Yet **Dirksen** himself was not above the storm, nor above criticism from his own people. He was feeling the pressures too, especially about his friending of Lyndon Johnson. He spoke of some of his own people complaining to him.

"They don't think," **Dirksen** said, "that I should be so friendly to the commander-in-chief and the president of the United States. I thought that it was a good idea to know the commander-in-chief and the president of the United States."

The fighting was getting more and more bitter in Vietnam, and at least some of the flack was hitting politicians of all persuasions. ...

END

October 5, 1967

MacNeil to Time, Nation

Nation's Lede—Take I

Context

President Lyndon Johnson continued to battle Congress over his proposed budget and the conduct of the war in Vietnam.

Lead Paragraph

The fifty-five men who constructed the U.S. Constitution 180 years ago, the men Thomas Jefferson called an assembly of demigods, were essentially oriented toward a legislative government, and in their wisdom they gave to the new Congress they invented far-reaching powers—to the House of Representatives the primary authority over federal revenues, and to the Senate a major control over foreign affairs. There have been vast changes in the very core of the government they created, with the remarkable growth of the president's presumptive powers in both these fields. But this week it was obvious that there has been a striking reversion—if a considerably distorted one—of both chambers in the special fields of competence laid out for them by the Founding Fathers.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

It was an irony past telling that the chief supporter of the president was the leader of the formal political opposition in Congress to the president, Senator **Dirksen**, and that he stood toe-to-toe in a slugging match with the president's most consequential congressional critic to defend the president. "The president is not our ruler," **Dirksen** cried, "but you do not demean him in the eyes of people abroad, for when you do, you demean the prestige of this Republic." Yet **Dirksen** did not alone tangle with Senator Fulbright, nor the other Democratic critics; he laid to with a will against his own Republicans, flatly repudiating one of the most influential men in his party, Thurston Morton. And it was a further irony that the chief support **Dirksen** got in his defense of the president came for the assistant Senate Republican floor leader, Thomas Kuchel.

That **Dirksen** should take up the cudgels in defense of the president marked, if anything, the depth of the criticism within the Senate of the president's handling of the war. For weeks that criticism has been growing, and for weeks **Dirksen** has been gravely worried about it. He was asked Tuesday afternoon, before he made his speech, whether he was concerned about the Republican senators lambasting the president. "Why should I be?" he retorted. "I just have to chart a course for myself." He misspoke himself and knowingly, out of his peculiar position. He is now slated to be chairman of the Republican Platform Committee at next year's party convention,

and he has been talking privately for several weeks, including to us, about his concern of any criticism that might “demean” the office of president.

But the criticism that **Dirksen** moved to quiet had obviously a root cause that would not easily be put down—again that sentiment from the folks back home, the sense of futility and stalemate, and frustration and anxiety. If critics made a discordant chorus with their varied and contradictory proposals, they were taking their cue from a common conductor, their constituents, and it was this that gave a sense of unity in the chaos: the advice they were giving was conflicting, but the unhappiness that prompted them was the same. And for Lyndon Johnson that was the challenge, if one not likely to find cohesion in a consensus on precisely what should be done in Vietnam.

...

The election of 1966 played a considerable role in taking from the president the tools he needed—those 47 liberal votes in the House that were replaced with as many conservatives. But there was a good deal more to his loss now than those votes, and the challenge to his leadership went to extents that it would not be easy for him, or his ally **Dirksen**, to quell. ...

...

END

October 27, 1967

MacNeil to Time Nation

Demonstrations Aftermath—Take VIII

Context

MacNeil covered the Republican congressional leadership's news conference following peace demonstrations at the Pentagon.

Lead Paragraph

From Capitol Hill and its members came this week more of the seemingly endless stream of criticism of the president and his war.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

It [the Republican leadership's statement] was presented to the press by **Ev Dirksen** and Jerry Ford after the regular weekly session of the joint Republican leaders on the Hill. In sum, they called for cracking down on the dissenters who resorted to violence—and by implication they tied Lyndon to the failure to quiet these “illegal” carryings-on.

...

“There is no right,” the **Dirksen**-Ford statement read, “to act against the public safety by anyone, anywhere, anytime—for any reason.”

...

END

January 18, 1968

MacNeil to Time Nation

Congress—Mood and Prospects—Take I; State of the Union—Take II

Context

In addition to previewing the upcoming session, MacNeil described President Johnson's State of the Union message and congressional reaction.

Lead Paragraph

Technically, the House of Representatives and the Senate convened at Monday noon—almost a fortnight belated from the “legal” opening day. But in reality, the leaders and members on either side of the Hill did what they always do; they put off everything until the president ran through that most ancient of rituals in the American Republic—the report on the State of the Union.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

The only fault that LBJ could have with his audience was the absence of so many of the members of Congress. There were only 55 senators there—missing were such as Gene McCarthy, Teddy Kennedy, George McGovern, Frank Church, **Ev Dirksen** (**Dirksen** ill with the flu at Walter Reed Army Hospital. McCarthy was downtown making a speech.) Many—perhaps 200 of the Representatives—did not turn out for this night-time show on the Hill. Notable among these absentees: Wilbur Mills of Arkansas.

...

END

January 18, 1968

MacNeil to Time Nation

Congress—Mood and Prospects—Take II; State of the Union—Take III

Context

More on the president's State of the Union message and Republican and Democratic reaction to it from members of Congress.

Lead Paragraph

The instant response—like those of Pavlov's dogs—was predictable.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

With **Dirksen** ill, the Senate leadership was reduced to Paul Fannin of Arizona as a stand-in, backed up by non-GOP-leaders Hugh Scott and Jack Javits and, yes, Strom Thurmond.

...

END

February 23, 1968

MacNeil to Time Nation

Revolution in the Senate

Context

MacNeil reported on the Senate's response to criticisms that it had adopted "slipshod" practices, as evidenced in the ethics charges brought against Senator Thomas Dodd, and efforts to restore the decorum and dignity of the body.

Lead Paragraph

Back in the 1920s, it was normal for senators to attend the sessions of their august body in morning coats, and the behavior of the senators and the formal manner in which they conducted their affairs was at one with their formal dress.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

He [Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield] alerted Senator **Dirksen**, who this Tuesday afternoon past briefed his Republican colleagues on the new conditions of conducting the affairs of the Senate. His Republican senators took the word with some grumping.

"We shall not have the spectacle of senators jumping up and asking if they are recorded," **Dirksen** announced. "The Democratic Policy Committee took a very dim view of this—that this did not comport with the dignity of the Senate."

"When the roll is completed, the regular order will apply no matter who is rushing to the floor. If you're going to have a rule, you have to have a rule. That's the rule."

Dirksen's warning came too late for Ed Brooke of Massachusetts. Just before the Republican policy lunch on Tuesday, at which **Dirksen** made the announcement, the Senate had voted on the motion for cloture on the civil rights bill.

...

Dirksen, as you might guess, takes a somewhat jaundiced view of the business, although he's going along with the whole thing too. He and Mansfield have asked the Architect of the Capitol to look into the possibility of a loud-speaker system for the Senate chamber—a matter to be handled with great delicacy and finesse, to be sure.

“The dignity of the Senate slips,” said **Dirksen** to a friend, “only if, as and when the members of the Senate are indecorous. It’s up to them to preserve the dignity of the Senate.”

“Everybody in the Senate is his own policeman.”

Dirksen doesn’t really believe in rules of decorum unduly restrictive—any more than he does in codes of ethics. But the old man has had his own little private reform. He used to wear clothes so badly that he looked like an unmade bed. Look at him now. Neat press, high shine on the shoes, expensive suits. Neatly tied tie. It didn’t happen yesterday, this statesmanlike dignified clothes of **Dirksen**, but recently enough to indicate that secretly he has his own feelings about the problem, if highly personal.

The only thing in disarray about **Dirksen** these days is that head of unruly hair—his trademark. But we don’t know how the rules in the Senate can alter that.

END

February 28, 1968

MacNeil to Jackson for Life, ex-Glennon, Editorials

Ethics

Context

As the Senate considered ethics reform, MacNeil interviewed **Dirksen**.

Lead Paragraph

Dirksen feels rather strongly that members of Congress should not be treated as “second-class citizens”—his phrase in reference to forcing congressmen to disclose their financial assets.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

Here’s some **Dirksen** quotes on the general subject:

“The Senate would be the whipping boy, and I do not propose to permit it to be the whipping boy. I believe that we have demeaned ourselves long enough...and I think it is time to stop.”

“This is a great business. We are going to become a group of bookkeepers. We shall not have time for much else before we are through.”

“After all, does not character count for something in this body? Have we reached the point where, when we are elected by the people in an entire state, they have not had an opportunity to assess one’s integrity and one’s devotion to public service?”

As we filed last week in the “Revolution in the Senate,” **Dirksen** believes that each senator is his own watchdog—and the voters have the assignment of deciding whether he does an adequate job of it.

Dirksen, when we spoke to him last evening, had not seen the proposed code—and wouldn’t comment in advance. We can be sure he won’t go for anything unduly restrictive—but a moderate (and, to him, preferably meaningless) code he’d probably roll with.

END

March 6, 1968

MacNeil to Joe Kastner Life (copy to Clurman, Time Nation)

How Old Ev Did It

Context

Dirksen's role in passing a fair housing bill. The original document is annotated in MacNeil's nearly illegible hand.

Lead Paragraph

"I know where the bodies are buried."

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

The way Senator **Everett Dirksen** uttered these words the other day, his voice rumbling like far-distant thunder, suggested cabalistic mysteries performed in the dark recesses of the Senate's hidden chambers. They evoked a sense of occult skullduggeries, of secret passageways, of inscrutable incantations used to penetrate the minds of U.S. senators and to make them change their minds.

Dirksen exaggerated the tone and nature of his secret artifices to cajole and persuade his colleagues. Those techniques are far more prosaic and commonplace than the ancient rites of witchcraft.

Yet what **Dirksen** proposed to do was scarcely more startling than the intent of the alchemist to change base metal into gold. In the face of absolute resistance, he proposed to make the Senate invoke cloture and then pass a far-reaching civil rights bill.

The idea was the more bewildering in that it was **Dirksen** himself, exercising his veto over Senate transactions, who for two years had prevented passage of this very bill. It was he who had led the fight against open occupancy in housing.

Twice before, **Dirksen** had done just this. In 1964 he had initially opposed the omnibus civil rights bill, only to change his mind, offer a compromise, and carry the Senate with him. The next year, on the voting rights bill, he had repeated that remarkable performance.

Now, he proposed to do the same again. Why he had changed, why he had somersaulted on this critical issue, caused the wildest speculation. He had lost control of his party in the Senate and was trying to recoup his leadership. He was trying for a bargain for the chairmanship of his party's Platform Committee. He had made a secret covenant, secretly arrived at, with his friend, President Johnson.

What really changed **Dirksen**, however, were the dire predictions of more riots in the cities this summer and the delicate matter of who would be blamed for them. He wanted to dampen down racial unrest, if he could, and he wanted to avoid positioning the Republican Party as hostile to the Negroes' aspirations.

"I was looking down the road," he said, "and at the impact of this on the party. I was thinking about the party's future."

But why he changed was less significant than that he had changed, and the real question was whether he could deliver the votes from his party regulars to make that change sway the Senate.

Actually, the presumed abruptness of **Dirksen's** change of heart was somewhat illusory. All through the six weeks of the Senate's filibuster, he had been talking privately and publicly of his desire for a bill. Seasoned senators and Hill correspondents just assumed that was the old **Dirksen** hokum. No one took him seriously until he told the attorney general, Ramsey Clark, that he was ready to negotiate a compromise.

For a full week these negotiations went on. There was no mistaking **Dirksen** now. He demanded changes in the proposals to protect civil rights workers. He insisted on basic alterations in the substance of the open housing provisions. He insisted, also, that the new bill would be "the **Dirksen** bill."

The proponents of the original bill were more than happy to meet **Dirksen's** terms.

"We had to compromise with him," said Ed Brooke of Massachusetts. "We couldn't do it without him."

Day and night the negotiations went on, most of them in **Dirksen's** office or private hideaway, and all sides except the southerners were brought in. Phil Hart of Michigan and Fritz Mondale of Minnesota, for the Senate Democrats; Ramsey Clark, for the Johnson administration; Jacob Javits of New York, Howard Baker of Tennessee, and Brooke of Massachusetts, for the Senate Republicans.

Shrewdly, **Dirksen** brought his best friend and ally, Roman Hruska of Nebraska, to the sessions. Hruska would help swing those mid-west Republicans, the real targets, for **Dirksen** had to change them to change the Senate.

At last a compromise bill was pasted together, and **Dirksen** presented it to the Senate. "It's a miracle," exclaimed Mondale, almost unbelieving. The measure was far stronger than anyone could have believed was possible.

All that remained now was the task of lining up the vote. That would be no problem. **Dirksen** radiated confidence, even though the Senate within the fortnight had twice rejected cloture, failing to muster the necessary two-thirds of those present and voting. **Dirksen** would perform his mysteries. He would go “begging and crawling,” as he puts it, to those mid-western colleagues.

But there was a problem, and a serious one. The mid-westerners were not going to roll over so easily. Hickenlooper of Iowa was adamant. So was Bennett of Utah. Williams of Delaware, allied with the mid-westerners, was bitter. Young of South Dakota was intractable.

Publicly they were making noises about the substance of the **Dirksen** bill, the instant demand for its approval without adequate debate, the cavalier ignoring of the Senate’s deliberative procedures. Privately they were furious at the idea of flip-flopping at **Dirksen’s** beck and call.

Over drinks the night before the vote, **Dirksen** told Hruska his problems. “Will you give me a vote?” **Dirksen** asked. Hruska shook his head. “No.” **Dirksen** was shaken, but he could not quit now. He had far too much on the line.

He harangued Hansen of Wyoming for an hour and failed. He pleaded with Curtis of Nebraska and was turned down. He argued with Miller of Iowa, and he sensed a softening of position. He talked earnestly to Mundt of South Dakota.

Not all he found was discouraging. Baker, his son-in-law, would follow him. Jordan of Idaho had already agreed to come along. Carlson of Kansas was nervous, agitated, but he agreed to vote with **Dirksen** if his vote made the difference.

The vote came on Friday, March 1, and before he went to bed the night before, **Dirksen** had lined up the votes needed. He had just enough to win, and Carlson’s pledge besides in case of an emergency.

But **Dirksen** miscalculated. The real estate lobby had launched a massive campaign, and there were other pressures, too. Murphy voted against **Dirksen**. Gore of Tennessee, resentful of **Dirksen’s** maneuvers, switched to vote against cloture. The mid-western Republicans refused to change.

Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Democratic leader, didn’t pull the bill down. He gave **Dirksen** and the civil rights advocates one more chance. He scheduled another vote Monday. **Dirksen** and his allies had the weekend.

It was a desperate business now. Carlson slipped away from this pledge. **Dirksen** got wind of it, and begged him for his vote. “Frank,” he said, “I need you.” Carlson came back.

Under the pressures, Mundt weakened. Brooke and Percy of Illinois conducted that negotiation. Mundt would vote for cloture if **Dirksen** and the others would agree to accept a softening amendment. **Dirksen**, backed to the wall, agreed, but in the end Mundt refused.

Miller, less than two hours before the vote, tried to negotiate further reductions in the bill with **Dirksen**. He had amendments of his own. He demanded **Dirksen's** pledge of support. **Dirksen** didn't dare give it. That might cost him other votes.

"Jack, I can't do it," **Dirksen** told him. "What you'll do is unhinge the bill. I can't give you that commitment."

Miller was lost.

Meanwhile, there were serious efforts to sway the Democrats. Gore was carefully romanced by Brooke and Javits. ...

...

Miller replied [to a plea from Brooke to vote for cloture] he'd vote for cloture if Brooke would support his amendments. Brooke was part of the **Dirksen** team; he didn't feel he could agree without **Dirksen's** permission. He hurried to **Dirksen's** side. **Dirksen** quickly agreed. The Clerk had almost finished the call of the roll.

Miller voted "aye." **Dirksen** walked up the aisle and signaled Carlson. His vote was necessary. Carlson had been waiting for that signal. He stood up and voted "aye." Bartlett had been hiding in the Democratic cloakroom. He hurried down the aisle, whispered with Mansfield, and then voted "aye."

The galleries burst into applause. They knew what Bartlett's vote had to mean. Vice President Humphrey gavelled for order. Then he announced the vote.

The Senate had invoked cloture, 65 to 32. A single defection would have meant defeat.

It had been harrowing, agonizing, and he'd needed help from a half-dozen quarters, but **Dirksen** all the same had done it again.

END

March 22, 1968

MacNeil to Time, Nation

Ethics

Context

The Senate considered adopting a code of ethics.

Lead Paragraph

The Senate spent the week laundering up its linen—and looking a bit sheepish in the process. Under consideration was the proposition by the Stennis committee to adopt a code of ethics for the members, and not all the members of the Senate were entirely pleased at going through this curious business.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

One of the least happy was that old rascal **Ev Dirksen**. He started with little purchase on the bill—seemingly a bit hesitant at opposing morality—but by midweek he was thundering: “I refuse to let you make me a class-B citizen.”

By the end of the week, he had launched an assault, with a cloudburst of proposed amendments, on the whole proposition.

Dirksen reflected the old school on this—that the people decide who is to be senator and the senator need answer only to them. But there were on hand the new school fellows, too, notably Cliff Case of New Jersey and Joe Clark of Pennsylvania, who believe in telling all.

The Stennis committee had gone along with the Case-Clark reformer school to the extent of proposing a code at all. But in its propositions, its strictures, the committee had tended to bear off toward the **Dirksen** school; what the hell, doesn't it mean something to be an august senator?

And thus, with the Stennis committee roughly in the middle, the battle raged all week between the two camps, with stentorian-voiced John Stennis trying to moderate between the contestants and hold his proposed package intact.

...

Beyond the actions themselves, and there were some significant actions, the show was **Dirksen's**—and he tore a passion to tatters on the Senate floor Wednesday afternoon, out-Heroding Herod.

The pending situation was that Case and Clark had proposed an amendment to the Stennis resolution that would have substituted the quite tame proposal for

submitting sealed financial reports to one requiring senators to disclose publicly their assets and income—and that of their immediate family.

...

But the real show came from **Dirksen**. And he turned his mockery—a formidable weapon—on the whole business of public disclosure of assets and interests, and especially those of his wife, or any senator’s wife.

Dirksen, in effect, confessed that he could not force his wife to tell him what she owned. He doesn’t inquire of such matters of his wife, he said. “She dabbles around a little now and then,” he said of her stock market activities. “I do not know the extent of it.” He wouldn’t think of asking her what she owned or how she was making out. If he did, he said, his wife would say to him: “I will do nothing of the kind, because it is not the Senate’s business.”

There was a method in this madness, **Dirksen** made plain, for his discretion in dealing with Mrs. D—“she’s a pretty independent person”—had led to a quite happy marriage; bliss, indeed.

“We have lived 40 happy years together,” **Dirksen** told the Senate. “...it just proves that love and harmony and sweetness of life still prevail in the **Dirksen** family. But she is her own boss.”

Dirksen made plain he wasn’t going to risk his lady’s wrath by the impertinence demanded by the ethics reformers.

Well, down went the Case-Clark amendment, but by a surprising[ly] close vote: 40 to 44.

...

END

May 22, 1968

MacNeil to Time Nation

The Year of Ferment—Take I

Context

MacNeil's report dealt with the nature of social and cultural change in the U.S. and the impact on politics.

Lead Paragraph

The picturesque circumstances agitating the America of 1968, a time when the nation itself has become the most awesomely powerful ever to bestride the earth, are far different than those when the Republic was young, and they must not be appraised without remembering that fever in a people comes and goes, that this nation has had greater convulsive periods than this.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

"Congressmen see the mood," Senator **Dirksen** wrote this week in his "Senator's Notebook," "they feel it—in the mail, telegrams and phone calls. The letters and telegrams are longer than they used to be. Callers have more words to describe their discontent. Visitors never have enough time to say all they came to say."

...

END

June 27, 1968

MacNeil to Time, Nation

Fortas Cover—Take II

Context

Abe Fortas, President Johnson's nominee for chief justice of the United States, earned a *Time* cover on July 5, 1968. McNeil reported on Johnson's cultivation of support in the Senate for Fortas and other potential nominees, including Homer Thornberry.

Lead Paragraph

In matters of high state, as in the appointment and confirmation of the chief justice of the United States, there is inevitably more involved than the seeming tranquility of what the chief actors present formally to the public, and it was so in this naming of Abe Fortas to the highest judicial station of the nation.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Johnson telephoned Mike Mansfield, the Senate Democratic leader, three or four times over the period of the fortnight in which he was resolving the question [of potential opposition to his appointments]. He talked to **Everett Dirksen**, the Republican leader, even more intensively. He talked, presumably, to the others who are key to the levers of power in the Senate. ...

...

END

July 17, 1968

MacNeil to Time Nation

Fortas—Take II

Context

A group of Senate Republicans threatened to filibuster against confirmation of Lyndon Johnson's appointment to the Supreme Court. **Dirksen's** son-in-law, Howard Baker of Tennessee, was a member of the group.

Lead Paragraph

One of the Johnson administration's stalwarts in the Senate lounged in an alcove off the Senate chamber and talked privately [of] his hopes that a filibuster against Abe Fortas's confirmation would fail.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Neither Griffin nor Baker is "anti" Supreme Court. Baker indeed led an extraordinary fight earlier this year against his father-in-law, **Everett Dirksen**, to defend the Court's one-man, one-vote decision.

...

Senator **Dirksen's** remarkable change in stance over the last three weeks is another indicator of the deterioration of the administration's position on the justices-designate. He had cleared both men in advance for Johnson and stands staunchly with the president on this.

Two weeks ago, he predicted there would be no filibuster. Senators who had signed the GOP round-robin had told him, he said, that they regretted it.

Last week, however, he saw the filibuster coming.

"I'm pretty confident of cloture," he said.

This week there was more slippage. He was no longer confident, and the majestic ruins of his face showed it.

"It's either way," he said publicly. "It'll be close. It could depend on the absentees."

Dirksen had the message. He'd been whistling a little bit to start, hoping for the best. But he wasn't whistling now: he was alarmed.

He was talking instead of the clear majority of the Senate who favored confirming Fortas—"if the name comes to a vote."

...

END

July 24, 1968

MacNeil to Time Nation

Fortas—Take I

Context

Senate leaders continued to discuss how to take up President Johnson's nomination of Abe Fortas to be chief justice of the United States. This reporting occurred after Fortas testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Lead Paragraph

There is a hallowed unwritten rule in the Senate Judiciary Committee that permits any member to postpone action on a nomination for a week simply by making the request.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Senate Minority Leader **Everett M. Dirksen** (R-Ill.) told a press conference, I believe Justice Fortas will be confirmed by the Senate. But I doubt it will happen until after we come back [from the political conventions and Labor Day].

What **Dirksen** and Eastland statements really mean is that the Fortas nomination is in trouble.

...

END

August 8, 1968

MacNeil (No. 1), Miami to Time Nation

The Convention—Chronology

Context

This was Neil MacNeil reporting from the Republican National Convention, Miami, Florida, the first of several filings.

Lead Paragraphs

“I am sorry....

On that apologetic note, his very first words, Richard Nixon began his statement announcing to a wondering press and nation his choice for vice president. The words had a symbolism to them—Nixon used them more than once—for this, the quadrennial gathering of the Republican Party.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

But they [the delegates] were not interesting in the speeches—and this student of political oratory as an art form could scarcely blame them. There was hardly a rouser in the lot, and only **Ev Dirksen** actually commanded the convention in toto, when he presented the party platform.

...

END

[August 8], 1968

MacNeil (No. 2), Miami Beach, to Time Nation

The Convention—Chronology

Context

In his continuing coverage of the Republican National Convention, MacNeil evaluated the speechmaking on Tuesday night. **Dirksen** addressed the convention.

Lead Paragraph

Tuesday night the tension at the convention was mounting. The floor was a rumor mill, and there was the UPI sucking back on its estimate of Nixon's strength, reporting erosion to open-candidate Reagan. At 11:02 that morning, the UPI reported Nixon's strength at 663 votes—as before. But at 4:40 in the afternoon, the UPI put Nixon with 648 votes.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Now it was **Dirksen's** hour, and this was his night more than any others, to present the party platform. He sauntered from the wings to the rostrum, slowly, hoarily, savoring the moment like the consummate actor that he is. He held aloft his raw-boned farmer's hands acknowledging the plaudits. Then he stood there, in mock surprise at the outpouring for him, the senior operating pro in the convention, his left hand stuffed in his pants pocket. For three minutes and more it went on, a rewarding howl of appreciation and welcome. Then the applause waned and died, and he stood there silently, waiting.

Dirksen is a student of crowds, and a master of them. The ground noises of the chatting delegates rose in a blur in the hall. He stared at them, waited. Finally he leaned forward and shouted: "Quiet." It brought a laugh.

"I accept the nomination," he shouted, and he won a cheer. He had cowed them with his waiting, and he had silenced them with his gags. In pure hokum, he threw over the rostrum onto the convention floor what he said [were] the speeches on the platform—a volume as fat as New York's yellow pages of the phone company. He had their attention completely at last, and he began then the speech he had written weeks ago for this very occasion.

Dirksen simply commanded silence in the hall. He went further—further than anyone else might have dared. He called for audience responses, with the nerve of a second-story man willing to try his luck on a most unresponsive crowd—and he got it. "One nation," he cried, and the great crowd echoed him ... "With liberty and justice" and the words came back, in his cadence.

Dirksen's message, in florid language, as reported in *Time* this week, was that the nation is not sick—just mismanaged. And he won a great roar of approval as he concluded.

...

It was plain that **Dirksen**, like an old-time Chautauqua-lecture circuit man, was the only one in the bunch with the style and verve to carry such an audience.

He'd been advised as a youth to handle a crowd by no less flamboyant an orator than William Jennings Bryan. (*New York Times* drama critic Clive Barnes dissented: "He would have been a cornball actor, I suspect, even in cornball roles.")

The galleries were almost empty when George Romney made his play. Belatedly he had demanded a reopening of the platform hearings, and **Dirksen** paid him the deference of doing it. **Dirksen** and his platform drafters were confused by what Romney was fussing about. He wanted to stiffen the platform with language clubbing big unionism's power, but the language he offered didn't scan intelligibly.

The committee had approved the final version of the platform without audible dissent, and it had been approved in various fashion by such varied personages as Roy Wilkins of [the] NAACP and Strom Thurmond. But Romney threatened to open a fight on it on the floor.

By convention meeting time, he had backed away from offering an amendment from the floor—swapping that option for time to address the delegates.

He praised **Dirksen's** work and that of the committee—fussed peripherally about the labor matter, sounding most, most conservative indeed. He thumped the Democrats, called for approval "enthusiastically" of the platform as is.

...

END

August 9, 1968

MacNeil (No. 5) Miami Beach to Time Nation

The Convention—Chronology

Context

MacNeil reported on the “call of the states” as the votes were tabulated for the Republican presidential candidates.

Lead Paragraph

The call of the states began at 1:16 Thursday morning—long after prime TV time in the East. But then there seemed little genuine effort to tailor this convention to the TV audience, as ABC proved.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

At the call of Illinois, **Dirksen’s** familiar voice momentarily flooded the chamber. He was a Nixon man and so was Illinois.

...

END

September 5, 1968

MacNeil to Time, Nation

Fortas

Context

The Senate Judiciary Committee had not yet reported out President Johnson's nomination of Abe Fortas as chief justice.

Lead Paragraph

The Senate Judiciary Committee was on the Senate's schedule for a session Wednesday morning. Senator Philip Hart of Michigan planned to push then for a vote on the nomination of Abe Fortas as chief justice of the United States.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

But assume, as **Everett Dirksen** did out loud this week, that the committee does not report the nomination favorably to the Senate.

"A filibuster will start," **Dirksen** said. "I'm sure of it. It can go a long time.

"There will be a long speech, and then they'll ask for a live quorum. It will be difficult to get. You have a very substantial number of senators who are campaigning for office. They'll want to get home. How do you keep them here?"

...

"In so far as I can tell," said **Dirksen**, "you will not have the votes for cloture.

"Then it's the prerogative of the majority leader to let the filibuster go on or withdraw the nomination."

...

Dirksen is for Fortas as chief justice. President Johnson reasoned together with **Everett** throughout the process by which he came to judgment on Fortas—and **Dirksen** cleared Fortas for the post. He did not consult his troops, and his troops are the ones preventing Fortas from being confirmed.

It's Bob Griffin and Howard Baker, **Dirksen's** son-in-law, who are prepared to defeat the nomination with a filibuster, and they have allies among the Democratic senators from the south.

...

But we sense trouble for **Dirksen**, who was quite cavalier in approving Fortas for Lyndon. He didn't touch base with his troops, and now a majority of them are against confirming Fortas. This is really what makes cloture impossible: too many Republicans are opposed.

Dirksen has had several such lapses in this 90th Congress—the Consular Treaty a year and a half ago is still vividly remembered. There's no sign at the moment of any rival emerging to challenge him for the leadership, but the Fortas business indicates that **Dirksen** is losing his grip—and that's the kind of thing that lets the young ambitious ones start dreaming dreams.

...

END

September 19, 1968

MacNeil to Time Nation

Fortas

Context

The Senate Judiciary Committee reported out President Johnson's nomination of Abe Fortas as chief justice.

Lead Paragraph

The Senate Judiciary Committee convened on schedule Tuesday morning at precisely 10:50, ten minutes before the hour agreed upon to vote on the nomination of Abe Fortas as chief justice of the United States.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Voting for Fortas were the administration senators on the committee—Dodd, Hart, Bayh, Kennedy (back in the harness again), Burdick, Tydings, and Smathers, and three key Republicans: **Dirksen**, Hruska, and Scott. Voting against were three influential southern Democrats, Eastland, McClellan, and Ervin, and three mixed Republicans, the rabid Thurmond, the moderate Baker, and nondescript Fong.

...

On the record, both **Dirksen** and Hruska, his closest friend in the Senate, seem solidly for Fortas. **Dirksen** cleared the nomination for Lyndon Johnson in the first place. Hruska, who has a legalistic bent to him, studied the hearings closely, came down two months ago solidly for Fortas.

Both have now weakened, even as they were voting for Fortas in the Judiciary Committee, and their softening on the Fortas nomination is instructive on what has been happening in the painful struggle.

Dirksen a fortnight and more ago quietly stopped pushing for the Fortas nomination, withdrew to the position that he would vote for him and for cloture. He avoided with calculation saying he would try to hustle Republican votes for cloture.

...

Dirksen has a similar problem [as Hruska], for he has always been sensitive to home-folks' sentiment and to the necessity to be in front of his own troops in the Senate. What's more, this year he is running for re-election, and although he seems

certain of winning that re-election, it naturally impinges on his views this late in the campaign.

In any event, on Monday, **Dirksen** baldly proposed an extraordinary legislative measure, and it goes to a side-issue that has been dragged into the Fortas nomination: obscenity. Strom Thurmond had tried to hang this around the neck of Fortas—that Fortas in his robes approved dirty movies—and the campaign was having a decided effect out in the hinterland. **Dirksen** was hearing from his folks.

“You’d think we were doing nothing in the Senate,” **Dirksen** said this week, “but looking at dirty movies.”

Dirksen, no fan of dirty movies, and who refused to view examples of the art shown by entrepreneur Strom Thurmond, had a solution of his own, his legislative remedy. He proposed to deny appeal to any other federal court the verdict of a jury on the guilt of “any person for the possession, sale, dissemination, or use of any obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, vile, or filthy article, matter, thing, device, or substance.”

In other words, he would deny jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of review of any question of obscenity.

It was an extraordinary proposal. It was first read as an attempt by **Dirksen** to help the Fortas nomination by taking the heat off the Supreme Court. That didn’t scan, however, and the insiders in the Senate soon knew what **Dirksen** was about: he was taking the heat off **Dirksen**.

Dirksen offered the proposal as an amendment to the gun control bill, then before the Senate, to insure its immediate consideration by the Senate. But he backed away Wednesday, after McClellan and Ervin threatened to open up the whole question of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and make the court something less than supreme over the American judicial processes.

The abortive **Dirksen** ploy was indicative of how badly off the Fortas nomination is in the Senate. There were other indications too.

...

END

September 23, 1968

MacNeil to Time Nation

Cover Suggestion

Context

MacNeil proposed that *Time* devote a cover to the 1968 Senate races.

Lead Paragraphs

In the presidential whirligig, the attention of the country has gone overwhelmingly to the three underwhelming candidates, Nixon, Wallace and Humphrey, and the crucial struggle for Congress has been ignored.

And in that struggle, the real test will come in the 34 separate races for seats in the U.S. Senate. This is so because, in political terms, the election in the House is already decided. The House is now a conservative body, and it will remain so when the new men come in on January 3. The only question is which party will organize the place.

In the Senate, the story is different. For the past decade, since the landmark 1958 election, the Senate has been a liberal body—with two-to-one Democratic majorities in each Congress.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Illinois—not even the mayor of Chicago looks like he'll vote for Bill Clark. It's **Dirksen** in a cake-walk.

...

END

September 26, 1968

MacNeil to Time Nation

Fortas

Context

A segment of Senate Republicans, led by Robert Griffin and Howard Baker, conducted a filibuster on a procedural question of whether the Senate should consider President Johnson's nomination of Abe Fortas for chief justice.

Lead Paragraph

Technically, the Senate will never consider the nomination of Abe Fortas as chief justice. That, at any rate, is the intention of Senator Robert Griffin of Michigan, and the phalanx of senators he is leading, and who are opposed to Fortas becoming the nation's highest judicial officer.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Over the weekend, this idea of ducking the direct facing of the issue gathered steam, and Monday evening in his hide-away off the Senate floor, **Everett Dirksen** tried to sell Griffin another version of the same tactic.

We have been filing in recent weeks on **Dirksen's** evaporating support of the Fortas nomination, and his attitude now, this week, shows totally how badly the Fortas nomination has fared in the Senate.

Dirksen, as you know, cleared the Fortas nomination for Lyndon Johnson—assuring (so they both thought) quick Senate approval. **Dirksen** neglected to check his rank and filers at the time, and for some time thereafter.

In early August, his side-kick and ally, Roman Hruska of Nebraska, also came out solidly for Fortas, but within a fortnight, both of them started a long retreat.

We get into motives here, and they are difficult matters to speak on with certainty. **Dirksen** is running for re-election—but he's a shoo-in by Democratic estimates. His mail has been running heavily anti-Fortas and anti-Supreme Court. Both of these considerations could be expected to influence **Dirksen**.

But there's something much more significant. He is the Republican leader of the Senate, and not less than 22 of the 37 Senate Republicans will vote against Fortas, will support the Griffin position. **Dirksen** has been accident-prone politically in the 90th Congress, repeatedly getting clipped by his own people—as by Thruston Morton with the consular treaty.

He's up for re-election as party leader next January, and we see him now maneuvering to placate Griffin and the young GOP rebels against their getting rambunctious in January. He doesn't want to be challenged—and everyone in town knows now that it was Bob Griffin in the House of Representatives who led the fight to depose Charlie Halleck four years ago and replace him as party leader with Jerry Ford.

...

Dirksen moved back from a stance in which he pledged to support Fortas and to fight any incipient filibuster against his nomination to one now very close to open opposition.

He'd been talking earlier Monday to Sam Ervin of North Carolina, the leader of the responsible southern Democrats (as against Strom Thurmond's hysteria) against Fortas. Ervin and **Dirksen** are ancient allies and parliamentarian connivers, and Ervin had an idea: have the Senate adopt a resolution declaring there was no vacancy in the Supreme Court. Goodbye Abe.

...

The camp supporting Fortas did not know what **Dirksen** was scheming. They suspected he was up to no good for Fortas, for they had seen his slippage over the weeks.

"Hell," said one of the administration Democratic senators, "**Dirksen** is not a reliable ally in any fight. He can turn himself around, and no one can ever lay a glove on him."

This was what was happening. And as he went through the gyrations, **Dirksen** moaned to reporters privately that they were misrepresenting his position, and then he refused to discuss the Fortas nomination at all.

But he'd gone a long way from support.

Tomorrow (Friday) Mansfield will offer a motion for cloture on his motion to take up the Fortas nomination. Then the Senate will vote on either Monday or Tuesday (depending if there's a Saturday session.) **Dirksen** blandly has declined to sign the cloture petition. Normally, in the successful fights to invoke cloture in the past eight years, **Dirksen** and Mansfield have offered the cloture motions jointly. And **Dirksen** has gone to work to persuade his Republican colleagues to vote for cloture.

He's not doing that now. He's not asking Republicans to vote for cloture. In fact, we suspect he may vote against it himself.

The blunt plain fact of the matter is that there are other questions of greater moment than confirmation of Fortas now before the Senate. The Fortas matter is over—in actuality—and **Dirksen** is fighting to regain his standing with the Senate Republicans. His formal title of party leader could be at stake otherwise.

...

END

September 27, 1968

MacNeil to Time, Nation

Fortas II

Context

Controversy continued to swirl around the nomination of Abe Fortas to be chief justice of the United States as some Senate Republicans filibustered an effort to move forward with confirmation.

Lead Paragraph

Mansfield has now decided that the cloture vote will be on next Tuesday, and he is positioning the Senate for the key vote on that date.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

Also **Dirksen** has now completely run out on Fortas, as we suspected he was in the process of doing. He told reporters, as you've seen by the wires, that he will vote against cloture. He said he felt "duty bound" to vote against cloture.

He's an extraordinary fellow, and here again he's turned 180 degrees. It adds more votes—not just his own—against Fortas.

...

END

September 30, 1968

The Washington staff to Clurman, New York (Confidential)

The Washington Memo--II

The Fortas Denouement

Context

Controversy continued to swirl around the nomination of Abe Fortas to be chief justice of the United States as some Senate Republicans filibustered an effort to move forward with confirmation. This report contained several different sections, each devoted to a different topic. **Dirksen** appeared in two: the Fortas denouement and “Would He Were Fatter.”

Lead Paragraph

(Steele). In the hours before the Senate vote on taking up the matter of Abe Fortas’ nomination to be chief justice of the United States Supreme Court [sic] there is only silence on the part of the president, who alone can avert a tragic denouement by withdrawing the nomination.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Meanwhile, as the steel girders outside the Capitol go up to house the inauguration of a new president, the Senate goes through its lackluster “debate” on a nomination which under other circumstances would have been confirmed with but routine consideration. Both Mansfield and Republican leader **Dirksen** greeted LBJ’s pre-announcement disclosure that he would name Fortas as “fine.” Neither for a moment foresaw the unusual nature of Johnson’s acceptance of Warren’s resignation as effective upon the qualification of his successor. Nor did they foresee the political storm which would follow. From a frankly political fight on timing of the nomination, the battle moved into the field of Fortas’ personal relations vis-à-vis Johnson, the conduct of the Court in recent years, and finally such peripheral issues as the Court’s stand on “obscene” movies and teaching fees accepted by Fortas.

...

Would He Were Fatter [about Senator Robert Griffin who led the filibuster against the confirmation of Fortas]
(MacNeil).

...

Griffin made a major conquest when he bowled over **Dirksen**. “That had a tremendous psychological impact,” he said. Not only that, but **Dirksen’s** defection

from the Fortas camp brought in at least one other senator: Roman Hruska of Nebraska, who had been wavering.

...

END

October 3, 1968

MacNeil to Time, Nation

Fortas—Take III

Context

The report covered the final stages of the Senate debate on the nomination of Abe Fortas as chief justice of the United States.

Lead Paragraph

When the Senate convened on Tuesday at noon, its time was under strict control—an hour's debate to be controlled by proponents and opponents equally, a half hour each, and then at 1 o'clock, the formal proceedings would start on the vote whether to impose cloture.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Everett Dirksen, who had specifically participated in the process of selecting Fortas in consultations with President Johnson last June, now controlled the time of those opposed to his nomination—a 180 degree turn.

He not only took charge of the opposition's side in the debate, he made the concluding speech of the debate himself—against Fortas.

In one of the most astonishing rationales ever heard in Congress, not to say out of **Dirksen's** own mouth, he accounted for his switch totally in terms of a Supreme Court decision, by 6 to 3 vote, on an Illinois murder case.

No one believed him. The decision was made last June, and **Dirksen** heard about it only last Wednesday—the Witherspoon case which challenged the Illinois jury selection system as seen by the Court.

Here was the senator who for six years has been fighting the Court on a half dozen major issues, trying even to call a constitutional convention to undo their work, and he hasn't been upset to the point of protesting against the Court by a vote in the Senate until a member of the Illinois Supreme Court last week notified his Chicago office of this dastardly deed by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Talk of credibility gaps!

Dirksen himself—and this is extraordinary—has been obviously embarrassed as he tried to answer reporters' questions about his remarkable

rationale. His eyes have watered in that embarrassment, which for all his great talents as an actor he could not conceal.

He was so unsure of himself that he didn't even use the last three minutes of his allotted speaking time. The old boy, under less trying circumstances, can keep the rhetoric flowing ad nauseum.

Then came the formal call of the Senate, to ascertain that a quorum was present.

...

A host of senators were keeping their own [vote] tallies, including **Dirksen**.

...

END

October 3, 1968

MacNeil to Time, Nation

Fortas—Take IV

Context

The report covered the final stages of the Senate debate on the nomination of Abe Fortas as chief justice of the United States with an emphasis on the role played by Michigan Senator Robert Griffin in opposing Fortas's confirmation.

Lead Paragraph

For Robert Griffin, there has been some misplaced emphasis on just what historic simile to use to describe him. There's a tendency among the press to describe him as the David going around Capitol Hill knocking off Goliaths. Bob doesn't see himself that way.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

And by the time Johnson had named Fortas, Griffin had collected support of a bloc of Senate Republicans who would stand with him.

He figured to enlist the whole party, and he and others tried to do so at a policy meeting of Republican senators. They found **Dirksen** hostile to the idea, to their surprise and chagrin. They did not then know that **Dirksen** had been in on the consultations and had cleared Fortas.

...

They [Griffin's forces] considered making a push to get support for their stance in the Republican platform, but they back away. For one thing, it would have created a fight in a convention crying out for unity, and more important, it would have frozen some senators on the Fortas side, including **Dirksen** and Hruska—although Griffin never figured to get **Dirksen**.

...

Dirksen started to hedge in mid-summer—although they never figured he'd make a complete turn. They knew they were having real bite.

...

Indeed, **Dirksen** went so far as to suggest that it wasn't really a filibuster,

that only 25 hours of debate had been taken on the Fortas nomination.

That's nonsense of course. ...

END

October 4, 1968

MacNeil to Time, Nation

ADD Fortas

Context

The report covered the final stages of the Senate debate on the nomination of Abe Fortas as chief justice of the United States.

Lead Paragraph

Some time back, Charlie Halleck sent word to **Everett Dirksen** over in the Senate: don't under-rate Bob Griffin. **Dirksen's** first instincts were to do so. He mocked the opposition to Fortas. But on mature thought, **Dirksen** changed his mind, and finally giving the matter full in-depth consideration, **Dirksen** joined the Griffin group.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

Griffin had nicked **Dirksen** before. Back last year, **Dirksen** offered an anti-busing amendment to a bill. Griffin, who doesn't cotton to racism, offered an amendment to that amendment, which **Dirksen** himself described as gutting it.

In the end, **Dirksen** withdrew his amendment rather than be defeated by Griffin on the Senate floor.

Dirksen, of course, knows Griffin's career in the House. As a very new man, a mere second term, he co-sponsored the Landrum-Griffin labor bill and won. To hold the spot as the Republican sponsor, he had to fight off a much senior and anti-labor colleague—and Halleck threw the ball to Griffin, keeping the other Republicans off him.

...

Dirksen, as we've cited, ran off with the excuse that he had to "protest" the Court's decision in the Witherspoon case, about which he apparently knew nothing until last week's Wednesday. Then, after the vote, he came up with another lulu:

"I might have voted for cloture," he wheedled, "if there had been adequate discussion. There was [sic] only 25 hours of discussion. This is not a filibuster. Who'd call 25 hours of discussion a filibuster?"

He was asked also whether he thought the Senate vote hurt the Supreme Court.

"Well," he said, "it wasn't improved any."

Neither was he. He's been shaky throughout this Congress, getting out on wrong slants from his party, as on the consular treaty and then having to switch 180 degrees. And he's obviously concerned about the implications of the Fortas case for his own leadership of the party.

We don't see much chance of the younger members, who led the Fortas fight, trying to depose **Dirksen** in January—although there's that kind of gossip around the Senate cloakrooms.

There are two reasons why we doubt it:

1) **Dirksen** is 72—he'll be 73 on January 4. He's not well and hasn't been for years. There's personal cruelty in kicking a guy out, and it strains the party's members to the breaking point, leaving salt-infested wounds. Better then to let nature take its course: it won't be long.

2) There's a key leadership slot open—the job as party whip. **Dirksen's** friend Hruska wants it, and the job carries the added prestige of being the stepping stone right into the floor leadership. What we expect is that the youngsters like Griffin, Baker and the others will mount a campaign for that job, get their own man into it—and then he'll be the party leader when **Dirksen** gives way.

At the moment, none of the key senators who would be in such a fight are willing even to talk off-record about this. They want to wait until after Election Day to decide what to do. They assume that there will be a considerable number of new young Republican senators in the 91st Senate—and they'll have to assess them before they pick their candidate for the party whip's job and make their move.

In any event, it will be an indirect but painful slap at **Dirksen** if and when it comes, because it will mean that the activist bloc in his party is making the choice, not him. But it won't be so sharp a slap that he won't be able to find another "Witherspoon" to explain why he favored the bloc's candidate all along.

END

October 24, 1968

MacNeil to Time, World

The 91st Senate—Take II

Context

MacNeil typically evaluated Congress periodically. This particular report provided an overview of the second session of the 91st Congress about two weeks before the 1968 presidential and congressional elections. One theme the reporter explored was the potential ideological movement of the Senate “somewhat to the right, but still leaving it moderately liberal.”

Lead Paragraph

Thus we end up by this figuring with a Senate composed of 59 Democrats, 41 Republicans. One Democrat is gaining a Republican seat—liberal Cranston for liberal Tommy Kuchel. Five Republicans are grabbing Democratic seats—in Alaska, where a conservative replaces a liberal dove; in Florida, where a conservative Republican replaces a conservative Democrat; in Maryland, where a conservative Republican replaces a wishy-washy Democrat; in Arizona, where a conservative replaces a moderate; and in Oregon, when a moderate replaces a liberal.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

This [an increase in liberal-moderate Republican senators] could spell trouble for the Senate’s conservative Republicans who want to claim the No. 2 leadership spot, the party’s whip, for one of their own. It would even make **Dirksen** a little nervous, as he’s been all fall about his own leadership post.

...

END

January 3, 1969

MacNeil to Time, Nation

Teddy Kennedy Cover—Take IV

Context

MacNeil reported on the new Congress as part of a larger story on political changes wrought by the 1968 elections which saw Richard Nixon win the presidency. Senator Ted Kennedy was rumored to be interested in running for Senate Democratic whip.

Lead Paragraph

“Senator Mansfield is a jewel to work with,” rumbled **Everett Dirksen**, the Senate’s Republican leader.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Both **Dirksen** and Ford privately express their willingness to accept Democratic votes from any quarter—the more the merrier—even though **Dirksen** tends to be more pragmatic and tough in talking about a revitalization of the old powerful coalition of the Republicans and the southern Democrats. Ford prefers to stick formally and publicly and privately with John McCormack.

As minority leaders, they have an agonizing problem if they intend, as they do, to enact whatever the Nixon program may be. Presumably it will be somewhat conservative, if not quite conservative, and they are counting on John McCormack and Mike Mansfield to provide the necessary “responsible” and “constructive” Democrats to pass these programs.

...

END

January 3, 1969

MacNeil to Time Nation

Teddy Kennedy Cover—Take V

Context

MacNeil prepared this report, and others in early January, for *Time's* January 10, 1969, cover feature on Senator Ted Kennedy.

Lead Paragraph

Teddy Kennedy, unlike either of his brothers, is really a United States senator. The matter is significant, for the world is assuming that somehow, some way, his push to grab the job of party whip in the Senate relates to a convoluted effort to run for president.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

He [Kennedy] got caught on the Morrissey nomination, one that the boys in the Senate understood he'd been trapped into as a matter of family loyalty—and forgave. But more than that, his withdrawal of the nomination showed courage—and **Dirksen** himself stepped forward (and **Dirksen** had led the fight against Morrissey) to congratulate the youngest Kennedy brother.

...

END

January 4, 1969

MacNeil to Time, Nation

Teddy Kennedy Cover—Take XI

Context

MacNeil prepared several reports in early January, for *Time's* January 10, 1969, cover feature on Senator Ted Kennedy. In this report, MacNeil described the plight of congressional Republicans now that one of their own, Richard Nixon, was soon to occupy the White House. Although the report focused on House Republicans, **Dirksen** rated a single mention.

Lead Paragraph

The Republicans in Congress are confronted with a new reality and a new role, as are the Democrats.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

A major point, of course, is that all the Republican leaders in Congress—even **Dirksen**—have shrunk a little since the election of Richard Nixon. That's the natural law of American presidential-congressional politics.

...

END

May 7, 1969

MacNeil to Time Nation

ABM—Take II

Context

Buried in a lengthy report on congressional consideration of deploying an Anti-Ballistic Missile system proposed by the Nixon administration, was a reference to **Dirksen's** role in defeating repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act.

Lead Paragraph

The struggle over ABM and its deployment, as faithfully reported in the public prints, has pitted the Vietnam doves and constituent-worried members of the U.S. Senate against the hawks in the Nixon administration, specifically the president and his secretary of defense.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

Actually, that is not so, for McCormack is acting on a different theory than the theory of giving the ABM a psychological lift in the House. He's the leader of all the House Democrats, and he wants the Senate to act first to spare his Democratic troopers in the House from unnecessarily hurting themselves by the first vote in the House.

"We were sold that argument on 14(b)," one Democratic House leader said.

That's shorthand for the fight a couple of years back on section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act—the so-called right-to-work law. The House did approve it. Only to have the measure killed in the Senate by **Dirksen's** filibuster.

...

END

June 6, 1969

MacNeil to Time Nation

Press Investigations of Dirksen

Context

MacNeil reported on three investigations of **Dirksen's** financial and ethical dealings. His report is reproduced in its entirety.

Lead Paragraph

In the wake of *Life Magazine's* spectacular journalistic coup, correspondents all over Washington have been looking to find a similar and susceptible target. The one that has come up into the sights of at least three major news organizations is **Everett McKinley Dirksen**, the Republican leader of the Senate.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

There are at least three outfits now investigating **Dirksen**: 1) *Newsweek*. *Newsweek's* one-time White House correspondent, Charles Roberts, now on special assignment, has spent the last month and a half trying to find **Dirksen's** hand in the till (not for use, but fyi only, we are tipped *Newsweek* is uttering Roberts's findings on **Dirksen** in this week's issue).

2) Hearst's Washington bureau. Leslie H. Whitten, Jr., a tough and able reporter, has been working for several weeks on a slightly different bent with **Dirksen**. Whitten is convinced that **Dirksen's** primary motive in life is not money, but power, and he has been scrounging through the Washington and Chicago political-financial underworld trying to tag **Dirksen's** various nefarious carryings-on there.

3) The *Chicago Daily News* Washington bureau. A task force has been under way on **Dirksen** for approximately three weeks. It has been concentrating on campaign contributions to the senator as well as his law practice in Peoria and his interventions with the regulatory agencies.

Thus far only Whitten has cut loose in print with anything on the senator. On Thursday night, May 29, Whitten moved on Hearst wires out of Washington a lengthy story detailing the bizarre (to say the least) shenanigans of Harold E. Rainville, **Dirksen's** political agent in Chicago. Please see that story for details. In effect, Rainville used **Dirksen's** name for his own improper operations with a Chicago bank.

Dirksen, in the best of good humor and full of fun, at least on the outside, has himself seized considerable of the initiative in the present journalistic campaign to get him. A week ago last Monday, May 26, **Dirksen** came out on the Senate floor

a few minutes before the Noon meeting hour to see Senate reporters who normally congregate at his and Mike Mansfield's desks to get the latest word on the Senate's business. **Dirksen**, in a loud voice for all to hear, braced Samuel Shaffer, *Newsweek's* congressional correspondent, on the *Newsweek* investigation of his activities. Shaffer, who had not been informed by his Washington office that the investigation was underway, was thunderstruck.

With Hearst, **Dirksen** himself did not act to take the initiative, but some of his friends did. Roy Cohn, a longtime friend of **Dirksen's** from his investigatory days with Joe McCarthy and currently under indictment (please hard check), was connected with the Mercantile National Bank in Whitten's story about Rainville's shenanigans. Cohn telephoned Richard Berlin, the top Hearst man in New York, to try and get the story killed. Berlin did precisely that. Berlin, deeply worried about the failing newspaper bill which would exempt newspapers from anti-trust laws, was fearful of offending the immensely influential **Everett Dirksen**.

Berlin telephoned William Theis, Hearst's Washington bureau chief, with the order to kill the story. Theis, a tough and veteran Washington correspondent, screamed his objections, but he was forced to send the kill order over Hearst's wires.

Meanwhile, over in Baltimore, the Hearst newspaper there had routinely made the story available to the Associated Press. The A.P. moved the story, crediting Hearst with a copyright. The jig was up, and the Hearst people then withdrew the kill order and also made the story available to United Press International.

The Hearst people here are operating under self-imposed maximum secrecy on the whole awkward and embarrassing backstage finaglings in their own shop. But **Dirksen** has no such compunctions. At a party Wednesday night given by Tommy Kuchel, onetime assistant to **Dirksen** as floor leader of the Senate, heralding the opening of Kuchel's new law partnership, **Dirksen** fairly chortled with glee at the maneuver to kill the Hearst story, giving details. He didn't have them all right, because he thought the Hearst story had been killed and that Theis had secretly leaked the story to UPI where Theis used to work as Senate Gallery chief. Not so.

Dirksen went on to regale a number of people at the crowded reception for Kuchel with the stories coming back to him on *Newsweek's* abortive effort to catch him in a[n] indiscretion.

He told, for example, about *Newsweek* checking with a Chicago bank to find out how much of that institution's stock the senator owned. The bank's reply: None. Another *Newsweek* failure, which amused **Dirksen**, was an attempt to extract from a corporation the presumably heavy fees **Dirksen** had been receiving. With great glee, **Dirksen** went back year after year on what the corporation official told *Newsweek*: Last year: none. Year before: none. Year before that: none. Year before that: none. Year before that: \$100. **Dirksen** could not hide his amusement.

The *Daily News*, as far as we know from here, has not as yet published anything on its investigation of **Dirksen**. It has found that **Dirksen's** record-keeping (done by his wife) on campaign contributions is unusually sloppy, with entries that seem obvious confusions and in error. But not anything more than mere sloppy. The Hearst people in this area, and presumably the *Daily News* also, have been trying to run down the legislative relationships between the generous donors of campaign contributions, such as airlines, and Mr. **Dirksen**. What they have found we do not know.

As we see it, there is little likelihood that any of the investigations of **Dirksen** now under way will prove much more than that he has been extremely high-handed in dealing as a senator with such as the regulatory agencies. This he has done, and the investigative reporters are pinning some of this down. Our own feeling about **Dirksen** is that he has not been on the take at any point in his congressional career. He lives a drone's life, working morning, Noon and night on Senate business and gives no indications (the way Tom Dodd did) that he is a big spender. He lives in a \$55,000 to \$60,000 house—fully paid—in Leesburg, Va., and he owns a Florida vacation retreat of no great pretensions. It is a house worth approximately \$25,000 to \$30,000 in a middle class community (DeBary) and he has a \$15,000 mortgage on it. His travel needs are provided by the Senate, with a huge limousine plus chauffeur. He is careless about food and clothing, and his only real treat in the working day is what he calls “the usual,” a large stiff drink of bourbon and water.

The senator himself loves to give the impression, as he has done for years, that he is something of a rascal. And his office is a regular calling place of just about every lobbyist, including the smelly ones, in town. But all the indications we have are that the only real money coming to **Dirksen** on a political-legislative basis are the campaign contributions, and these we believe **Dirksen** has carefully segregated from his own money.

END

June 20, 1969

MacNeil to Time, Nation

McCarthy Story—Goodell-Dirksen—Take IV

CONTEXT

After New York Senator Charles Goodell called **Dirksen** an “obstructionist” for opposing parts of the Nixon administration’s program, including the new president’s nominations (chiefly John Knowles to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare), the two senators engaged in a back-and-forth of charges and countercharges. This report is reproduced in its entirety.

Lead Paragraph

On Wednesday afternoon, a little nervously, Senator Charles Goodell of New York took the Senate floor to belabor **Everett Dirksen**. It was the third flurry of small arms fire between the two, and so far neither has waited to see the whites of the other fellow’s eyes before opening up.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

A few weeks ago, in Toronto, Canada, at a news conference, Goodell described **Dirksen** as an “obstructionist.” Unfortunately, Goodell’s word fell unrecorded, and so his press man here telephoned around until he got the word in print.

Dirksen, when he read it, didn’t like it, and he took the occasion of a Senate Republican policy lunch to reply (on which we memoed a fortnight back.) **Dirksen** ticked off the Nixon appointees whom he has opposed and claimed he was defending the president’s best interests in so doing, and followed with a long list of the Nixon legislation he was supporting—pointedly comparing his record here against Goodell’s.

Goodell was absent from that policy committee meeting, but he gained points by **Dirksen’s** half-hour attack. If nothing else, the **Dirksen** reply to Goodell got publicity for the original charge—and publicity is what Goodell needs and wants.

On his own part, **Dirksen’s** attack on Goodell, if it helped Goodell outside the Senate, hurt Goodell inside the Senate.

For there, inside the Senate, Goodell has been steadily going downhill. Appointed to the Senate last year by Governor Rockefeller, Goodell has but a tenuous handle on the job, for he has no real political base in New York state.

An upstate conservative, Goodell has been desperately trying to crack the New York City voting blocs for a year—and not doing well. He has abruptly

discovered Israel, Biafra, and liberalism generally, but until he wrangled with **Dirksen** he has not been able to score with that coldly indifferent crowd, the New York City electorate.

He has gone so far as to become the foremost in support of John Lindsay for mayor—trying to tie his political kite to that liberal Republican who did crack the New Yorkers. Among his Republican senators, for example, Goodell circulated a petition of support for Lindsay, neglecting to tell some of his colleagues that Lindsay was engaged in a primary fight. One, Bob Dole of Kansas, even complained that Goodell put his name on his list of Lindsay backers without telling him.

In any event, Goodell this week moved to escalate his battle with **Dirksen** and the liberal publicity therefrom. He took up the flagging cause of Mr. Knowles, whose appointment as assistant HEW secretary **Dirksen** has been opposing.

Dr. John Knowles is a forthright, sometimes abrasive fellow opposed by the AMA [American Medical Association], and the political liberals in town have made his cause their own. **Dirksen** has seemed alone in opposing him—and therefore blocking his appointment—but **Dirksen** has the backing of almost all the Republicans in Congress, certainly all the conservative Republicans.

“I stand here now,” Goodell told the almost empty chamber, “as a matter of conscience, to oppose the leader of my party in the Senate.”

Goodell made the point that Nixon has the right to nominate whom he will and that the Senate should debate any such nomination on its merits. He argued that **Dirksen** was frustrating the normal operations of free government and shaking the ultimate strength of American democracy.

He challenged **Dirksen** to let the Senate vote on the matter. Actually the nomination has not been made—he was really challenging **Dirksen** to let the president make the nomination. That, of course, doesn’t quite scour—and, as we shall suggest below, there’s more involved here that meets the casual eye.

Dirksen, who had been given an advance copy of Goodell’s speech—as had everyone else in town—stayed off the Senate floor while Goodell spoke. At the policy committee lunch in which he laced Goodell, incidentally, he had suggested that anyone making charges against the leadership should make them on the Senate floor—not in far off places (like Toronto.)

Dirksen, however, has no great desire to fight Goodell. “I wish him well,” he said the other day privately of Goodell’s desperate maneuvers to win renomination and election to the Senate next year—although he declined to say that he was willing to serve as Goodell’s punching bag for that purpose.

The old man doesn't believe in Republicans cutting up Republicans—at least in public. Before Goodell spoke in midafternoon, **Dirksen** ran into him in the Republican cloakroom and he let his annoyance show. He reminded Goodell of “the considerable clout” he, **Dirksen**, had in the Senate—and idly suggested that he might not get around to answering Goodell until next year, i.e., when he could hurt him most.

Goodell's tactic in attacking **Dirksen**, of course, is part and parcel of his overall strategy of switching from an arch conservative to a flaming liberal. (His conservatism had the grace that he wasn't pious about it, as he is with his liberalism now.) It is a desperate maneuver, primarily, in that he has all but totally alienated the conservative backers he had in upstate New York in the gamble to crack the liberal voters downstate.

“He'll never be elected,” one conservative Republican leader of Congress said this week. “If he's not beaten in the primary, he'll be beaten in the fall. The Republicans just won't put up money for him.”

That, actually, was what **Dirksen** was talking about when he talked of his “clout”—**Dirksen** has the handle on the GOP campaign fund spigot, and he can turn it on and off.

Dirksen didn't reply to Goodell on the floor, (nor did anyone else), presumably on the old congressional theory that you don't get into a peeing contest with a skunk. But Goodell has about run out of gas with **Dirksen** and the Senate apparatus.

Some of the Republican senators are annoyed with him for using them in his campaign to identify with Lindsay. The conservatives are annoyed at his defection to liberalism, and the liberals are mighty unhappy at his too obvious politically-motivated shift to their camp.

“You know how he performed in the House,” a liberal Republican senator said of Goodell as a member of the House of Representatives. “He was in full cry with the conservatives. This is too transparent. People don't change their spots.”

Senator Javits tries to justify Goodell's course. He believes that whatever Goodell is now losing with his one-time conservative backers in upstate New York he can win back later on. Javits, who has made the bridge in New York's divided constituency, concedes that the reaction to Goodell in upstate New York has been “very adverse.” But he realizes also Goodell's problem with that New York City vote.

“He's got to deal with New York City's lack of knowledge of him,” Javits said.

How does he crack New York City?

“Only by becoming a character who appeals to them,” Javits replied. “It can be done, but you have to appeal to their sensibilities.”

Goodell is trying, but there are Republicans here who now doubt whether he can even be nominated by the party next year.

As for the reality of **Dirksen** blocking the Knowles appointment, **Dirksen** in effect has been winking and grimacing at his colleagues and friends, in effect hinting that he’s up to the chore of doing Nixon’s dirty work, taking the heat for defeating a nomination to high executive office really at the president’s private urging.

He has done that in other cases, notably with Driver at the Veterans Administration. In that instance, Nixon told a meeting of the congressional Republican leaders that he was “committed” to Driver—in response to documentary evidence that Driver had used the VA’s facilities last year to forward the Humphrey-Muskie cause.

“I’ll uncommit you,” **Dirksen** whispered to Nixon.

“I don’t care,” Nixon whispered back.

And **Dirksen**, thus prompted, went ahead and drove Driver out of the VA.

We’re told by inside Republican Senate sources—not **Dirksen**—that the same thing is underway now on Knowles. That Nixon really doesn’t want Knowles, but doesn’t want to take the blame for vetoing him. Therefore: **Dirksen’s** ploy.

“There’s more to it than meets the eye,” a Republican senator (NFA: Baker) with close White House connections tells us. “It’s like the Driver thing. The old man wouldn’t have gone so far out on this without some understanding with the president.”

END

June 29, 1969

MacNeil to Time, Nation

Foreign Policy—Take II

Context

MacNeil reported on Senate Resolution 85 to express the “sense” of the Senate in order to restore balance between Congress and the president with regard to foreign policy. He contrasted that action with Senate consideration of the Bricker amendment in the 1950s. **Dirksen**’s name appeared in the concluding paragraph.

Lead Paragraph

On Wednesday night, the Senate voted 70 to 16 for a resolution which its sponsors believe significantly restores to the Senate part of its long-eroding powers in foreign affairs.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

...

There were few of the old advocates of the Bricker amendment still in the Senate. Bricker himself was defeated a decade ago. But **Everett Dirksen** had been an ardent champion of the Bricker amendment, and so was Barry Goldwater. They were among the 16 who voted “no.”

END

September 11, 1969

MacNeil to Time Nation

Dirksen—An Appraisal

Context

Following **Dirksen's** death, MacNeil offered a retrospective. His report is reproduced in its entirety.

Lead Paragraph

Everett McKinley Dirksen was a man of striking and often confusing contrasts, and even those of us who knew him long and intimately, often had difficulty fathoming his motives and his purposes.

Dirksen-Related Excerpt

Much of the public man was deliberately contrived, and Senator **Dirksen** himself freely conceded as much—the frowzy, tousled hair; the unmade-bed look of his clothes; the incredible, sepulchral voice; the stylized postures he assumed on the Senate floor.

He was a consummate actor, and he was on stage always.

At times he played the buffoon, and his capacity for self-mockery and self-ridicule were unmatched in national politics. At other times, with equal zest, he cast himself as the villain, the deliberate rascal, and he seemed to take a private pleasure in the outrage he thus fomented.

This play-acting of his, often beguiling and amusing, made him the more difficult to understand. But he was not a fool nor a scoundrel. From his first days in Washington in 1933 until his death last week, his primary concern went to the heart of public policy.

Up before dawn every morning, he worked with an intensity and earnestness that carried him frequently beyond the point of exhaustion. He enjoyed work as other men enjoy ease. He read dreary committee reports and hearings as other men read novels.

He constantly quoted the Bible, “the Big Book,” as he called it, but he was no moralist, as he himself often said. He was a legislator and proud of his parliamentary prowess. He believed in compromise. He had a legislator’s tolerance of other men’s views.

He believed in flexibility, but he was not as flexible as he pretended nor as other men tried to paint him. Like every good legislator, he was infinitely patient.

Dirksen loved the theatricals of politics—the Senate floor, the platform of a political convention, even the head-table at a Kiwanis Club lunch, wherever he could find a credulous audience. Then he could let out the stops of his steam-boat gothic rhetoric.

Even more, however, he loved the collisions of politics—in the committee sessions, in the back rooms with the smoke thick and heady and the whiskey pouring freely, where the decisions were made.

Despite his rough-and-tumble ways as a politician, his tough talk and often abrasive manner, he was a man of marked sensitivity. He shrank from inflicting pain. As a boy, he would not go hunting with the other fellows. As a senator, even in the most bruising of debates, he avoided the personal thrust.

When he first came to the Senate in 1951, when I first met him, he suffered from the pretentiousness that sometimes affects new senators. He was intensely ambitious, and he draped his senatorial toga about his shoulders in the Roman manner.

Winning the leadership of his party in 1959 slaked his ambition, and the passing years faded his ostentation. At the core, he was an engaging, immensely likable man. He did not see opponents as enemies nor did he see friends as merely allies.

His instincts were generous. If he could help, he would. He did not hesitate to step in quietly and show a frustrated freshman, Democrat or Republican, how to unravel himself from a tangle in the Senate's rules. He treated the Senate's hired help as people, not menials.

He had no use for press agents or ghost writers, and there was neither on his staff. He took pride in the claim that he never (or almost never) doctored his speeches before they appeared in the *Congressional Record*. He looked down on his colleagues who could not parse a sentence on their feet.

Dirksen had the capacity to endure the impositions of others on him. In my own case, over the years, he submitted to private session after private session to explain himself and his actions, normally answering with revealing candor but never questioning how his confidences would be treated.

It was his fate to spend almost all of his 35 years in the minority in Congress. Such a frustration has soured other men, but it did not unduly ruffle **Dirksen**. As with so much in life, he made the best of it, and no member of the minority Republican Party had greater impact on the legislation of these Democratic years.

Only the rare Republican has managed to have even a minor bill of his authorship approved, but **Dirksen** had the unique distinction of writing some of the great landmark laws of our times, including the civil rights acts of 1964, 1965, and 1968.

They were the rewards for his unflagging efforts to prove himself an effective legislator. His boyish enthusiasm for each new day, his buoyant good spirits, and his zest for life and work were not contrived.

And as a result, the world gained something by his living, and it lost something when he died.

(Note: the title of my biography of Dirksen is “Senator Dirksen: Portrait of a Public Man.” It will be published this coming winter by World Publishing Co.)

END